Lasiter v. State

Decision Date15 April 2009
Docket NumberNo. 09-07-00359-CR.,09-07-00359-CR.
Citation283 S.W.3d 909
PartiesJeffrey Clay LASITER, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Kaye Ellis Stone, The Woodlands, for appellant.

Michael McDougal, District Atty., R. Michael Shirley, Asst. District Atty., Gail Kikawa McConnell, Conroe, for State.

Before McKEITHEN, C.J., KREGER and HORTON, JJ.

OPINION

HOLLIS HORTON, Justice.

A jury found Jeffrey Clay Lasiter mentally competent to stand trial, and Lasiter subsequently pled guilty to first degree murder. See TEX. PEN.CODE ANN. § 19.02 (Vernon 2003). The trial court assessed punishment at life imprisonment in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. On appeal, Lasiter challenges the jury's finding that determined him competent to stand trial, and he asserts that several errors occurred during his competency trial. Lasiter also contends that the trial court erred in denying his post-trial motions. We affirm.

Background

Lasiter followed Kasey Davis's vehicle from a parking lot to an apartment complex and then shot Davis at close range with a deer rifle. The two had never previously met. After shooting Davis, Lasiter walked to his truck and drove away from the scene. Soon thereafter, a Conroe police officer stopped Lasiter's truck because it matched the description of the truck involved in the parking-lot shooting. After exiting his truck, Lasiter admitted to the officer that he shot a man and explained that he believed Davis was a member of the "CIA and the FBI" that had harmed Lasiter's family. Lasiter also stated that he was a servant of God, apologized to God, and requested the officer take him to jail.

While jailed, Lasiter drank an extraordinary amount of water and sustained a significant brain injury. The injury caused Lasiter to lose consciousness and to be placed on life support for a short time. Because of the brain injury, Lasiter's permanent injuries included a speech impairment.

After Lasiter's condition improved, the State requested a competency examination. The trial court ordered that Lasiter submit to an examination by Dr. Steven Rosenblatt, who subsequently examined Lasiter twice. Following the second examination, Dr. Rosenblatt composed his March 7, 2007, written report, expressing his opinion that Lasiter was not currently competent to stand trial. Dr. Rosenblatt's written report notes that after his first examination, he had concluded that Lasiter was competent for trial.

In March 2007, the trial court conducted a jury trial on the competency issue. Following a two-day trial, a jury found Lasiter mentally competent to stand trial. Dr. Victor Scarano, Lasiter's expert, and Dr. Rosenblatt testified during the competency trial. Although each physician's opinion had a different basis, both physicians testified that Lasiter was not competent to stand trial.

The jury also heard testimony from several witnesses with whom Lasiter had interacted while in jail awaiting trial. In general, these witnesses described how they could communicate with Lasiter. They explained that Lasiter appeared to comprehend the situations in which each of them dealt with him.

The jury found Lasiter competent to stand trial. Following the jury's verdict, the trial court denied all relief requested by Lasiter in several post-trial motions. On May 7, 2007, Lasiter pled guilty to the offense of murder and then waived his right to have a jury assess his punishment.

A videotape depicting the stop and arrest and several letters written by Lasiter to his parents were admitted into evidence during the punishment phase of Lasiter's trial. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court imposed a life sentence. Lasiter subsequently filed a motion for new trial, which was overruled by operation of law. Lasiter raises five issues in his appeal.

Complaints Regarding Admission of Evidence of the Alleged Offense

In issue one, Lasiter argues that during the competency trial, the State's attorney revealed facts of the crime with which Lasiter was charged. Lasiter also asserts that the State suggested to the jury that he would receive a less severe punishment if the jury found him incompetent to stand trial.

Standard of Review

Generally, a competency hearing is a separate and independent hearing from the trial on the crime charged in the indictment. TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46B.005 (Vernon 2006); Barber v. State, 757 S.W.2d 359, 361 (Tex.Crim.App.1988). "The purpose of a separate hearing is to allow a determination uncluttered by evidence of the offense itself." Basham v. State, 608 S.W.2d 677, 679 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980). The guilt of the defendant is not an issue in the competency hearing, and, generally, introducing evidence of the alleged offense is improper. See Goodman v. State, 701 S.W.2d 850, 862-63 (Tex.Crim. App.1985), overruled on other grounds by Hernandez v. State, 757 S.W.2d 744, 751-52 n. 15 (Tex.Crim.App.1988); Callaway v. State, 594 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980); McBride v. State, 655 S.W.2d 280, 284 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, no pet.).

