Larkin v. City of Minneapolis
| Decision Date | 28 October 1910 |
| Docket Number | 16,756 - (137) |
| Citation | 127 N.W. 1129,112 Minn. 311 |
| Parties | MARGARET LARKIN v. CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for Hennepin county to recover $5,731 for personal injuries. The case was tried before John Day Smith, J., who, at the close of plaintiff's case, denied defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the ground that the evidence failed to establish a cause of action against defendant, and especially upon the ground that the notice required to be given by the plaintiff before suit was not in compliance with the law. At the close of all the testimony the court denied defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the ground that the notice given pursuant to R.L. 1905, § 768, failed to state or specify the circumstances, as required by law, of the injury for which compensation was demanded, and on the further ground that the evidence failed to establish any cause of action against defendant. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff for $2,500. From an order denying defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, it appealed. Affirmed.
Statutory notice of personal injury.
A notice of a personal injury from a defective sidewalk, given under the provisions of section 768, R.L. 1905, is held to contain a sufficient statement of the time, place, and circumstances of the accident. There was no substantial departure therefrom in the proof. Olcott v. City of St Paul, 91 Minn. 207, 97 N.W. 879, distinguished, and Kandelin v. City of Ely, 110 Minn. 55, 124 N.W. 449 followed and applied.
Instruction to jury -- erroneous assumption.
An inaccurate statement of the facts of a case by the trial judge in his charge to the jury, which might have had an important bearing on the jury's view of the case, or an erroneous statement of the evidence upon the pivotal fact in the case, is ground for reversal. Instructions which assume the existence of material facts which are in dispute, are erroneous. The charge in the case at bar is held valid within this criterion.
Frank Healy, City Attorney, A. C. Finney and Clyde R. White, for appellant.
John H. Steele and John P. Nash, for respondent.
Plaintiff brought this action against defendant city to recover damages consequent on its negligence in maintaining the sidewalk crossing in a certain alley in a safe and proper manner. Plaintiff recovered a verdict of $2,500. Defendant appealed.
The principal controversy concerns the adequacy of the notice given to the city under section 768, R.L. 1905. That notice sufficiently stated the time and place, and then proceeded: "And that said injuries were caused at said place through the carelessness and negligence of said city in failing to maintain and construct in a safe and proper manner the sidewalk crossing said alley at said place, and in failing to remove therefrom the ice and snow which has accumulated and become bumpy, slanting, and slippery, whereby the undersigned while travelling on said sidewalk on said 5th St. was caused to fall."
The main contention of defendant city is that this notice advised the city of its negligence in failing to remove snow and ice; whereas, the proof showed that the injury was caused by the fact that plaintiff, walking along said sidewalk, was caused to fall by a broken and projecting flagstone. The city was notified of the charge of its negligence in two respects: (1) In failing to construct and maintain the sidewalk in a safe and proper manner; (2) in failing to remove accumulated snow and ice. It is true that no recovery could be had under the evidence for any falling due to the bumpy, slanting, or slippery ice or snow. The city was advised exactly where to look. It was advised that the accident was caused by an unsafe and improper sidewalk. Examination of that sidewalk under the present circumstances would have revealed all that a more particular and definite statement of the defect would have communicated. Technically the notice was imperfect; practically it gave the city the information the statute was designed to secure.
The statement concerning defendant's failure to maintain and construct in a safe and proper manner the sidewalk crossing is not as definite and certain as is desirable and is sometimes required. Noonan v. City, 130 Mass. 161; Dalton v. City, 131 Mass. 551; Maloney v. Cook, 21 R.I. 471, 44 A. 692; Gagan v. City, 106 Wis. 662, 82 N.W. 558. In each case, however, the sufficiency of the notice must depend primarily upon the language of the statute requiring it.
Section 768, R.L. 1905, requires merely that the notice state "the time, place and circumstances" of the injury complained of and the amount of compensation or other relief demanded. The construction which this court has in many instances placed upon this statute is familiar and obviously reasonable. The essential criterion is whether the notice gives the city officials such information that due investigation may be made to determine the truth and merits of the claims made. Nicol v. City of St. Paul, 80 Minn. 415, 83 N.W. 375; Kandelin v. City of Ely, 110 Minn. 55, 124 N.W. 449. "A notice of this character ought not to be construed with technical strictness." Harder v. City of Minneapolis, 40 Minn. 446, 42 N.W. 350. The notice is not a pleading, and the statutory requirements as to its validity should not receive so strict a construction as to make it difficult for the average citizen to draw a good notice. Tattan v. City, 128 Mich. 650, 651, 87 N.W. 894; Oesterreich v. City, 137 Mich. 415, 416, 100 N.W. 593; Buchmeier v. City, 138 Iowa 623, 116 N.W. 695; Connor v. Salt Lake City, 28 Utah 259, 78 P. 479.
The notice in Olcott v. City of St. Paul, 91 Minn. 207 97 N.W. 879, closely resembles the one at bar. It was there, however, repeatedly stated that plaintiff in that case ...
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