Lafferty v. Nickel

• Decision Date: 09 May 1983
• Docket Number: No. 5758,5758
• Citation: 663 P.2d 168
• Parties: Johnny Franklin LAFFERTY, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. Officer Mark S. NICKEL, Officer Rich Patton, Reserve Officer Brite and the Town of Mills, Wyoming, Appellees (Defendants).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Page 168

663 P.2d 168

Johnny Franklin LAFFERTY, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. Officer Mark S. NICKEL, Officer Rich Patton, Reserve Officer Brite and the Town of Mills, Wyoming, Appellees (Defendants).

No. 5758.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

May 9, 1983.

Kenneth R. Marken, Casper, for appellant.

James W. Owens and Jo Sherman of Murane & Bostwick, Casper, for appellees.

Before ROONEY ^*, C.J., and RAPER, THOMAS, ROSE ^**, and BROWN, JJ.

ROONEY, Chief Justice.

On November 27, 1981, Johnny Franklin Lafferty, appellant-plaintiff, filed a civil action against Officer Mark S. Nickel, Officer Rich Patton, Reserve Officer Brite, and the Town of Mills, appellees-defendants, alleging that appellees were liable for various torts and civil rights violations arising out of appellant's March 24, 1979, arrest. Appellees moved for summary judgment, relying on the pleadings. The district court granted appellees' motion for summary judgment ¹ finding that the statutes of limitations applicable to appellant's claims for relief had run and that the Town of Mills was protected from appellant's claims by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. On appeal, appellant words the issues as follows:

"A. Did the District Court err in granting Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment on grounds that Appellant's claims were barred by statutes of limitations where the Appellant's pleadings alleged and Appellees' Answer denied the existence of a material fact underlying the application of said statutes, and where Appellees' Motion was otherwise unsupported by Affidavits or discovery materials?

"B. Does the applicability of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act extend the liability of the Appellee law enforcement officers for the torts of assault, battery, malicious prosecution, and/or false imprisonment beyond the one-year statute of limitations provided by Wyoming Statute § 1-3-105(a)(v), (1977)?

"C. Is the Appellee Town of Mills shielded from any or all of Appellant's claims by the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity?"

We agree with the district court that appellant's claims for relief were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations and we affirm.

The grant of a motion for summary judgment requires the district court to make the dual determinations "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c), W.R.C.P. As a general rule, motions for summary judgment are to be supported by competent evidence admissible at trial, and we are required to examine that evidence from a viewpoint most favorable to the party opposing the motion in making the determination of whether or not there is a genuine issue as to a material fact. Hyatt v. Big Horn School District No. 4, Wyo., 636 P.2d 525, 528 (1981); and Bancroft v. Jagusch, Wyo., 611 P.2d 819, 820 (1980). Of course, a motion for summary judgment is proper where a question of law is prescribed and there is no factual dispute. Mason v. Laramie Rivers Company, Wyo., 490 P.2d 1062, 1065 (1971); Fugate v. Mayor and City Council of Town of Buffalo, Wyo., 348 P.2d 76, 81, 97 A.L.R.2d 243 (1959).

In this case appellees based their motion for summary judgment on the pleadings without providing any other competent evidence to support the motion. In this posture appellees' motion for summary judgment is equivalent to either a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), W.R.C.P., or a motion for a judgment on the pleadings made pursuant to Rule 12(c), W.R.C.P. Schwartz v. Compagnie General Transatlantique, 405 F.2d 270, 273 (2nd Cir.1968); United States v. Mills, 372 F.2d 693, 696 (10th Cir.1966); Parker v. DeKalb Chrysler Plymouth, 459 F.Supp. 184, 187 (D.C.Ga.1978), aff'd 673 F.2d 1178 (11th Cir.1982); 6 Moore's Federal Practice, pp 56.02, pp. 56-29, 56.11, p. 56-229. Therefore, for the purpose of this appeal the facts alleged in the complaint are deemed admitted and the allegations contained therein are viewed in a light most favorable to the appellant. Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., Wyo., 600 P.2d 733, 734 (1979); State Highway Commission v. Bourne, Wyo., 425 P.2d 59, 63 (1967).

Appellant's complaint consists of five separate claims--the first claim alleges various tortious acts on the part of appellees and the second through fifth claims allege various civil rights violations.

