Kyle S., In re

• Decision Date: 14 April 1997
• Docket Number: No. 96-156-A,96-156-A
• Citation: 692 A.2d 329
• Parties: In re KYLE S. ppeal.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 329

692 A.2d 329

In re KYLE S.

No. 96-156-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

April 14, 1997.

Anthony E. Angeli, Jr., Providence, Regina M. Gibb, Wakefield, Laureen Quaranto D'Ambra, for Plaintiff.

Janet Gilligan, Paula Rosin, Janice Weisfeld, Providence, for Defendant.

Before: Weisberger, C.J., Lederberg, Bourcier, and Flanders, JJ.

OPINION

WEISBERGER, Chief Justice.

This case comes before the court on the basis of three certified questions from the Family Court pursuant to G.L.1956 § 9-24-27. The relevant facts are not in dispute and are as follows.

Kyle S. was born to respondents Janice Woodward Sabatini and Thomas Sabatini on March 18, 1995. As a result of the parents' previous involvement with the Department of Children, Youth and Families (the department or DCYF), the hospital authorized a seventy-two-hour detention of Kyle and notified DCYF of his birth. The department then obtained an ex parte order of detention from the Family Court and took temporary custody of the child. Soon thereafter Kyle was placed in nonrelative foster care.

Two months prior to Kyle's birth, respondent-parents voluntarily agreed to terminate their parental rights to his older siblings. ¹ Precipitating these terminations were allegations that four of the children were abused and/or neglected. The fifth child was removed from respondents' custody ex parte at birth because of the family's history of abuse and neglect. In granting the petition to terminate parental rights to the five children, the Family Court made no finding of parental unfitness.

On the basis of these voluntary terminations, DCYF filed a petition to terminate involuntarily respondents' parental rights to Kyle pursuant to G.L.1956 § 15-7-7(l )(b)(iv), as amended by P.L.1994, ch. 233, § 1. ² The respondents moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds that § 15-7-7(l )(b)(iv) authorizes the involuntary termination of parental rights on the basis of a former termination only when the former termination of rights was involuntary following a judicial finding of parental unfitness.

The department, on the other hand, contends that § 15-7-7(l )(b)(iv) applies to all former terminations of parental rights, whether voluntary or involuntary. It asserts that § 15-7-7(l )(b)(iv) makes no distinction between the two types of terminations and thus should be read to encompass both. According to DCYF, the statute merely requires that a previous termination be accomplished by order of the court.

Following a hearing on the matter, the Family Court justice entered an order certifying the following three questions to this court:

"1. Does R.I.G.L. [§ ] 15-7-7(l )(b)(iv), on its face, include both voluntary and involuntary terminations of parental rights[?]

"2. If [§ ]15-7-7(l )(b)(iv) is read to include voluntary terminations, does that inclusion violate [respondent-parents'] [ ] right to due process of law[?] ³

"3. Does [§ ] 15-7-7(l )(b)(iv), if read to include voluntary terminations, violate respondent-parents' [r]ight to Equal Protection under the law[?]"

The question of whether § 15-7-7(l )(b)(iv) encompasses voluntary as well as involuntary terminations of parental rights is an issue of first impression for this court. We begin our analysis, therefore, with a review of the general principles of statutory construction.

First and foremost, we follow the well-settled principle that in construing a statute, this court must ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature. Wayne Distributing Co. v. Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights, 673 A.2d 457, 460 (R.I.1996); Sorenson v. Colibri Corp., 650 A.2d 125, 128 (R.I.1994). In so doing, we examine " 'the language, nature and object of the statute,' " Wayne Distributing Co., 673 A.2d at 460, "in light of circumstances motivating its passage." Krikorian v. Rhode Island Department of Human Services, 606 A.2d 671, 675 (R.I.1992). The statute itself must be viewed as a whole, and individual sections "considered in the context of the entire statutory scheme." Sorenson, 650 A.2d at 128. This court will then apply the statutory meaning most consistent with the statute's policies or purposes. Bailey v. American Stores, Inc./Star Market, 610 A.2d 117, 119 (R.I.1992).

