Kruger v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 15 September 1937
• Citation: 298 Mass. 124,10 N.E.2d 97
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
• Parties: KRUGER v. JOHN HANCOCK MUT. LIFE INS. CO. BLACKWELL v. SAME. JOHN HANCOCK MUT. LIFE INS. CO. v. BOSTON SAFE DEPOSIT & TRUST CO.

298 Mass. 124

10 N.E.2d 97

KRUGER

v.JOHN HANCOCK MUT. LIFE INS. CO.

BLACKWELL

v.SAME.

JOHN HANCOCK MUT. LIFE INS. CO.

v.BOSTON SAFE DEPOSIT & TRUST CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Sept. 15, 1937.

Report from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Pinanski, Judge.

Actions of contract by Joseph Kruger, administrator, against the John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, by Agnes K. Blackwell against the John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, and by the John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company against the Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Company, executor. On report by the superior court without a jury, which found for plaintiff in the first action in the sum of $448.11, and for the defendants in the other actions.

Judgment entered for the defendant in each action.J. Kruger, of Boston, pro se.

A. L. Hyland, of Boston, for John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.

J. Abbott, of Boston, for plaintiff Blackwell.

C. M. Rogerson, of Boston, for Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co.

DONAHUE, Justice.

The John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company on the application of Louise C. Pfaff, in 1902, issued a policy of insurance on her life. The policy provided that the insurer ‘does insure the life of Louise C. Pfaff * * * in the amount of Eight hundred Dollars, and promises to pay said amount * * * upon satisfactory proof of the death of said Insured, to her children, Gerard H. and Agnes K. Pfaff, in equal shares to each, if living, or to such other beneficiary as may, according to the conditions hereof, be finally designated and recognized by endorsement hereon; or if no beneficiary be then living, then to the executor of the said Insured. * * *’ The policy contained a provision reserving to the insured the right to change the beneficiary. The application for insurance which is attached to and made a part of the policy stated: ‘I hereby apply to the * * * Insurance Company * * * for insurance on my life * * * to the amount of $800.00 for the benefit of Gerard H. Pfaff & Agnes K. Pfaff, my two children, equally if living at my death, otherwise to my executor or administrator. * * *’ The words quoted above appearing in italics were inserted in writing on printed forms of policy and application in which the other words above quoted appear in print.

After the death of the insured which occurred in 1933 the insurer paid one half the proceeds of the policy to the named beneficiary Agnes and one half to the executor of the insured. The named beneficiary Gerard died intestate in 1925 leaving as his only heir at law and next of kin a minor son. The administrator of the estate of Gerard, who is the plaintiff in the first of these actions, contends that one half the proceeds of the policy should have been paid to him as administrator. The named beneficiary Agnes, who is the plaintiff in the second action, contends that she should have been paid the entire proceeds of the policy. The insurer brought the third action to recover from the executor of the will of the insured the amount of one half the proceeds of the policy paid by it to the executor, contending that in the event it is held that such payment should not have been made, the insurer is entitled to recover the amount of the payment on the ground that it was made under a mistake of fact.

The three actions were tried together before a judge of the Superior Court, sitting without jury, on a statement of agreed facts, the insurance policy, and the application for insurance. He found for the administrator of the estate of Gerard for the amount of one half the proceeds of the policy with interest, found for the defendants in other two actions, and reported the three cases for the determination of this court, ‘judgment to be entered in accordance with the stipulations contained in said ‘Statement of Agreed Facts.”

It is the contention of the administrator of the estate of the named beneficiary Gerard that his intestate took, upon the issuance of the policy, a vested interest which was not divested by the death of Gerard before the death of the insured. When the language of a life insurance policy expresses no other condition than a provision that the insured receives the right to change the beneficiaries, a named beneficiary takes a qualified vested interest which will be divested if the insured exercises the right reserved. Kochanek v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 262 Mass. 174, 177, 159 N.E. 520;Resnek v. Mutual Life Inc. Co. of New York, 286 Mass. 305, 308, 190 N.E. 603. But an insuredin creating an interest in a named beneficiary may attach thereto the condition that, upon the beneficiary not surviving the insured, the interest of the beneficiary shall terminate and thus not be transmissible to his legal representatives. Fuller v. Linzee, 135 Mass. 468, 470;Haskins v. Kendall, 158 Mass. 224, 227, 33 N.E. 495,35 Am.St.Rep. 490;Wilde v. Wilde, 209 Mass. 205, 208, 95 N.E. 295;Davis v. New York Life Ins. Co., 212 Mass. 310, 314, 98 N.E. 1043,41 L.R.A.(N.S.) 250;Hersam v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 225 Mass. 425, 427, 114 N.E. 711. The contention of the administrator of the estate of Gerard presents the question whether the policy in the present case expresses such a condition.

The policy states obligations of the insurer with respect to the payment of its proceeds after the death of the insured upon the happening of certain alternatively described contingencies. It first provides that the insurer must make such a payment to the two ‘ children’ of the insured, whose names are stated, ‘ in equal shares to each, if living. * * *’ The contingent words ‘ if living’ are to be given a meaning if that is reasonably possible. Maksymiuk v. Puceta, 279 Mass. 346, 353, 181 N.E. 388;Bray v. Hickman, 263 Mass. 409, 414, 161 N.E. 612. The natural construction of the limiting phrase ‘ if living’ is to apply it to the last antecedent, which is the word ‘ each.’ See Williams v. Old Colony Street Railway, 193 Mass. 305, 307, 79 N.E. 484;Hopkins v. Hopkins, 287 Mass. 542, 547, 192 N.E. 145, 95 A.L.R. 1286. Thus applied, the intent is indicated not only that a division of the...