Kuyper v. Stone County Com'n, 74442
| Decision Date | 22 September 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 74442,74442 |
| Citation | 838 S.W.2d 436 |
| Parties | Mary L. KUYPER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STONE COUNTY COMMISSION, Defendant-Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Robert L. Anderson, Kimberling, for plaintiff-appellant.
Robert B. Fuchs, Sikeston and Thomas W. Rynard and Terry C. Allen, Jefferson City, for defendant-respondent.
In this case we decide whether the county commission of a county of the third classification may alter the salary of a person hired by the county assessor after the start of the county's fiscal year. The trial court found that the Stone County Commission (the Commission) had authority to lower the salary of the assessor's new employee.
On review, the Court of Appeals, Southern District, examined its jurisdiction and determined that transfer to this Court was appropriate on two grounds. First, this Court has "exclusive appellate jurisdiction" over the case because it involves "the construction of the revenue laws of this state." Mo. Const. art. V, § 3. Second, the court of appeals entered an order transferring the case to this Court because of the general interest and importance of the authority of a county commission to control the expenditure of funds appropriated to the county assessor. The court of appeals did not render an opinion on the merits prior to entering its order of transfer.
We are obliged to consider our jurisdiction before proceeding. Jurisdiction, of course, is the authority of a court to hear and determine the controversy presented in a case. Sullenger v. Cooke Sales & Service Company, 646 S.W.2d 85, 88 (Mo. banc 1983).
The Supreme Court is a court of limited jurisdiction. The Constitution limits this Court's "exclusive appellate jurisdiction" to those categories of appeals listed in article V, section 3. Included within this Court's exclusive appellate jurisdiction are cases requiring "construction of the revenue laws of this state."
In transferring the appeal in this case, the court of appeals relied on cases of this Court holding that where the law in question is (1) a state law; (2) relates to the subject matter of revenue; (3) directly and primarily concerns revenues; and (4) relates to "the disbursement of the revenue and its preservation, as well as provisions relating to the assessment, levy, and collection of [revenue]," the law under scrutiny is a revenue law, and exclusive appellate jurisdiction to construe that law lies in this Court. State ex rel. Hadley v. Adkins, 221 Mo. 112, 119 S.W. 1091, 1093 (1909); accord State ex rel. Martin v. Childress, 345 Mo. 495, 134 S.W.2d 136, 138 (1939), and State ex rel. Strong v. Cribb, 364 Mo. 1122, 273 S.W.2d 246, 247 (1954). Without question, the court of appeals read the cited cases properly in determining whether to transfer the appeal to this Court.
In 1983, this Court decided Buechner v. Bond, 650 S.W.2d 611 (Mo. banc 1983). That case counsels:
[t]he words used in constitutional provisions are interpreted so as to give effect to their plain, ordinary and natural meaning. The plain, ordinary and natural meaning of words is that meaning which the people commonly understood the words to have when the provision was adopted. The commonly understood meaning of words is derived from the dictionary. [citations omitted.]
Id. at 613. Employing these canons of constitutional construction, Buechner defines "revenue" as Id.
Buechner's definition of revenue is consistent with the unambiguous text of the constitution granting this Court exclusive, though limited, appellate jurisdiction. The text of article V, section 3, limiting this Court's exclusive appellate jurisdiction to construction of "revenue" laws speaks to the seriousness with which the people of this state view the efforts of government to reach into their pockets and pocketbooks. By their unambiguous language, the people of this state intend their highest appellate court to determine the meaning and validity of laws by which the tax collector exacts tribute for the support of government. Had the people been as concerned with the expenditure of funds already properly within the state's coffers, the constitutional language would not have been limited to "revenue."
