Kolbe v. NSR Marts, Inc.
| Docket Number | Civil Action 23-1482-PJM |
| Decision Date | 05 September 2023 |
| Parties | HEATHER A. KOLBE, Plaintiff, v. NSR MARTS, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Heather A. Kolbe has sued her former employer, NSR Marts, Inc. (“NSR”), for alleged violations of the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601, el seq., and intentional infliction of emotional distress. NSR has filed a Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 5), which has been fully briefed by both sides. Based on the parties' submissions (ECF Nos. 5, 9, 12), the Court finds that no hearing is necessary. See D. Md. Local R. 105.6. For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS the Motion and DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Kolbe's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and portions of her FMLA claim. The Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Kolbe's FMLA interference claim based on NSR's alleged misrepresentations of her rights and responsibilities under the Act and will grant her twenty (20) days to file an amended complaint that addresses the Court's concerns as set forth below.
From August 17, 2020 until August 10, 2022, NSR employed Kolbe as an assistant manager at its Accokeek, Maryland location. ECF No. 2 ¶¶ 7, 18, 29.
On September 18, 2021, Kolbe was involved in a car accident that resulted in injuries that affected her ability to perform some job functions. Id. ¶ 8. That same day, she requested FMLA leave from NSR, which granted her request. Id. ¶ 9-11.
On October 14, 2021, Kolbe provided a medical certification to NSR explaining that she could return to work but only with “light duty restrictions.” Id. ¶ 13. She requested reinstatement with those restrictions. Id. ¶ 14. She says that the requested restrictions “presented no undue burden” for NSR but that NSR nevertheless refused to reinstate her with those restrictions, claiming that “no light duty work was available.” Id. ¶¶ 14-15. .
At some point thereafter, Kolbe observed another NSR employee with a “sling around her . arm.” Id. ¶ 16. This was the same accommodation that Kolbe says she requested. Id. She also alleges that “during her employer-approved medical leave,” NSR offered her job “to at least one” of her coworkers. Id. ¶ 18.
Kolbe says that she communicated with NSR “bi-weekly” about her recovery and her anticipated return to work, but that during her FMLA leave and for several months thereafter NSR “continued to accept updates” about her recovery while at the same time “refusing to provide information regarding her employment status and return to service,” instead offering only “vague assurances” about her return. Id. ¶¶ 17, 19, 22-23. Kolbe characterizes these communications as NSR “actively misleading” her as to her employment status, and says that at one point during her leave, NSR offered to transfer her to its Charlotte Hall Maryland location. Id. ¶¶ 20, 23.
NSR notified Kolbe of her termination on August 10 2022.[1] Id. ¶ 22. Kolbe says that NSR invited her to re-apply to other open positions when it terminated her employment. Id.
Kolbe's Complaint proceeds in two counts against NSR: violation of the FMLA (Count I) and intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count II). She seeks $500,000 m damages, which includes the wages she claims she would have received had she been reinstated ($38,000), plus an amount attributable to her IIED claim ($472,867.26), plus costs for the mental health counseling that was allegedly necessitated by NSR's conduct ($4,667.26). She also seeks attorney's fees and costs.
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege enough facts to state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is facially plausible when the facts alleged allow a court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. A complaint is properly dismissed where, even if true, the allegations “could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007). The court must examine the complaint as a whole, accept all well-pled facts as true, and must construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Davidson Cnty., 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir. 2005). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
In its Motion, NSR contends that Kolbe has failed to state a claim that it violated the FMLA or intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon her.
The FMLA entitles qualified employees to take up to twelve weeks of leave if they are afflicted with a serious health condition and provides that those employees are to be “restored .. . to the position of employment held by the employee when the leave commenced,” or to “an equivalent position with equivalent employment benefits, pay, and other terms and conditions of employment.” 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1)(A)-(B). The FMLA makes it unlawful for employers to either (1) interfere with an employee's exercise of their rights under the Act or (2) discharge, discriminate, or retaliate against an employee for exercising those rights. Id. § 2615(a); see Yashenko v. Harrah's NC Casino Co., LLC, 446 F.3d 541, 546 (4th Cir. 2006).
