Lanier v. Fair
| Citation | 876 F.2d 243 |
| Decision Date | 27 February 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 88-2046,88-2046 |
| Parties | Albert E. LANIER, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Michael FAIR, etc., et al., Defendants, Appellees. . Heard |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit) |
Richard L. Neumeier, with whom Rebecca J. Wilson and Parker, Coulter, Daley and White, Boston, Mass., were on brief, for plaintiff-appellant.
Robert M. Mendillo, Asst. Atty. Gen., Criminal Bureau, with whom James M. Shannon, Atty. Gen., Boston, Mass., was on brief, for defendants-appellees.
Before CAMPBELL, Chief Judge, and COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge, and FUSTE, * District Judge.
Plaintiff-appellant Albert E. Lanier filed this action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 alleging that his due process rights were violated by his removal from a halfway house program and by the rescission of his previously established "reserve parole date." The case was submitted to the district court on cross motions for summary judgment, whereupon defendants' motion was granted and appellant's was denied. At the district court level appellant sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as monetary damages. Prior to oral argument appellant withdrew his claim for injunctive and declaratory relief and now only the damage claim remains. 1 For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the decision of the district court.
The relevant facts are as follows. At the time of the events giving rise to this action, appellant Lanier was in custody of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts pursuant to two state convictions for rape and one conviction for robbery. 2 On February 1, 1984, the State Parole Board voted to assign Lanier a "reserve parole date" of May 25, 1984, with the conditions of residence, work, and supervision for drugs. This meant, arguably, that appellant would be paroled on May 25, 1984, provided that he found a job and a place to live, agreed to be supervised for drugs, and that his conduct was otherwise acceptable. Additionally, the Parole Board recommended that Lanier be transferred from a medium security prison to a pre-release facility prior to his reserve date. Such facilities generally provide their residents with greater opportunities for employment and interaction with the community. In early April 1984 Lanier was transferred from prison to a minimum security halfway house facility in Boston called "Brooke House" that operated under the auspices of Massachusetts Halfway House, Inc. ("MHHI") and the Massachusetts Department of Correction ("DOC"). Prior to becoming a resident of Brooke House, Lanier signed a community release permit and a community release agreement. These agreements were also signed by employees of the DOC and MHHI. Appellant was furnished a copy of the MHHI Program Standards.
On May 8, 1984, around 4:00 a.m., Lanier was found to be missing during a routine bed check. A jacket was allegedly stuffed under Lanier's blanket and a window was found open, thus leading Brooke House employees to believe Lanier had attempted to escape. Lanier denies the business about the jacket and claims he was taking a shower during his absence. In any event, he was located approximately a half hour later. The incident was immediately reported to defendant-appellee John W. Noonan, the acting DOC duty officer, who authorized Lanier's return to higher custody. The appellant was transferred to MCI-Concord at approximately 6:00 a.m. on that same morning without a prior hearing and was charged with being "out of place." A disciplinary hearing was held on June 14, 1984, at which time the charge was dismissed.
Six days after Lanier was transferred from Brooke House, defendant-appellee Lynn Ferraris, a supervising parole officer, recommended in a memorandum addressed to the Parole Board that Lanier's reserve parole date be rescinded. Appended to the memorandum was a report from appellant's counsellor at Brooke House delineating numerous rule infractions Lanier allegedly committed while in the Brooke House program, including the May 8th incident. On May 17, 1984, Ms. Ferraris updated her memorandum recommending rescission with recently received information alleging Lanier's participation in illegal activities in the state of Maine during a prior parole.
