Lames v. Armstrong

• Decision Date: 22 November 1913
• Citation: 162 Iowa 327,144 N.W. 1
• Parties: LAMES v. ARMSTRONG ET AL.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

162 Iowa 327

144 N.W. 1

LAMES

v.ARMSTRONG ET AL.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Nov. 22, 1913.

Appeal from District Court, Polk County; Charles S. Bradshaw, Judge.

Appellant's automobile was levied upon by the sheriff. He sought to enjoin the sheriff from selling it on the ground that it was exempt. A temporary injunction was issued, and later the case was tried on an agreed statement of facts. The court dismissed the petition and dissolved the injunction. Plaintiff appeals. Reversed.Chester J. Eller, of Des Moines, for appellant.

Franklin & Miller, of Des Moines, for appellees.

PRESTON, J.

After the levy by the sheriff, plaintiff served notice and affidavit, claiming exemption. The stipulation of facts follows: “It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between the parties to said litigation that said cause may be submitted to his honor Judge Bradshaw of equity court and by him determined upon an agreed statement of facts, which said facts are as follows, to wit: (1) That H. Armstrong has a judgment in the district court of the state of Iowa in and for Polk county against H. B. Lames and Emma Lames, for the amount shown therein in law case No. ______. (2) The automobile levied upon under said execution is the property of H. B. Lames. (3) The plaintiff, H. B. Lames, is a married man, a resident of the state of Iowa, and county of Polk, and the head of a family therein. (4) The said H. B. Lames is a general agent in life insurance and requires the constant use of said machine; said machine being used in the place of a horse and buggy for the purpose of said Lames earning his livelihood in attending to his daily occupation and business, said machine being used in covering his territory, which comprises 10 counties, in assisting the local agencies established in said counties. (5) That said automobile is reasonably worth the sum of $250; the same being a two-cylinder Mason four-passenger car.”

The decree finds: “That an automobile, under the facts as stipulated herein, is exempt to the proper person, but that the plaintiff is not within the purview of the statutes of Iowa as to exempt property in the hands of debtors as provided therein as to other laborers or otherwise, and therefore said property is not exempt in the hands of said plaintiff. It is therefore ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the plaintiff's petition be and the same is hereby dismissed with all the court costs of this action taxed at $______ to said plaintiff, and that the defendant be and he is hereby given judgment therefor; and it is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that said injunction be and the same is hereby dissolved. To each and all of the said findings, conclusions, orders, judgments, and decree, and each part thereof, the plaintiff at the time and in each instance duly excepted and now excepts.”

[1] Section 4008 of the Code, so far as material to this inquiry, provides: “If the debtor is a resident of this state and the head of a family, he may hold exempt from execution the following property: * * * If the debtor is a physician, public officer, farmer, teamster or other laborer, a team, consisting of not more than two horses or mules, or two yoke of cattle, and the wagon or other vehicle, with the proper harness or tackle, by the use of which he habitually earns his living, otherwise one horse.”

In arriving at the intent of the Legislature, we have a rule of construction that, where general words follow the enumeration of particular classes of words or things, the general words will be construed as applicable only to persons or things of the same general nature or class as those enumerated. Rohlf v. Kasemeier, 140 Iowa, 182, 118 N. W. 276, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1284, 132 Am. St. Rep. 261, 17 Ann. Cas. 750 (construing a criminal statute); 36 Cyc. 1119. Appellant contends that under this rule the words “or other laborer” should be considered in connection with the words preceding them and as referring to the classes of individuals named in the preceding terms of the statute. That they refer to persons engaged in like or similar occupations, and therefore any person in a similar employment, needing the use of a team or vehicle, etc., to aid in earning his livelihood and necessary to carry on the occupation, if a debtor, and resident, and head of a family, is entitled to claim exemption for such a team or vehicle, etc.

In our opinion, appellant's contention ought to be sustained. All the language used in the statute should be considered, and these words should be considered in connection with the other language. Ordinarily a physician, public officer, such as a sheriff, for instance, a farmer, and teamster need a team of one or two horses and wagon or other vehicle. An automobile takes the place of such an outfit. Other persons than those enumerated in the statute and who work or labor may require a team in making a living. A physician would, of course, be classed as a professional man, and his team, etc., is exempt because he is specifically named. A sheriff, out serving subpœnas, would not be considered an artisan or skilled workman, nor would he be called a laborer in the sense that he was engaged in menial or manual labor, but such work would be similar to the work of an insurance agent. In Consolidated Tank-Line Co. v. Hunt, 83 Iowa, 6, 48 N. W. 1057...