Kotz v. Bank
Decision Date | 24 March 2010 |
Docket Number | No. 04-09-00433-CV.,04-09-00433-CV. |
Citation | 319 S.W.3d 54 |
Parties | Carole O. KOTZ, Appellant,v.IMPERIAL CAPITAL BANK, et al., Appellees. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Gary M. Poenisch, Attorney At Law, San Antonio, TX, for Appellant.
Stephen C. Stapleton, Scott R. Meyer, Cowles & Thompson, P.C., Dallas, TX, Daniel A. Foster, Attorney At Law, Arlington, TX, Frank Oliver, Oliver & Oliver, P.C., Austin, TX, Troy “Trey” S. Martin, III, Martin, Cukjati & Richman, L.L.P., San Antonio, TX, for Appellees.
Sitting: CATHERINE STONE, Chief Justice, PHYLIS J. SPEEDLIN, Justice, REBECCA SIMMONS, Justice.
Carole Kotz brings this interlocutory appeal from the trial court's order granting a temporary injunction enjoining her from taking or attempting to take possession of certain commercial real estate, communicating with any tenants of the property, or receiving any rents from the tenants currently occupying the premises under leases held by Patrick Man and Grace Man. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(4) (Vernon 2008). Kotz contends the temporary injunction order is void because it does not detail why irreparable injury will occur if the temporary injunction is not granted. We agree.
In relevant part, Rule 683 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an “order granting an injunction ... shall set forth the reasons for its issuance[.]” Tex.R. Civ. P. 683. The Texas Supreme Court “interpret[s] the Rule to require in this respect only that the order set forth the reasons why the court deems it proper to issue the writ to prevent injury to the applicant in the interim; that is, the reasons why the court believes the applicant's probable right will be endangered if the writ does not issue.” Transp. Co. of Tex. v. Robertson Transps., Inc., 152 Tex. 551, 261 S.W.2d 549, 553 (Tex.1953); State v. Cook United, Inc., 464 S.W.2d 105, 106 (Tex.1971) (). The trial court must set forth specific reasons, not merely conclusory statements, in the order granting temporary injunctive relief. Tex.R. Civ. P. 683 (); accord Charter Med. Corp. v. Miller, 547 S.W.2d 77, 78 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1977, no writ). The procedural requirements of Rule 683 are mandatory, and an order granting a temporary injunction that fails to strictly comply with the rule is subject to being declared void and dissolved. Qwest Communications Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 24 S.W.3d 334, 337 (Tex.2000) (per curiam); InterFirst Bank San Felipe, N.A. v. Paz Constr. Co., 715 S.W.2d 640, 641 (Tex.1986) (per curiam).
In this case, the only part of the order that can be construed as setting forth the reasons for issuing the injunction reads as follows:
The Court finds that Intervenors Patrick Man and Grace Man will suffer irreparable injury in their possession and use of the Subject Property in the event that the requested injunctive relief is not granted, that they have no adequate remedy at law, and that the requested injunctive relief is necessary to preserve the status quo pending final trial.
We conclude this language does not comply with the requirements of Rule 683 because it does not provide specific reasons why injury will result in the absence of a temporary injunction. Merely stating that “irreparable injury will result” if injunctive relief is not granted does not comply with the specificity requirements of Rule 683. See
Indep. Capital Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Collins, 261 S.W.3d 792, 795-96 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.) (injunction order simply setting out elements necessary for relief, and failing to identify the injury from denial of the injunction, was conclusory and void); AutoNation, Inc. v. Hatfield, 186 S.W.3d 576, 581 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (mere recital of “irreparable harm” does not meet Rule 683's specificity requirements); Univ. Interscholastic League v. Torres, 616 S.W.2d 355, 358 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1981, no writ) (same).
Nor can we agree with the Mans that the additional verbiage, “[the Mans] will suffer irreparable injury in their possession and use of the Subject Property in the event that the requested injunctive relief is not granted ...” is sufficiently detailed to meet the requirements of Rule 683. (emphasis added). The trial court fails to set forth any underlying facts to support its finding that “irreparable injury in [the Mans'] possession and use of the Subject Property” will occur, making the court's finding conclusory. Arkoma Basin Exploration Co. v. FMF Associates 1990-A, Ltd., 249 S.W.3d 380, 389 n. 32 (Tex.2008) ( ). At most, this language characterizes by what means harm will occur unless Kotz is enjoined from taking possession and use of the subject property-but does not state or explain the reasons why irreparable injury will result absent an injunction. See Robertson Transps., 261 S.W.2d at 553 ( ). Compare Byrd Ranch, Inc. v. Interwest Sav. Ass'n, 717 S.W.2d 452, 454 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ) (it is inadequate under Rule 683 to simply state that “defendants are enjoined from doing X because X will be done unless so enjoined;” order must state with particularity why injury will result absent injunction) and Stoner v. Thompson, 553 S.W.2d 150, 151 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ( ) with Robertson Transps., 261 S.W.2d at 553 ( ) and IAC, Ltd. v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 160 S.W.3d 191, 200 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) (injunction set forth sufficient reasons for its issuance where order explicitly stated that Bell had shown that respondents had possession of Bell data entitled to trade secret protection and were actively using that data to compete with Bell in the replacement blade market, and respondents' blade would be priced lower than Bell's which would lead to “incalculable loss of business goodwill”) and Khaledi v. H.K. Global Trading, Ltd., 126 S.W.3d 273, 280 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.) (injunction order was adequate to support issuance where court stated that former business partner's failure to release and subordinate prevented companies and businessmen “from realizing the significant loan values in such unique properties” and significantly...
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