Langlitz v. Board of Registration of Chiropractors

• Citation: 486 N.E.2d 48,396 Mass. 374
• Parties: George LANGLITZ, Jr. v. BOARD OF REGISTRATION OF CHIROPRACTORS.
• Decision Date: 11 December 1985
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

Page 48

486 N.E.2d 48

396 Mass. 374

George LANGLITZ, Jr. v. BOARD OF REGISTRATION OF CHIROPRACTORS.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Suffolk.

Argued Oct. 9, 1985.

Decided Dec. 11, 1985.

John C. Sikorski, Springfield, for plaintiff.

Kim E. Murdock, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and WILKINS, LIACOS, LYNCH and O'CONNOR, JJ. HENNESSEY, Chief Justice.

The plaintiff, George Langlitz, Jr., is a licensed chiropractor who resides and practices in Springfield. On October 11, 1984, the Board of Registration of Chiropractors (board) suspended Langlitz's license to practice chiropractic medicine for a period of sixty days. ¹ The plaintiff appealed to a single justice of this court pursuant to G.L. c. 112, § 64 (1984 ed.), and G.L. c. 211, § 3 (1984 ed.), seeking review of his suspension and injunctive relief. The single justice reserved and reported the case, without decision, for determination by the full court.

Langlitz placed an advertisement in the 1983 "yellow pages" section of the Springfield telephone directory. On October 3, 1983, the board issued an order to show cause why Langlitz's license should not be revoked or suspended by reason of this advertisement. The board held an adjudicatory hearing in May, 1984, at which Langlitz was present and represented by counsel. Five months later, the board issued its decision suspending Langlitz's license. The board concluded that Langlitz, in his advertisement, offered treatment beyond the scope of his expertise and the statutory definition of "chiropractic," G.L. c. 112, § 89 (1984 ed.); that he offered therapies independent of chiropractic care, and not supportive thereof, in violation of G.L. c. 112, § 89, and 233 Code Mass.Regs. §§ 4.03 and 4.10 (1983); that he advertised in a misleading and deceptive manner, in violation of 233 Code Mass.Regs. § 4.11; and that he engaged in misrepresentation and deceit, in violation of 233 Code Mass.Regs. § 4.09.

Langlitz argues on appeal that (1) the board's procedures deprived him of due process of law as guaranteed by the United States Constitution and Massachusetts Declaration of Rights; and (2) the board's findings were unsupported by substantial evidence. We conclude that the decision of the board should be upheld.

1. Due Process Claims.

Langlitz argues that the board's proceeding against him denied him due process of law. He contends that his due process rights were denied because the board failed to provide him with adequate notice of the charges against him; amended the allegations against him after all the evidence had been heard; and earlier refused to render an advisory ruling on the propriety of the advertisement. ² We conclude that the board's actions did not violate Langlitz's rights to due process.

Fundamental considerations of fairness require that administrative decisions involving licenses to engage in lawful occupations be made after a reasonable opportunity for a hearing. See Milligan v. Board of Registration in Pharmacy, 348 Mass. 491, 495, 204 N.E.2d 504 (1965). G.L. c. 30A, § 11 (1984 ed.). "Due process requires that, in any proceeding to be afforded finality, notice must be given that is reasonably calculated to apprise an interested party of the proceeding and to afford him an opportunity to present his case." LaPointe v. License Bd. of Worcester, 389 Mass. 454, 458, 451 N.E.2d 112 (1983). Levy v. Board of Registration & Discipline in Medicine, 378 Mass. 519, 522 n. 5, 392 N.E.2d 1036 (1979). See Konstantopoulos v. Whately, 384 Mass. 123, 135, 424 N.E.2d 210 (1981); G.L. c. 30A, § 11(1) (1984 ed.). While constitutional principles require administrative procedures to be reasonable and to comply with the requirements of "natural justice and fair play," Higgins v. License Comm'rs of Quincy, 308 Mass. 142, 146, 31 N.E.2d 526 (1941); Marmer v. Board of Registration of Chiropractors, 358 Mass. 13, 16, 260 N.E.2d 672 (1970), such hearings need not comport with any particular form. See Higgins, supra 308 Mass. at 145-146, 31 N.E.2d 526; Foster from Gloucester, Inc. v. City Council of Gloucester, 10 Mass.App.Ct. 284, 291, 407 N.E.2d 363 (1980).

