Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood

• Decision Date: 05 November 1984
• Docket Number: No. 48001,48001
• Citation: 20 Ohio App.3d 338,486 N.E.2d 194,20 OBR 441
• Parties: , 20 O.B.R. 441 LAKEWOOD, OHIO CONGREGATION OF JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES, INC., Appellant, v. CITY OF LAKEWOOD et al., Appellees. *
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

Page 338

20 Ohio App.3d 338

486 N.E.2d 194, 20 O.B.R. 441

LAKEWOOD, OHIO CONGREGATION OF JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES, INC., Appellant, v. CITY OF LAKEWOOD et al., Appellees. ^*

No. 48001.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eighth District, Cuyahoga County.

Nov. 5, 1984.

Syllabus by the Court

A cause of action which has been litigated in federal court determining that a zoning ordinance did not violate the United States Constitution may not thereafter be litigated in a state court, in a case involving the same parties and the same facts as those in the federal case, on the grounds that the zoning ordinance violated the Ohio Constitution, based on the doctrine of res judicata.

Sheldon Berns, Robert J. Valerian and Adrienne C. Lalak, Cleveland, for appellant.

Henry B. Fischer, Cleveland, for appellees.

PRYATEL, Judge.

Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. (hereinafter Lakewood Congregation) appeals from an order of summary judgment entered in favor of the city of Lakewood and its building commissioner.

This case has a lengthy history. In 1971, the Lakewood Congregation applied for a permit to build a new church at the intersection of Clifton Boulevard and West Clifton Avenue. At that time, the congregation had not yet purchased this property. The permit was denied. The Board of Zoning Appeals, the common pleas court and this court affirmed. The Ohio Supreme Court refused to certify the record.

In 1973, after Lakewood Congregation bought the property in question, the city of Lakewood enacted a new zoning code, which still allowed only residential use in the area where the congregation's property is located. In 1975, Lakewood Congregation again applied for a permit, which was denied and affirmed by way of summary judgment, on the ground of res judicata. This court reversed, stating that a new controversy existed since there was a new ordinance and because the traffic patterns, a major factor in the previous decision to deny a permit, may have changed. The case was remanded to the trial court for determination of the constitutional issues originally raised by the Lakewood Congregation: (1) that the zoning ordinance was unconstitutional on its face and (2) that it was unconstitutional as applied to the congregation.

Upon remand the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the city of Lakewood, stating that the ordinance was constitutional. This court again reversed, noting that the only motion for summary judgment for the city of Lakewood was based on res judicata and that motion had been granted by the trial court and reversed by this court. Thus, no motion for summary judgment (in favor of the city) existed for the trial court to rule on. Furthermore, this court noted that the trial court only decided the constitutionality of the ordinance on its face and did not determine its constitutionality as applied to the particular property in question. Thus, on May 17, 1979, the case was again remanded for a determination on these issues to the trial court where it lay dormant.

Apparently, no further action was taken because the congregation thereafter filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. After a trial, the court held that the city of Lakewood's zoning ordinance did not violate the United States Constitution. The United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, affirmed, and the United States Supreme Court denied the Lakewood Congregation's petition for writ of certiorari. Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. Lakewood (C.A. 6, 1983), 699 F.2d 303, certiorari denied (1983), 464 U.S. 815, 104 S.Ct. 72, 78 L.Ed.2d 85.

On November 17, 1983, the Lakewood Congregation filed a motion to amend its original complaint before the court of common pleas. According to the brief in support of this motion, the purpose of the amended complaint was to delete all references to the United States Constitution and to substitute the name of the new building commissioner for the one previously named. The court denied this motion on November 22, 1983.

The city of Lakewood then filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings or, in the alternative, summary judgment, arguing that the congregation was precluded from litigating this action by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The city of Lakewood argued that the Lakewood Congregation had asserted its rights under the Ohio Constitution during the federal trial, and, assuming arguendo that this claim had not been asserted, that the congregation was barred from raising any claims that could have been raised in the federal action.

The trial court granted the city of Lakewood's motion, and the congregation appeals, citing two assignments of error.

Assignment of Error No. 1

"1. The trial court committed prejudicial error by granting the city of Lakewood's motion for judgment on the pleadings or in the alternative summary judgment, for the reason that res judicata does not bar an action under a claim for relief which has not been previously litigated."

Appellant argues that the cause of action presently being litigated is different from the one heard in federal court, and that res judicata thus has no application. We disagree.

Both federal and Ohio law indicate that the principle of res judicata is applicable to the case at bar. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has held that where a plaintiff filed a federal suit alleging that defendants violated a federal statute, that plaintiff could not subsequently bring an action in state court alleging violation of state contract laws. Harper Plastics, Inc. v. Amoco Chemicals Corp. (C.A. 7, 1981), 657 F.2d 939. In Harper Plastics, the court reasoned that both lawsuits were based on the same physical actions taken by the defendant, and that there was not a second cause of action merely because recovery was sought under different laws. The court in Harper Plastics further held that the plaintiff could have joined the state claim in federal court, and that res judicata operates to bar litigation not only of matters that were raised, but also of matters that should have been raised, in the previous proceeding.

The instant case involves the same parties and the same facts as those involved in the federal case. The congregation is still seeking a permit to build a church on the same property, except it has...