LaFleur v. C.C. Pierce Co., Inc.

• Citation: 398 Mass. 254,496 N.E.2d 827
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
• Decision Date: 18 August 1986
• Parties: Michael LaFLEUR v. C.C. PIERCE CO., INC. et al. 1

Page 827

496 N.E.2d 827

398 Mass. 254

Michael LaFLEUR v. C.C. PIERCE CO., INC. et al. ¹

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Suffolk.

Argued April 8, 1986.

Decided Aug. 18, 1986.

Thomas B. Benjamin, Portland, Me., (Daniel Burnstein, Boston, with him) for plaintiff.

Andre A. Sansoucy (Richard L. Neumeier, Boston, with him) for defendants.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and WILKINS, ABRAMS, NOLAN and O'CONNOR, JJ.

HENNESSEY, Chief Justice.

The issue presented by this case is whether a settlement agreement may be set aside on the ground of mutual mistake where the parties were unaware at the time of entering the agreement that the injured person had suffered a serious and unknown injury.

In January, 1975, Michael LaFleur suffered a work-related injury when a forklift blade fell on his right foot. The company doctor told LaFleur that the injury was superficial, and that an X-ray showed no fracture or other complications. LaFleur returned to work within two weeks but continued to experience pain. A doctor from his employer's insurance carrier told LaFleur that he was suffering from a sprain of his great right toe. LaFleur was offered a desk job, but was discharged in May, 1976, upon his failure to report for work.

In August, 1976, after filing a claim with the Industrial Accident Board, LaFleur entered into a lump-sum agreement with the employer's insurer in the amount of $4,000. The agreement recited that the payment was "in redemption of the liability for all weekly payments now or in the future due me under the Workmen's Compensation Act, for all injuries" received from the industrial accident. The agreement further provided that LaFleur understood "that this is a complete and final settlement of my claim and that I will not be able to reopen my claim or seek further benefits because of this injury." The Industrial Accident Board approved the agreement pursuant to G.L. c. 152, § 43 (1984 ed.), in November, 1976. ²

After entering into this agreement, LaFleur experienced increasing pain in his right foot. In January, 1977, LaFleur was diagnosed as having arterial occlusive (Buerger's) disease. Several operations to combat this problem were unsuccessful. As a result of this disease, LaFleur eventually had both of his legs amputated above the knees. LaFleur is permanently confined to a wheelchair.

LaFleur filed a complaint in Superior Court against the employer and its insurer, requesting that the lump-sum settlement agreement be rescinded on the ground of mutual mistake, and that the case be recommitted to the Industrial Accident Board. LaFleur moved for partial summary judgment, and submitted in support thereof the affidavit of Dr. Edward D. Frank, an assistant professor of surgery at Harvard Medical School and surgeon at Beth Israel Hospital. Dr. Frank attested that he had examined LaFleur, and had concluded that LaFleur's arterial occlusive disease existed at the time of the accident, but had not been diagnosed "because the disease is rare and difficult to detect." Dr. Frank further attested that the forklift accident had injured LaFleur's arterial system and had aggravated the preexisting arterial disease. The injury to the arterial system was "completely separate, and distinct in nature" from the sprained toe which was diagnosed after the accident. Finally, Dr. Frank attested that the forklift accident was causally related to the amputation of LaFleur's legs. ³ LaFleur also introduced the defendants' answers to the plaintiff's interrogatories, as well as LaFleur's own affidavit, which indicated that none of the parties knew at the time the settlement was executed that LaFleur was afflicted with Buerger's disease, or that the forklift accident had aggravated this condition.

The judge denied LaFleur's motion for summary judgment, and entered judgment for the defendants. The judge reasoned that "[a]n incorrect prediction of the future, notwithstanding the inaccuracy proceeds from mutual ignorance of an essential fact, is not grounds for setting aside a release which the parties have fairly and freely undertaken.... Here, the parties, each represented by counsel, struck a bargain. Plaintiff received compensation for his injuries; the insurer obtained a release from further liability. The one could not complain if the amount of the lump-sum agreement turned out to be too small, nor the other if the amount was, on hindsight, too large." LaFleur appealed from this judgment, and we transferred the case here on our own motion. We reverse.

Under G.L. c. 152, § 48, the parties to a worker's compensation claim may enter into a lump-sum agreement in redemption of the employer's liability for medical expenses and benefits. Once approved by the board, this agreement precludes reopening of the case except upon a showing of fraud or mutual mistake. ⁴ Hansen's Case, 350 Mass. 178, 180, 213 N.E.2d 869 (1966). Cook's Case, 19 Mass.App.Ct. 986, 988, 475 N.E.2d 404 (1985). Jurisdiction to set aside the lump-sum agreement on either of these equitable grounds rests with the Superior Court. Perkins's Case, 278 Mass. 294, 299, 180 N.E. 142 (1932). O'Reilly's Case, 258 Mass. 205, 209, 154 N.E. 851 (1927).

