Langley v. Nunn

• Decision Date: 29 April 2021
• Docket Number: Case No. CIV-20-966-R
• Parties: AARON FRANCIS LANGLEY, Petitioner, v. SCOTT NUNN, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Oklahoma

AARON FRANCIS LANGLEY, Petitioner, v. SCOTT NUNN, Respondent.

Case No. CIV-20-966-R

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

April 29, 2021

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner, a state prisoner appearing pro se, brings this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, seeking habeas relief from a state court conviction. (ECF No. 1). Mr. Nunn has filed his Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Petitioner has filed a Reply (ECF Nos. 13 & 18). For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that the Petition be DENIED.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On the evening of September 26, 2015, Rebecca Canzoneri hosted a cookout at her residence. Petitioner lived at the residence with Ms. Canzoneri and her boyfriend, Kirk Dawson. Also present at the cookout were: the victim, Josh Goodwin, his wife, Rozina Gonzalez, her two children, Ray Hailey, and his daughter. At some point in the evening, Ms. Gonzalez spoke to her children in Spanish and Mr. Langley told her she needed to "speak English." Mr. Goodwin heard the verbal exchange and asked Mr. Langley to apologize to Ms. Gonzalez. Mr. Langley eventually apologized and Ms. Gonzalez left the cookout with her children. Mr. Goodwin stayed at the cookout, and all of the adults were drinking heavily. Throughout the evening, two verbal confrontations occurred between Petitioner and Mr. Goodwin. At some point, Mr. Langley and Mr. Goodwin engaged in a physical altercation which resulted in Petitioner stabbing Mr. Goodwin seven times in his upper body with a pocketknife. Mr. Dawson stopped the fight and called 911. Mr. Goodwin was taken to the hospital for treatment of his injures and Petitioner was arrested.

On May 5, 2017, a jury convicted Petitioner of assault and battery with a deadly weapon. Original Record, State of Oklahoma v. Langley, Case No. CF-2015-1670 (Okla. Co. Dist. Ct. May 5, 2017) 182 (O.R.). On December 13, 2018, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) affirmed the conviction. (ECF No. 13-3). On December 16, 2019, Petitioner filed an Application for Post-Conviction Relief in the Cleveland County District Court. (ECF No. 13-4). The district court denied the application on February 3, 2020. (ECF No. 13-6). The OCCA affirmed the denial on July 29, 2020. (ECF No. 13-10). Mr. Langley filed the habeas Petition on September 24, 2020. (ECF No. 1).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (the "AEDPA") governs this Court's power to grant habeas corpus relief. Under the AEDPA, the standard of review applicable to each claim depends upon how that claim was resolved by the state courts. Coddington v. Sharp, 959 F.3d 947, 952 (10th Cir. 2020).

"When a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on themerits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011).

For claims adjudicated on the merits, "this [C]ourt may grant . . . habeas [relief] only if the [OCCA's] decision 'was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States' or 'resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.'" Hanson v. Sherrod, 797 F.3d 810, 814 (10th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). "It is the petitioner's burden to make this showing and it is a burden intentionally designed to be 'difficult to meet.' " Owens v. Trammell, 792 F.3d 1234, 1242 (10th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). The deference embodied in § 2254(d) "reflects the view that habeas corpus is a 'guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,' not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal." Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102-103 (citation omitted).

This Court first determines "whether the petitioner's claim is based on clearly established federal law, focusing exclusively on Supreme Court decisions." Hanson, 797 F.3d at 824. "A legal principle is 'clearly established' within the meaning of this provision only when it is embodied in a holding of [the United States Supreme Court.]" Thaler v. Haynes, 559 U.S. 43, 47 (2010). If clearly established federal law exists, this Court then considers whether the state court decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See Owens, 792 F.3d at 1242.

"A state court's decision is 'contrary to' clearly established federal law 'if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.'" Id. (citations omitted). Notably, "[i]t is not enough that the state court decided an issue contrary to a lower federal court's conception of how the rule should be applied; the state court decision must be 'diametrically different' and 'mutually opposed' to the Supreme Court decision itself." Id. (citation omitted).

The "unreasonable application" prong requires the petitioner to prove that the state court "identifie[d] the correct governing legal principle from [Supreme Court] decisions but unreasonably applie[d] that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. (citation omitted). On this point, "the relevant inquiry is not whether the state court's application of federal law was incorrect, but whether it was 'objectively unreasonable.'" Id. (citations omitted, emphasis in original). So, to qualify for habeas relief on this prong, a petitioner must show "there was no reasonable basis for the state court's determination." Id. at 1242-43 (citation omitted). "The question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable—a substantially higher threshold." Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007).

In sum, "[u]nder § 2254(d), a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported . . . the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories areinconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme] Court." Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101-02. Relief is warranted only "where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with [the Supreme] Court's precedents." Id. at 102.

Finally, a federal habeas court must "accept a state-court [factual] finding unless it was based on 'an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.'" Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2199 (2015). In other words, when the state appellate court makes a factual finding, the Court presumes the determination to be correct; a petition can only rebut this presumption with clear and convincing evidence. See id. at 2199-22; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

If the state appellate court has not addressed the merits of a claim, the Court exercises its independent judgment. See Littlejohn v. Trammell, 704 F.3d 817, 825 (10th Cir. 2013) ("For federal habeas claims not adjudicated on the merits in state-court proceedings, we exercise our 'independent judgment[.]'") (citation omitted). "And, even in the setting where we lack a state court merits determination, '[a]ny state-court findings of fact that bear upon the claim are entitled to a presumption of correctness rebuttable only by clear and convincing evidence.'" Grant v. Royal, 886 F.3d 874, 889 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)) (internal citation omitted).

III. GROUND ONE

In Ground One, Petitioner claims that the jury panel was tainted because during voir dire, one of the prospective jurors stated that Mr. Langley had committed a crime.(ECF Nos. 1:5; 13-1:10-12; 18-1:1).¹ Reviewing for plain error, the OCCA rejected this claim on the merits, stating:

In Proposition One, Appellant contends that he was denied a fair and impartial jury. He asserts the jury panel was tainted because one of the jurors was biased or partial.

. . .

Reviewing the record in the present case, we find that Appellant has not shown the existence of an actual error. Although the juror initially expressed a partiality towards a determination of guilt, the entirety of her voir dire shows that the juror's view were not such that they would prevent or substantially impair the performance of her legal duties in accordance with her instructions and oath. Proposition One is denied.

(ECF No. 13-3:4) (internal citations omitted). The Court should conclude that the OCCA's decision was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent.

A. Clearly Established Law

The Sixth Amendment as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right of a trial by jury in all state criminal cases. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 150 (1968). The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause independently requiresthe impartiality of any jury empaneled to hear a case in a state court. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961). "In essence, the right to jury trial guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, 'indifferent' jurors. The failure to accord an accused a fair hearing violates even the minimal standards of due process." Id. at 722. Potential jurors, however, are not expected to be totally ignorant of the facts surrounding a case. Rather, jurors are considered constitutionally impartial if they can lay aside any preconceived opinions regarding the outcome of the case and "render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court." Id. at 723. Criminal defendants bear the burden of establishing juror partiality. Id.

B. Habeas Relief is not Warranted on Ground One

Mr. Langley alleges that ...