NSR argues that Kolbe's Complaint fails to specify whether she pursues a claim for FMLA interference or retaliation. ECF No. 5-1 at 4. In either case, NSR contends that Kolbe's Complaint fails to state a claim under the FMLA. See id. In her opposition, Kolbe frames her FMLA claim exclusively through the lens of retaliation. See ECF No. 9-1. Although the Court could treat Kolbe's failure to address NSR's interference arguments as an abandonment of any interference claim, see Ferdinand-Davenport v. Children's Guild, 742 F.Supp.2d 772, 777 (D. Md. 2010), the Court will not do so and instead will consider whether she has sufficiently pled either an interference or retaliation claim.
“To make out an ‘interference' claim under the FMLA, an employee must.. . demonstrate that (1) [s]he is entitled to an FMLA benefit; (2) [her] employer interfered with the provision of that benefit; and (3) that interference caused harm.” Adams v. Anne Arundel Cnty. Pub. Sch., 789 F.3d 422, 427 (4th Cir. 2015).
The parties do not dispute that Kolbe was entitled to FMLA benefits. Nor do they dispute that Kolbe did, in fact, take FMLA leave, so that any interference by NSR cannot be based on the denial of such leave. See id. Instead, the Court's inquiry is guided by the purpose of an interference claim, which is “‘to permit a court to inquire into matters such as whether an employee would have exercised his or her FMLA rights in the absence of the employer's actions.'” Id. (quoting Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 89 (2002)).
Kolbe's Complaint includes three allegations that, charitably, may be read as claiming interference. These are based on NSR's supposed (1) failure to accommodate her request for light-duty restrictions; (2) failure to reinstate her upon the expiration of her FMLA leave when she required light-duty restrictions; and (3) continued correspondence with Kolbe about her recovery, upon which she claims she reasonably relied to her detriment instead of returning to work at the end of her twelve weeks of leave. As will be explained, the first two of these three allegations do not state a claim for FMLA interference as a matter of law. While as currently pled, the third allegation fails to state an interference claim, unlike the first two, Kolbe's pleading deficiencies could conceivably be cured by an amended complaint.
First, Kolbe alleges that NSR violated her FMLA rights by failing to accommodate her request for light-duty accommodations upon her return to work. The Court rejects this claim as a matter of law. The FMLA confers no right or benefit on an employee to be accommodated by an employer upon his or her reinstatement. Instead, the Act entitles a qualified employee to be reinstated to the same position he or she held prior to leave, or to an “equivalent position with equivalent employment benefits, pay, and other terms and conditions of employment.” 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1)(A)-(B). Indeed, the Act's implementing regulations suggest that an employee who cannot perform “an essential function” of his or her job because of a serious health condition has no right to restoration to their original position or an equivalent one. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.216(c). Although an employer would be obligated to provide reasonable accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) or other laws,[2] an employer is not required to do so under the FMLA. See id. Simply put, NSR's failure to accommodate Kolbe's request for light-duty restrictions is irrelevant to her FMLA rights, as is NSR's supposed inconsistent conduct in providing such accommodations to another NSR employee but not Kolbe. See Ensor v. Jenkins, No. ELH-20-1266, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41701, at *59-60 (D. Md. Mar. 8, 2022) (collecting cases). Therefore, the Court will dismiss with prejudice Kolbe's FMLA claim to the extent that it is premised on a failure to accommodate.
Second Kolbe alleges that NSR failed to reinstate her to her previously held position of assistant manager upon the expiration of her twelve-week leave. This can be understood as an alleged interference with her right to reinstatement under 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1)(A). However, the Complaint fails to allege that Kolbe sought to be reinstated in her assistant manager position at the end of her FMLA leave. At most, Kolbe says she informed NSR mid-way...
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