Laughlin v. State, 79CA0955
| Decision Date | 29 May 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 79CA0955,79CA0955 |
| Citation | 618 P.2d 689,44 Colo.App. 341 |
| Parties | Billy Ray LAUGHLIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE of Colorado and Alan N. Charnes, Director of Department of Revenue, Defendants-Appellees. . I |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
Feuer, Flossic & Rich, Philip A. Cherner, Dana L. Larson, Denver, for plaintiff-appellant.
J. D. MacFarlane, Atty. Gen., Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy Atty. Gen., Mary J. Mullarkey, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Richard H. Forman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for defendants-appellees.
Billy Ray Laughlin appeals the judgment of the district court affirming the revocation of his driver's license under the habitual offender statutes. See §§ 42-2-202 and 42-2-203, C.R.S.1973. He argues that the hearing officer should have permitted him to attack the validity of an underlying conviction for driving while his ability was impaired because of the trial court's failure to comply with the requirements of Crim. P. 11(b) before accepting his guilty plea. We agree and therefore reverse.
In Anderson v. Colorado Department of Revenue, Colo.App., 615 P.2d 51 (announced March 27, 1980), we held that a jurisdictional challenge to a conviction may be raised at a driver's license revocation hearing because a void judgment is subject to attack directly or collaterally at any time. Likewise, since a conviction based on a guilty plea accepted in violation of Crim. P. 11(b) is constitutionally infirm, it may be challenged in a later proceeding to impose a statutory liability, see People v. Heinz, 197 Colo. 102, 589 P.2d 931 (1979), and such a challenge may also be raised at a license revocation hearing.
The question remains, however, whether a trial court must comply with the requirements of Crim. P. 11(b) before accepting a guilty plea to the charge of driving while impaired. We hold that it must. In Cave v. Department of Revenue, 31 Colo.App. 185, 501 P.2d 479 (1972), responding to a challenge to a guilty plea to a speeding violation, the court held that more simplified procedures than those prescribed in Crim. P. 11(b) could properly be used for receiving guilty pleas in "minor traffic offenses." Driving while impaired, however, is not a minor traffic offense since the person convicted is subject to possible imprisonment. See § 42-4-1501(2)(a), C.R.S.1973 (1979 Cum.Supp.); cf. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 2012, 32 L.Ed.2d 530, 538 ...
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State v. Laughlin
...Feuer, Flossic & Rich, Philip A. Cherner, Denver, for respondent. ERICKSON, Justice. We granted certiorari to review Laughlin v. State, Colo.App., 618 P.2d 689 (1980). We reverse the court of appeals and remand to the court of appeals with directions to affirm the judgment of the district T......
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Chapter 2 - § 2.4 • REQUIREMENTS OF A VALID GUILTY PLEA
...not minor traffic offenses and are subject to possible incarceration. People v. Heinz, 589 P.2d 931, 933 (Colo. 1979); Laughlin v. State, 618 P.2d 689 (Colo. App. 1980), rev'd, 634 P.2d 49 (Colo. 1981), on the ground that a challenge to the propriety of the Rule 11 advisement could not be m......
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Chapter 2 - § 2.5 • PROCEDURES FOR ACCEPTING GUILTY PLEAS
...and therefore the court must comply with Crim. P. 11 in such cases. People v. Heinz, 589 P.2d 931 (Colo. 1979); Laughlin v. State, 618 P.2d 689 (Colo. App. 1980), rev'd, 634 P.2d 49 (Colo. 1981). § 2.5.6—Guilty Pleas by Counsel If a defendant is actually present in open court with counsel, ......