However, not every mention of the crime itself is prejudicial; to be prejudicial, "[t]he evidence of the offense presented to the competency jury must be of such a nature as to deny the accused a fair and impartial determination of his competency." Brandon v. State, 599 S.W.2d 567, 580 (Tex.Crim.App.1979), vacated on other grounds, 453 U.S. 902, 101 S.Ct. 3134, 69 L.Ed.2d 988 (1981).

Application of Law to Facts

First, we address whether Lasiter preserved the complaints he makes in his first issue for our review. In his brief, Lasiter complains about the State's attorney's comment during the cross-examination of Dr. Rosenblatt that Lasiter was potentially "lying about his lack of recall of the shooting incident to boost his `competency defense[.]'" Lasiter also complains about the State's attorney's suggestion in closing argument that incompetency was Lasiter's "only defense" and of the State's argument that the jury should find Lasiter competent and make him stand trial for murder.

Before the competency trial, the trial court conducted a hearing on Lasiter's motion in limine in which Lasiter requested that no evidence of Lasiter's offense be admitted into evidence. The State responded that it intended to cross-examine the experts about the offense to show Lasiter's motive for feigning incompetency. The trial court stated that it would address any objections to the State's cross-examination about the offense during trial.

During trial, Lasiter did not lodge an objection when the State's attorney questioned Dr. Rosenblatt about why Lasiter might claim to be incompetent. Lasiter also failed to object to the State's attorney's comments regarding Lasiter's effort to use incompetency as a defense during the State's closing argument.

Generally, a defendant must object at trial to preserve error for review. Basham, 608 S.W.2d at 679. "[T]he denial of a motion in limine is simply not sufficient. There must be a proper objection to the proffered evidence." Id. By not objecting at trial, Lasiter failed to preserve these complaints for our review. See TEX.R.APP. P. 33.1(a); Basham, 608 S.W.2d at 679.

Lasiter also did not object when the State's attorney asked Dr. Scarano about the crime with which Lasiter had been charged; in response to the question, Dr. Scarano answered: "Charged with murder." Later, Lasiter did object when, in reply to the State's attorney's inquiry regarding the facts of the case, Dr. Scarano agreed they were "[e]xtremely serious."

We hold that by not objecting to the question about the crime with which he had been charged, Lasiter failed to preserve his complaint as to the question or to Dr. Scarano's response for our review. With respect to Dr. Scarano's statement that the facts of the case were "[e]xtremely serious," Lasiter's brief acknowledges that the "mere mention that the offense was a `serious offense' would not necessitate reversal[.]" We further note that appellate courts have stated that during a competency trial, the mention that the offense was capital murder, does not necessarily deprive a defendant of a fair determination of his competency. See Goodman, 701 S.W.2d at 863; see also Barber, 757 S.W.2d at 362. We hold that Dr. Scarano's express acknowledgment that the facts were extremely serious did not deprive Lasiter of a fair determination of whether he was competent to stand trial.

Lasiter also did not preserve error with respect to several questions inferring that being in a state hospital would be better than going to prison. Because no error was preserved on these questions, we likewise overrule Lasiter's complaints about them. See TEX.R.APP. P. 33.1(a); Basham, 608 S.W.2d at 679.

Finally, Lasiter complains about several comments made by the State's attorney during a bench conference. During the bench conference, the State asserted that Lasiter was "malingering," and that the evidence would show that Lasiter killed "an unarmed innocent[.]" Lasiter claims the jury heard these statements, but the record does not reflect that Lasiter's attorney requested either a mistrial or an instruction from the judge for the jury to disregard these comments. Absent a request to the trial court to cure the alleged error, no error was preserved for our review. See Young v. State, 137 S.W.3d 65, 70 (Tex.Crim.App.2004). Having reviewed the arguments Lasiter makes in issue one, and finding them either not preserved or without merit, we overrule Lasiter's first issue.

Challenge to Jury's Competency Finding

In issue two, Lasiter asserts that the jury's finding him competent to stand trial is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Lasiter argues he was incompetent to stand trial because both medical experts who testified agreed that he did not possess sufficient present ability to consult with his attorney with a reasonable degree...

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