Langner v. Simpson

• Decision Date: 24 May 1995
• Docket Number: No. 93-1364,93-1364
• Parties: Kathy LANGNER and Marlin Langner, Appellants, v. Floyd SIMPSON and Spencer Municipal Hospital, Appellees, Brian Nedoba, Northwest Iowa Mental Health Center, Defendants.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 511

533 N.W.2d 511

Kathy LANGNER and Marlin Langner, Appellants, v. Floyd SIMPSON and Spencer Municipal Hospital, Appellees, Brian Nedoba, Northwest Iowa Mental Health Center, Defendants.

No. 93-1364.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

May 24, 1995.

As Amended June 22, 1995.

Roxanne Barton Conlin of the Roxanne Barton Conlin Law Firm, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.

Marvin F. Heidman of Eidsmoe, Heidman, Redmond, Fredregill, Patterson & Schatz, Sioux City, for appellee Floyd Simpson.

Michael W. Ellwanger of Rawlings, Nieland, Probasco, Killinger, Ellwanger, Jacobs & Mohrhauser, Sioux City, for appellee Spencer Municipal Hospital.

Considered by LARSON, P.J., and LAVORATO, NEUMAN, SNELL, and TERNUS, JJ.

LAVORATO, Justice.

Kathy Eileen Langner and her husband Marlin Ralph Langner appeal from an adverse summary judgment ruling dismissing all claims against two defendants in the Langners' medical malpractice case against psychiatrist Floyd Simpson, Spencer Municipal Hospital, counselor Brian Neboda, and Northwest Iowa Mental Health Center.

In the petition, Kathy alleged numerous claims arising out of care each provided her during the 1980s. Marlin's claim is for loss of consortium based on each of Kathy's claims.

Simpson and the hospital moved for summary judgment on all claims against them. The district court granted their motions over the Langners' resistance. The court rested its conclusion on twin findings that (1) all of the Langners' claims against Simpson and the hospital were filed outside of the applicable statutes of limitation time bars, and (2) none of the three grounds the Langners posited for tolling the statutes of limitation applied to any of the Langners' claims against Simpson and the hospital.

On appeal, the Langners assert--as they did in the district court--that their claims against Simpson and the hospital are timely for the following reasons. First, despite reasonable diligence, the Langners were unable to discover their injuries until late 1990 or early 1991, making their petition timely. Second, three different grounds for tolling the applicable statutes of limitation exist in this case: (a) Simpson and the hospital were negligent in treating Kathy under either the "continuous treatment" doctrine or the "continuum of negligent treatment" doctrine, (b) Simpson and the hospital conspired to fraudulently conceal Kathy's injuries, and (c) Kathy was mentally ill at the time she allegedly was injured.

Our careful consideration of the record convinces us that summary judgment for Simpson and the hospital on all claims was proper. We affirm.

I. Background Facts.

Kathy presents a long and troubled history of alleged abuse by family members. She claims she was sexually abused as a youngster by a grandfather.

The early death of Kathy's father shattered her. This event forced Kathy's mother to work to support the family, and Kathy was sent to live with relatives. Kathy believes her mother abandoned her.

Kathy began dating Marlin as a teenager. She became pregnant and the couple married. Kathy was very concerned about how her mother viewed the pregnancy and marriage, and also had deep feelings of anger toward her mother regarding the abandonment.

During the early years of the Langners' marriage, Kathy was raped. She and Marlin were involved in extramarital affairs.

Kathy began seeking professional help in dealing with all of these issues in the early 1980s. She first went to the center in 1981, where she was diagnosed as suffering from depression. Over the next several years, a variety of individuals associated with the center treated her.

In 1987 she began counseling with Neboda, a counselor employed by the center. Allegedly, Kathy became emotionally addicted to Neboda. She called him at home, went out to dinner with him, invited him to her home, and made him bouquets of dried flowers and a wreath for Christmas.

Neboda apparently accepted her invitations and gifts but nevertheless continued to treat Kathy. Kathy claims that Neboda engaged in self-disclosure during therapy sessions, discussed her treatment with another employee at the center, failed to have or follow a treatment plan, engaged in sexual improprieties, and failed to keep adequate records of her treatment.

Kathy told Neboda that her legs were weak and shaky and she thought she was experiencing a drug withdrawal. Because of these symptoms, in April 1988 Neboda referred Kathy to Simpson. Simpson was a staff psychiatrist employed by the center and had admitting privileges at the hospital.