With these principles in mind we begin our analysis with the clear language of § 15-7-7(1)(b)(iv), as amended by P.L.1994, ch. 233, § 1, which provides in pertinent part:

"Termination of parental rights.--(1) The court shall, upon a petition duly filed after notice to the parent and hearing thereon, terminate any and all legal rights of the parent to the child, including the right to notice of any subsequent adoption proceedings involving the child if the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds as a fact by clear and convincing evidence that: * * *

"(b) The parent is unfit by reason of conduct or conditions seriously detrimental to the child; such as, but not limited to the following: * * *

"(iv) The child has been placed with the department for children, youth and families and the court has previously terminated parental rights to another child who is a member of the same family and the parent continues to lack the ability or willingness to respond to services which would rehabilitate the parent and provided further that the court finds it is improbable that an additional period of services would result in reunification within a reasonable period of time considering the child's age and the need for a permanent home." (Emphases added.)

Subsection (1)(b)(iv) of the statute is silent in regard to the nature of the previous termination proceeding to which it refers. The department contends that the statute should therefore be read to embrace both voluntary and involuntary terminations of parental rights. However, subsection (iv) also requires the state to prove by clear and convincing evidence a parent's continued unwillingness to respond to services designed to rehabilitate him or her and reunify the family. We are of the opinion that to include voluntary terminations within the purview of the statute belies legislative intent since state-sponsored rehabilitative services are neither contemplated nor required for the voluntary termination of parental rights.

In contrast, before the state may involuntarily terminate parental rights pursuant to subsections (1)(a), (1)(b)(i), or (1)(b)(iii) of § 15-7-7, it must provide the parent with services designed to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship, ⁴ G.L.1956 § 15-7-7(2)(a); ⁵ see also In re Alan W., 665 A.2d 877, 878 (R.I.1995); In re Kenneth, 439 A.2d 1366, 1370 (R.I.1982). If in spite of the state's efforts to reunify the family, the parent continues to act in a manner that is seriously detrimental to the child, the court may grant the state's termination petition. Section 15-7-7(2)(a); In re Michael F., 665 A.2d 880, 882 (R.I.1995). It is to these efforts that subsection (iv)'s provisions respecting rehabilitative services refer.

Further, limiting the applicability of § 15-7-7(1)(b)(iv) to former involuntary terminations is consistent with the entire statutory scheme of chapter 7 of title 15. The legislative intent behind chapter 7 of title 15 is to provide children who are in need with permanent and safe placement. Sections 15-7-5, ⁶ 15-7-6, ⁷ and 15-7-7 were enacted to effectuate this purpose. A parent's rights to the custody and management of a child may be terminated by any one of these three statutory mechanisms. Pursuant to §§ 15-7-5 and 15-7-6, however, a parent may relinquish his or her rights to a child without explanation or reason. In effectuating § 15-7-6 or § 15-7-5 in conjunction with § 15-7-6, the primary inquiry undertaken by the court is whether the surrender of parental rights is voluntary and in the best interests of the child--no inquiry into parental unfitness is made.

Before parental rights may be terminated by the state pursuant to § 15-7-7, however, the trial justice must be convinced by clear and convincing evidence that a parent is either unfit or incapable of providing a child with the proper care. Section 15-7-7; see also In re Kristina L., 520 A.2d 574, 579-80 (R.I.1987). Seven conditions are enumerated in § 15-7-7 as justifying the involuntary termination of parental rights. ⁸ Each of these conditions either explicitly or implicitly requires the court to make a finding of parental unfitness. In our opinion the Legislature's placement of subsection (iv) within the involuntary-termination statute is significant and indicative of its intent that only former involuntary terminations trigger application of the statute's provision. Under such an analysis a prior finding of unfitness absent rehabilitation becomes the basis for the state's present petition to terminate parental rights involuntarily.

The department's contention that § 15-7-7(1)(b)(iv) should be read to include voluntary terminations would produce results contrary to the policies underlying the act. Parents who choose to terminate their rights to a child out of concern for the child's well-being may find themselves subject to an involuntary-termination proceeding regarding another child subsequently born to them. Consequently, young single mothers who decide to relinquish custody of a child to caring adoptive parents more emotionally and financially secure than they may risk losing custody of other children born to them years later. Ill or disabled parents unable to care for their children would be similarly affected. Such a construction would have the effect of discouraging voluntary terminations that may be in a child's best interest. When the mechanical application of a statute "produces an absurd result or defeats legislative intent, this court will look beyond mere semantics and give effect to the purpose of the act." Labbadia v. State, 513 A.2d 18, 22 (R.I.1986) (quoting State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688, 694 (R.I.1985)). In this instance the purpose of the act is best...