Section 50.540, RSMo 1986, 1 is at issue in this case. Section 50.540 does not authorize county government to impose or collect a tax. Instead, that section establishes a procedure by which county government may plan expenditures of anticipated tax funds collected pursuant to extant revenue laws. Section 50.540 does not authorize a tax, excise, custom, duty or other source of income; it is not a revenue law. Therefore, this case does not fall within this Court's exclusive appellate jurisdiction. To the extent that Adkins, Cribb and Childress follow a contrary reading of the constitution and, in so doing, expand this Court's jurisdiction beyond the plain meaning of article V, section 3, they are overruled.
The court of appeals also transferred the appeal to this Court as a matter of general interest or importance. Article V, section 10, permits the court of appeals, "after opinion," to transfer a case to this Court because of general interest or importance. An opinion is a "statement by a judge or court of the decision reached in regard to a cause tried or argued before them expounding the law as applied to the case, and detailing the reasons upon which the judgment is based." Black's Law Dictionary, 985 (5th ed. 1979). Rule 83.02 also permits the court of appeals to transfer "a case in which an opinion has been filed in the district of the court of appeals" to this Court "because of general interest or importance of a question involved in the case." Rule 83.02 and article V, section 10, are consistent, as they must be.
In this case, the court of appeals filed a memorandum of law and fact. That memorandum did not contain the court's judgment of the merits of the trial court's decision. The memorandum is not an opinion. The court of appeals' attempt to transfer the matter to this Court on the basis of general interest or importance fails under article V, section 10, and Rule 83.02 since the court of appeals did not render an opinion prior to entering its order of transfer.
This Court is without jurisdiction to consider the merits of the appellant's appeal in this case on the grounds set forth by the court of appeals. This Court may not obtain jurisdiction of the subject matter of this appeal by consent, waiver, or in the interest of judicial economy. We are mindful of cases of recent vintage in which this Court has retained cases before it in which it has no jurisdiction "as a matter of judicial economy." See, e.g., Pace v. City of Hannibal, 680 S.W.2d 944, 946 (Mo. banc 1984); State ex rel. Lack v. Melton, 692 S.W.2d 302, 304 (Mo. banc 1985); State v. Davis, 653 S.W.2d 167 (Mo. banc 1983); State v. Higgins, 592 S.W.2d 151 (Mo. banc 1979). The jurisdiction of this Court may not be expanded beyond its constitutional limits, even in the name of judicial economy. To the extent that cases of this Court hold otherwise, they, too, must be overruled.
Article V, section 10, permits this Court to order transfer of a case before opinion of the court of appeals "because of general interest or importance of a question involving the case." This case involves such an important question: Whether a county commission may determine the salary of a person hired by the county assessor with funds already budgeted to the assessor by the county commission. On our own motion, we transfer this case to this Court under article V, section 10, because of "the general interest or importance of a question involved in the case." The judgment of the trial court awarding appellant damages is reversed.
The Stone County Commission adopted a budget for the county's fiscal year 1989. That budget took effect on January 1, 1989. Section 50.010. Within that budget, the Commission appropriated funds for the operation of the county assessor's office and specifically for the payment of employees within that office. The assessor's budget as finally approved by the Commission included a line item appropriation for "Deputies-Clerks Salaries" in the amount of $83,840.00.
On February 21, 1989, Raper hired Kuyper as a full-time employee of the assessor's office and agreed to pay her $800 per month for the first month and $825 for each month thereafter. Raper's office submitted pay warrants to the county requesting checks to Kuyper in those amounts for February and March respectively.
That same day the Stone County Commission met and adopted a policy that "employees hired by the county for office clerical duties will be hired at $650 per month with no built-in raise." When the assessor submitted Kuyper's pay voucher on February 21 seeking $800 from the county, the county adjusted Kuyper's pay to $650 per month, presumably in accordance with the Commission's newly-adopted policy. Kuyper protested. Several meetings with the Commission followed. The Commission, however, refused to adjust Kuyper's pay. Kuyper sued the Commission to recover the difference between the salary Raper promised and the amount the Commission paid.
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