No action was taken by the Parole Board until May 31, 1984, at which time a three-person panel provisionally rescinded appellant's May 25 reserve parole date. 3 Lanier was not afforded notice and a hearing at this time. On July 20, 1984, the Parole Board conducted a final rescission hearing. Lanier received notice of the charges against him 4 and was represented by a law student who submitted a memorandum on his behalf responding to each of the allegations. Soon after the hearing the Parole Board voted to affirm the provisional rescission. In a written notice the Parole Board reported that this action was based on Lanier's return to higher custody and on various enumerated infractions of Brooke House program standards, including the charge of being out of place on May 8, even though that charge had been dismissed after the June 14 disciplinary hearing. The Parole Board then recommended that the DOC transfer Lanier to a pre-release facility for a six-month period. Once transferred, Lanier would receive a review by the Parole Board after five months, and if he had performed satisfactorily in the program he would be paroled at the end of this six-month period without having to appear before the Parole Board again.
On August 8, 1984, Lanier received a DOC reclassification hearing to determine whether he should remain in higher custody or be returned to a halfway house. At this hearing, which occurred three months after his removal from Brooke House, the DOC determined that Lanier should be kept in a medium security prison.
On March 6, 1985, Lanier filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in Norfolk County Superior Court, complaining that the Parole Board had rescinded his reserve parole date of May 25, 1984 without due process. On June 27, 1985, the Superior Court entered an order partially granting Lanier's request for injunctive relief and set aside the rescission of Lanier's reserve parole date. A preliminary injunction followed on July 9, 1985. However, the Parole Board promptly appealed the Superior Court's ruling, and Chief Justice Greany of the Massachusetts Appeals Court issued a memorandum and order dissolving the injunction.
On March 5, 1986, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the dissolution of the preliminary injunction in Lanier v. Massachusetts Parole Board, 396 Mass. 1018, 489 N.E.2d 670 (1986). In a brief opinion the Court concluded that Lanier had not met his burden of showing a likelihood of success on his claims that the Parole Board violated his rights under Article 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution and the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. Id. Thus, the case was sent back to the lower courts for a trial on the merits.
The instant case was filed in October of 1985, and the complaint was amended in May of 1986. The amended complaint alleged two federal claims: (1) that Lanier had a liberty interest in remaining at Brooke House such that he could not be transferred to higher custody without due process; and (2) that Lanier had a protected liberty interest in his reserve parole date such that rescission of the same without an adequate hearing violated due process. Lanier also alleged various pendent state law claims brought under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, G.L. c. 12, Secs. 11H-11J.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on both of Lanier's federal claims. First, assuming without deciding that Lanier had a liberty interest in remaining at Brooke House, the district court nonetheless held that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity with respect to any alleged violation of that right. Second, the district court held that Lanier did not have a liberty interest in his reserve parole date and was thus not entitled to a hearing before it could be rescinded. We affirm the district court's dismissal of both of appellant's federal claims, although we do so for reasons other than those expressed by the court below.
The first issue is whether appellant had a liberty interest in remaining at Brooke House. Only if we find a liberty interest do we need to inquire into whether appellant received an adequate hearing concerning his transfer to higher custody. Customarily, the court has looked for a liberty interest both in the fourteenth amendment and in various state law sources.
The Supreme Court has held that when a prisoner is still under confinement the due process clause itself does not convey a liberty interest in the conditions or degree of confinement as long as these are "within the sentence imposed" and are "not otherwise violative of due process." Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468, 103 S.Ct. 864, 869, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). Moreover, we have held that a prisoner has no constitutionally-derived liberty interest in remaining in a halfway house, and that any liberty interest a prisoner might have against recommitment to a higher security prison must be derived from state law sources. Brennan v. Cunningham, 813 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir.1987); Garcia v. De Batista, 642 F.2d 11 (1st Cir.1981). The question, therefore, is whether the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, through its statutes, regulations or practices, can be said to have created a protected liberty interest by allowing appellant to participate in a halfway house program. Id. at 14. As we noted in Brennan, to establish a liberty interest deriving from state law, a prisoner must show
"that particularized standards or criteria guide the State's decisionmakers." If the decisionmaker is "not required to base its decisions on objective and defined criteria," but instead "can deny the requested relief for any...
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