The board's order to show cause and notice of hearing adequately informed Langlitz of the charges against him. In its order to show cause, the board advised Langlitz in unambiguous language that it would examine whether the content of his telephone directory advertisement violated G.L. c. 112, § 89, and board regulations, 233 Code Mass.Regs. §§ 4.03, 4.09, 4.10, and 4.11. The notice of hearing subsequently issued by the board advised Langlitz of the time and place for the hearing. Due process does not require that notices of administrative proceedings "be drafted with the certainty of a criminal pleading," as long as the notice is sufficient for persons whose rights may be affected to understand the substance and nature of the grounds upon which they are called to answer. Higgins, supra 308 Mass. at 145, 146, 31 N.E.2d 526, and cases cited. Langlitz was provided sufficient information to prepare and present his case through the order to show cause and the hearing notice.

Langlitz contends that the board improperly refused to supplement its order and notice and to provide him with detailed information relative to the charges against him. Due process does not require an administrative agency to provide interested parties with a detailed description of evidence it intends to introduce at a disciplinary hearing. LaPointe, supra 389 Mass. at 458, 451 N.E.2d 112. Cf. Commonwealth v. Hayes, 311 Mass. 21, 25, 40 N.E.2d 27 (1942) (in criminal proceeding bill of particulars not required to set forth evidence which Commonwealth will present at trial); Commonwealth v. Giacomazza, 311 Mass. 456, 461, 42 N.E.2d 506 (1942) (same). Further, if Langlitz was surprised by, or unprepared to respond to, any of the grounds for discipline raised by the board at the hearing, he could have requested a continuance or the opportunity to present additional evidence and argument after the hearing. See G.L. c. 30A, § 11(1). Foster from Gloucester, supra 10 Mass.App.Ct. at 290, 407 N.E.2d 363. As Langlitz did not make any such request, he is in no position to challenge the suspension of his license. Id.

Langlitz contends that the board amended the allegations against him after all the evidence had been heard. See In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 1226, 20 L.Ed.2d 117 (1968). This claim is without merit. Langlitz had notice that his advertisement in the telephone directory was the primary subject of the disciplinary proceeding. The board did not base its findings on any activity not mentioned in the advertisement, nor did it base its decision to discipline Langlitz on any statute or regulation not referred to in the order to show cause.

Langlitz argues that his suspension violates fundamental principles of fairness, because he requested, and was denied, an advisory ruling regarding the propriety of his advertisement. On November 8, 1982, Langlitz, by his attorney, forwarded a draft of the proposed advertisement to the board, requesting that the board review its contents to determine if any representations made therein were deceptive or misleading. By letter dated November 30, 1982, the board notified Langlitz that it "does not act as an approving authority for advertising," and indicated that "responsibility for placing advertisements" in accordance with 233 Code Mass.Regs. § 4.11 "lies solely with the doctor placing the ads." Langlitz argues that the board's refusal to grant an advisory ruling precludes it from later imposing sanctions based upon the content of the same advertisement.

To the extent that Langlitz advances an estoppel argument, we are "reluctant to apply principles of estoppel to public entities where to do so would negate requirements of law intended to protect the public interest." Holahan v. Medford, 394 Mass. 186, 191, 474 N.E.2d 1117 (1985) quoting Phipps Prods. Corp. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 387 Mass. 687, 693, 443 N.E.2d 115 (1982). See Levy v. Board of Registration & Discipline in Medicine, 378 Mass. 519, 527, 392 N.E.2d 1036 (1979) (revocation of physician's license not penal, but designed to protect public health, welfare, and safety). To the extent that Langlitz's argument rests on due process considerations, we think that the board's discipline of Langlitz after denying his request for an advisory ruling did not violate "fundamental considerations of fairness." Milligan, supra 348 Mass. at 495, 204 N.E.2d 504. Under 233 Code Mass.Regs. § 2.09, the board is authorized, but not required, to render advisory rulings in appropriate cases. It was not unreasonable for the board to require Langlitz, as a licensed professional, to exercise his own judgment in accordance with the board's regulations and the specific proscriptions of § 4.11. The board was not prevented from disciplining Langlitz by his unsuccessful attempt to gain prior approval of the advertisement.

2. Substantial Evidence.

Langlitz argues that the decision of the board is unsupported by substantial evidence and therefore must be set aside. The scope of review under the State Administrative Procedure Act, G.L. c. 30A, § 14 (1984 ed.), is circumscribed. Trustees of Forbes Library v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 384 Mass. 559, 568, 428 N.E.2d 124 (1981). We must uphold the decision of the board where, considering the entire record, its findings are supported by substantial evidence. G.L. c. 30A, § 14(7)(e ). Costello v. Department of Pub. Utils., 391 Mass. 527, 539, 462 N.E.2d 301 (1984). Under G.L. c. 30A, § 1(6), substantial evidence is defined as "such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." See Arthurs v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 383 Mass. 299, 304, 418 N.E.2d 1236 (1981); Maddocks v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 369 Mass. 488, 495, 340 N.E.2d 503 (1976). Applying this standard...