The legal principles underlying the doctrine of mutual mistake are well established. Where there has been a mistake between the parties as to the subject matter of a contract, there has been no "meeting of the minds," and the contract is voidable at the election of the party adversely affected. Jeselsohn v. Park Trust Co., 241 Mass. 388, 392, 135 N.E. 315 (1922). 13 S. Williston, Contracts § 1535 (1970). The mistake must be shared by both parties, and must relate to an essential element of the agreement. Century Plastic Corp. v. Tupper Corp., 333 Mass. 531, 534, 131 N.E.2d 740 (1956). Cavanagh v. Tyson, Weare & Marshall Co., 227 Mass. 437, 444, 116 N.E. 818 (1917). See generally Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 152 (1975). The mistake must involve a fact capable of ascertainment at the time the contract was entered into, and not a mere expectation or opinion about future events. Cook v. Kelley, 352 Mass. 628, 632, 227 N.E.2d 330 (1967). Aldrich v Travelers Ins. Co., 317 Mass. 86, 88, 56 N.E.2d 888 (1944). A contract will not be rescinded for mutual mistake where one party was aware at the time the contract was signed that he had limited knowledge as to essential facts, but nonetheless assumed the risk that circumstances would prove to be other than as expected. Aldrich, supra. Covich v. Chambers, 8 Mass.App.Ct. 740, 749, 397 N.E.2d 1115 (1979). See Maloney v. Sargisson, 18 Mass.App.Ct. 341, 346, 465 N.E.2d 296 (1984). See generally Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 156, comment a (1975).

In Tewksbury v. Fellsway Laundry, Inc., 319 Mass. 386, 65 N.E.2d 918 (1946), we declined to set aside a release for personal injuries on the ground of mutual mistake. The minor plaintiff had been struck and injured by a truck owned by the defendant. Her injuries were diagnosed as "abrasion of face and right hip, laceration in right groin, and fracture of the right femur." Id. at 387, 65 N.E.2d 918. She settled her claim against the defendant for $1,850, and executed a release in complete discharge of her claim for damages "ensuing from the aforementioned accident." Id. "Thereafter...., the plaintiff became afflicted with an 'aggravated and perilous condition of osteomyelitis of the right leg ... directly, solely and exclusively a result of the accident.' " Id. at 387-388, 65 N.E.2d 918. The plaintiff brought a bill in equity seeking rescission of the release on the ground of mutual mistake. We held that "[t]he great weight of authority supports the view that a release of a claim for personal injuries cannot be avoided merely because the injuries proved more serious than the releasor believed them to be at the time of executing the release, and that, in order to invalidate a release on account of mutual mistake, the mistake must relate to a past or present fact material to the contract and not to an opinion respecting future conditions as a result of present facts." Id. at 389, 65 N.E.2d 918. Because the plaintiff's osteomyelitis developed after the accident and execution of the release, id. at 387, 65 N.E.2d 918, any misapprehension by the parties related to a future condition, and not to a fact capable of ascertainment at the time of contract.

In Tewksbury, we were confronted with a situation in which the consequences of an injury turned out to be more serious than expected. ⁵ In this case, however, we are dealing with a separate condition which existed and yet was unknown to the parties at the time of contract. Although this presents a question of first impression in this Commonwealth, the great weight of authority in other jurisdictions supports the view that a release of claims for personal injuries may be avoided on the ground of mutual mistake if the parties at the time of signing the agreement were mistaken as to the existence of an injury, as opposed to the unknown consequences of known injuries. See Evans v. S.J. Groves & Sons, 315 F.2d 335, 339-341 (2d Cir.1963) (latent head injury); Great N.Ry. v. Reid, 245 F. 86, 89 (9th Cir.1917) (unknown hernia); Casey v. Proctor, 59 Cal.2d 97, 110-112, 28 Cal.Rptr. 307, 378 P.2d 579 (1963) (unknown fractured vertebrae); Gleason v. Guzman, 623 P.2d 378 (Colo.1981) (epilepsy); Saunders v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 387 So.2d 603, 605 (La.Ct.App.1980) (dormant bursitis); Hall v. Strom Constr. Co., 368 Mich. 253, 258, 118 N.W.2d 281 (1962) (unknown brain injury); Doud v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 259 Minn. 341, 346, 107 N.W.2d 521 (1961) (thoracic aneurysm); Frahm v. Carlson, 214 Neb. 532, 534-535, 334 N.W.2d 795 (1983) (herniated disc); Mangini v. McClurg, 24 N.Y.2d 556, 564, 301 N.Y.S.2d 508, 249 N.E.2d 386 (1969) (hip injury); Cambell v. Stagg, 596 P.2d 1037, 1040 (Utah 1979) (herniated disc). Contra Trevathan v. Tesseneer, 519 S.W.2d 614, 615 (Ky.1975) ("[g]eneral...