The sequence of events upon which appellant predicates his claims are: He was stopped, arrested and jailed on March 24, 1979, for two violations of the municipal ordinances of the Town of Mills. His imprisonment ended approximately twelve hours after arrest on March 25, 1979. He was formally charged on March 26, 1979, and was convicted after a trial on April 30, 1979. On May 10, 1979, a formal judgment and sentence was entered. Appellant appealed his convictions to the district court and the convictions were reversed on November 29, 1979. ² Appellant filed the present civil action on November 27, 1981, more than two years after his arrest, imprisonment, and conviction, but within two years of the district court's reversal of his conviction in municipal court.

Because we accept as true the allegations contained in appellant's complaint, the question presented is whether or not as a matter of law the applicable statutes of limitations periods had run when appellant filed his complaint on November 27, 1981. ³ Because appellant's complaint alleged claims for relief based on common-law tort principles and on civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, and because appellant has advanced separate arguments concerning the statute of limitations applicable to each, we will treat each argument separately.

LIMITATIONS--CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIMS

The claims based on the federal civil rights statutes, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, are governed by the two-year statute of limitations period contained in § 1-3-115, W.S.1977. Spiegel v. School District No. 1, Laramie County, 600 F.2d 264, 265-266 (10th Cir.1979). Section 1-3-115 provides as follows:

"All actions upon a liability created by a federal statute, other than a forfeiture or penalty, for which no period of limitations is provided in such statute, shall be commenced within two (2) years after the cause of action has accrued."

Appellant concedes that the appellees' actions giving rise to appellant's claims for relief which were based on alleged civil rights violations occurred between March and May of 1979, more than two years before he filed his action, but argues that the municipal court convictions effectively estopped him from pursuing his civil claims because of the implicit finding of probable cause in those convictions. Therefore, he contends that either the claims did not accrue until the reversal of his municipal court convictions or the convictions tolled the running of the statutes of limitations until such reversal.

A claim for relief accrues or arises:

" ' * * * when that person first comes to a right to bring an action. A cause of action implies that there is some person in existence who can bring suit, and also a person who can lawfully be sued. Again, when a wrong has been committed, or a breach of duty has occurred, the cause of action has accrued, although the claimant may be ignorant of it. A cause of action does not accrue until the existence of such a state of things as will enable a person having the proper relations to the property or persons concerned to bring an action. * * * ' " Cantonwine v. Fehling, Wyo., 582 P.2d 592, 596 (1978), quoting from Bliler v. Boswell, 9 Wyo. 57, 72-73, 59 P. 798, 803 reh. denied 9 Wyo. 80, 61 P. 867 (1900).

In this case the actions giving rise to the alleged civil rights violations arose upon appellant's arrest, confinement, and prosecution in March of 1979. At that time, appellant had a cause of action which could be brought against appellees. See: Rodarte v. City of Riverton, Wyo., 552 P.2d 1245 (1976). Appellant's causes of action based on appellees' alleged civil rights violations occurred in March of 1979 and the two-year statute of limitations period began to run at that point. Therefore, unless the statute of limitations was tolled, it expired prior to appellant's filing of his complaint barring his action.

In support of appellant's contention that the running of the statutes of limitations was tolled during the pendency of the municipal court criminal proceedings and until the district court's reversal of the conviction resulting from those proceedings, he relies on Keith v. Schiefen-Stockham Insurance Agency, Inc., 209 Kan. 537, 498 P.2d 265 (1972), and Hoover v. Galbraith, 7 Cal.3d 519, 102 Cal.Rptr. 733, 498 P.2d 981 (1972). However, these cases are easily distinguishable.

In Keith, supra, plaintiffs filed an action against an insurance broker for failure to procure worker's compensation coverage for the employer of the plaintiffs' decedents after plaintiffs' claims for worker's compensation were denied. The court held that the action sounded in both contract and tort and went on to say at page 272 of 498 P.2d:

" * * * Plaintiffs were effectively prevented from suing defendants [on a contract theory] until it was finally determined in Otta v. Johnson, supra [204 Kan. 366, 461 P.2d 758], that insurance had not been procured, nor an election caused to be filed, and with respect to the action sounding in tort actual damages did not result until a final determination of those matters."

In this case, it is unnecessary to wait for a determination as to whether or not insurance had actually been procured or to wait for the damages to result. Contract provisions are not here present for determination and the alleged damages occurred when the civil rights were alleged to have been violated.

In Hoover, supra, a judgment creditor brought an action against the former directors of a defunct corporation to collect on a judgment debt of the corporation. The court held that...