Laughlin v. Tips

• Decision Date: 07 November 1894
• Citation: 28 S.W. 551
• Parties: LAUGHLIN v. TIPS et al.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

28 S.W. 551

LAUGHLIN v. TIPS et al.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas.

November 7, 1894.

Appeal from district court, Bexar county; W. W. King, Judge.

Action in trespass to try title by Walter Tips and others against E. A. Laughlin. Plaintiffs had judgment, and defendant appealed. Reversed.

Wm. Aubrey, for appellant. P. J. Lewis, Wurzbach & Goeth, and John A. & N. O. Green, for appellees.

FLY, J.

This is an action of trespass to try title to 208 acres of land in Bexar county, commonly known as the "Bedford Hodge Tract," brought by appellees against appellant. Appellant answered by general demurrer and special exceptions, and by pleas of not guilty, and improvements in good faith. The exceptions were overruled, and, the case being tried before a jury, they returned a verdict in favor of appellees for the land; that the improvements placed on the land by appellant were worth $750; that the value of the use and occupation of the land was $62.40, and the land was of the value of $1,600. Upon this verdict the proper judgment was rendered.

Appellees first sued in the name of Walter Tips; A. G. Castanola, of the firm of M. Castanola & Son; Armita Conover; and Mary A. Brown, joined by her husband. Afterwards, an amended petition was filed, describing the plaintiffs as Walter Tips; M. Castanola & Son, a firm composed of A. G. Castanola and M. Castanola; Armita Conover; and Mary A. Brown, joined by her husband. The only change made in the parties is the addition of the firm of Castanola & Son, or rather the addition of the name of the other partner of the firm. We are of the opinion that the amendment did not set up a new cause of action. The law of amendment in this state is liberal, and it would be contrary to its spirit to hold that the addition of a new party, or even a change of the capacity in which one of a number of plaintiffs sue, would be setting up a new cause of action. If there had been an entire change of parties, or the capacity in which they sued, there might be some force in the contention, but even in that event the matter would resolve itself into one of costs. Roberson v. McIlhenny, 59 Tex. 615.

Appellees introduced, as a link in their chain of title, a deed from W. T. Lytle to John T. Lytle and James Speed; and it is insisted by appellant that this instrument is a quitclaim deed, and as such conveyed only such interest as W. T. Lytle owned at the time the deed was executed, and any title acquired by said title afterwards did not inure to the benefit of the vendees in said deed, and said deed, being only a quitclaim deed, did not give notice of any adverse claim to any subsequent purchaser for value of the after-acquired title. It is the settled law of Texas, which was recognized by the judge who tried this cause, that a party receiving a quitclaim deed to land cannot be deemed a bona fide purchaser of any greater interest therein than his grantor had at the date of the execution of the deed. Rodgers v. Burchard, 34 Tex. 442; Harrison v. Boring, 44 Tex. 255; Taylor v. Harrison, 47 Tex. 460; Richardson v. Levi, 67 Tex. 359, 3 S. W. 444. Then, if the deed made conveyed only what title the vendor may have had at the time of the execution of the conveyance, and not the land itself, appellees, by their purchase from the vendees of W. T. Lytle, received only the interest that he had at the time, and any after-acquirement of title did not inure to their benefit. But if the deed, no matter how expressed, shows an intention on the part of W. T. Lytle to convey the land itself to John T. Lytle and James Speed, then the deed was not a quitclaim. "Where the deed assumes to convey the land, and not merely the title, such as it is, that the vendor has in it, and there is a general warranty, the deed not only imports a bona fide conveyance in reference to the subject of the sale and purchase designed thereby to be vested in the purchaser, but it will carry any after-purchased rights or title that may be acquired by the vendor, thereby avoiding any circuity of action of the general warranty." Harrison v. Boring, 44 Tex. 255. The deed of W. T. Lytle conveys to J. T. Lytle and James Speed "all that certain real and personal property, to wit, my right, title, and interest in and to a tract of land situated in Bexar county, Texas, containing about 209 acres, and known as the `Bedford Hodge Tract'";...