After meeting with Kathy, Simpson concluded that she should be admitted to the hospital's psychiatric unit for evaluation. During the seven days that Kathy was an inpatient, she claims that Simpson engaged in inappropriate behavior. This allegation stems primarily from statements the Langners contend Simpson made to Kathy during the sessions he had with her while she was hospitalized. These include the following:

"Let's get this straight, honey. I'm not going to sleep with you."

"[I]t was probably just wishful thinking on your part [that you were abused by your father]."

"You're next to a whore, but I'm not saying you're a whore. You know what I mean by that. In my drinking days, I would have slept with a woman like you. I know you go for wealthy men and fancy cars."

Of course, at this stage of the proceedings, whether Simpson made these statements had not been established. Because Simpson denies having made them, there is an initial material fact question on whether he did.

After her release from the hospital, Kathy returned to Neboda for treatment and immediately told him of Simpson's alleged statements. Neboda told Kathy he would investigate her allegations. He approached Simpson, who denied he had done or said anything improper in treating Kathy. Simpson allegedly stated that if Kathy thought he had done anything wrong, she could sue him. Neboda reported this to Kathy and was reluctant to discuss the issue any further with her.

Kathy called a close friend while she was still in the hospital and told her of Simpson's alleged statements. When she was released from the hospital, Kathy also contacted her family doctor of twenty years and told him the same thing, but the doctor did not believe her. After her release from the hospital, Kathy also told her husband about Simpson's alleged statements.

At some point Kathy tried to review her psychiatric records. At first Neboda refused to give them to her. She eventually did receive the records from Neboda, but contends the critical records were missing.

In October 1990 Neboda left the center. Kathy briefly continued treatment with another counselor. In late 1990 and early 1991, Kathy allegedly discovered that she had been injured by Neboda, Simpson, the hospital, and the center.

II. Background Proceedings.

The Langners filed suit on September 26, 1991. All of the defendants raised the statute of limitations in Iowa Code section 614.1(9) (1989) as an affirmative defense. Simpson and the hospital moved for summary judgment. Neboda and the center moved for partial summary judgment. The district court dismissed all claims against Simpson and the hospital, and dismissed some of the claims against Neboda and the center. This appeal only involves the district court's ruling sustaining the motions for summary judgment filed by Simpson and the hospital.

We recite additional facts as they relate to the issues we discuss.

III. Scope of Review.

Summary judgment is appropriate under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 237

when there is no genuine issue of [material] fact and the moving party is entitled to the judgment as a matter of law. The burden of showing the nonexistence of a material fact is upon the moving party. While an adverse party generally cannot rest upon [the adverse party's] pleadings when the moving party has supported [the] motion, summary judgment is still not proper if reasonable minds could draw different inferences and conclusions from the undisputed facts. In this respect, summary judgment is functionally akin to a directed verdict; every legitimate inference that reasonably can be deduced from the evidence should be afforded the non-moving party, and a fact question is generated if reasonable minds can differ on how the issue should be resolved.

Randol v. Roe Enters., Inc., 524 N.W.2d 414, 415-16 (Iowa 1994) (citation omitted). Whether a genuine issue of material fact exists is determined by the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits. Iowa R.Civ.P. 237.

IV. Which Statute of Limitations Applies?

The petition alleges six claims against Simpson. These claims include psychiatric malpractice, intentional infliction of emotional distress, slander per se, slander, invasion of privacy, and breach of contract.

The petition alleged that the hospital--on the theory of respondeat superior--was liable for the actions of Simpson as to each of these six claims. Additionally, the petition alleged the hospital was liable on the theory of corporate negligence. Under this theory, the petition alleged the hospital (1) negligently selected, retained, and supervised Simpson, and (2) was negligent in failing to formulate, adopt, and enforce adequate rules and policies to ensure quality care for all patients. Finally, the petition alleged an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against the hospital for allegedly failing to provide reasonable care to Kathy.

As to Simpson, the district court ruled that (1) Iowa Code section 614.1(9) barred only the psychiatric malpractice claim, and (2) Iowa Code section 614.1(2) barred all the other claims against him. And as to the hospital, the court ruled that (1) Iowa Code section 614.1(9) barred the respondeat superior claim as it pertained to the psychiatric malpractice claim against Simpson. The court also ruled that Iowa Code section 614.1(2) barred (1) the respondeat superior claim as it...