Lawrence Baking Co. v. Mich. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n

• Decision Date: 24 February 1944
• Docket Number: No. 7.,7.
• Citation: 13 N.W.2d 260,308 Mich. 198
• Parties: LAWRENCE BAKING CO. v. MICHIGAN UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION COMMISSION.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

308 Mich. 198

13 N.W.2d 260

LAWRENCE BAKING CO.

v.MICHIGAN UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION COMMISSION.

No. 7.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Feb. 24, 1944.

Proceeding by Lawrence Baking Company against the Michigan Unemployment Compensation Commission to review an award of unemployment compensation benefits. From a judgment affirming the award, plaintiff appeals in the nature of certiorari.

Affirmed.

BOYLES, WIEST, and BUTZEL, JJ., dissenting.Appeal (in the Nature of Certiorari) from Circuit Court, Ingham County; Leland W. Carr, Judge.

Before the Entire Bench.

Cummins & Cummins, of Lansing, for plaintiff and appellant.

Herbert J. Rushton, Atty. Gen., Edmund E. Shepherd, Sol. Gen., of Lansing, and Florence N. Clement and Daniel J. O'Hara, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee.

STARR, Justice.

Plaintiff appeals from a circuit court judgment affirming an award of unemployment compensation benefits by the appeal board of defendant commission.

The facts are stipulated. Plaintiff, a Michigan corporation, is engaged in the wholesale baking business in the city of Lansing. Prior to July 1, 1941, the United Bakery & Confectioners Workers, affiliated with the United Retail & Wholesale Workers of America, C. I. O., attempted to organize the employees of plaintiff company into a union. The union representatives and plaintiff's officials conferred on several occasions regarding a collective bargaining agreement as to hours of work, wages, seniority, and other conditions of employment. Such negotiations failed, and on July 1, 1941, 16 union members of plaintiff's 98 employees stopped work and went on strike. Such strike interrupted plaintiff's baking operations for a period of only about 15 minutes. It immediately hired new employees, and after July 1st there was no further interruption or stoppage of its work and operations. On July 2d it notified each of the 16 striking employees, by letter, that ‘due to your participation in the strike it has been necessary to replace you with a new employee.’ The union established a picket line at plaintiff's plant and continued such picketing until about September 16th.

Eleven of the 16 striking employees filed claims with defendant commission for unemployment compensation benefits for the period from July 8 to July 22, 1941. The commission issued its determination allowing such claims, and plaintiff appealed to the referee, who affirmed the allowance. The appeal board of the commission affirmed the referee's decision, and, upon review by certiorari, the circuit court entered judgment affirming the appeal board. Plaintiff appeals from such judgment.

This case, involving the question of the qualification of the claimants to receive unemployment benefits, requires an interpretation of Act No. 1, § 29(c), Pub.Acts 1936, Ex.Sess., as amended by Act No. 364, Pub.Acts 1941, effective July 1, 1941, Comp.Laws Supp.1942, § 8485-69, Stat.Ann.1941 Cum.Supp. § 17.531 (further amendments of said section 29 by Act No. 18, Pub.Acts 1942, 2d Ex.Sess., and by Act No. 246, Pub.Acts 1943 are not involved in the present case). Prior to the 1941 amendment, said section 29(c) of the 1936 act, as then last amended by Act No. 324, Pub.Acts 1939, and designated therein as section 29(d), provided in part:

‘An individual shall be disqualified for benefits: * * *

‘(d) For any week with respect to which his total or partial unemployment is due to a labor dispute which is actively in progress in the establishment in which he is or was last employed.’

The 1941 act amended said section 29 to read in part as follows:

‘An individual shall be disqualified for benefits: * * *

‘(c) For any week with respect to which his total or partial unemployment is due to a stoppage of work existing because of a labor dispute in the establishment in which he is or was last employed.’

To summarize, section 29(c) of the 1936 act disqualified an employee for benefits if his unemployment was ‘ due to a labor dispute * * * actively in progress in the establishment.’ The 1941 amendment of said section disqualifies an employee for benefits if his unemployment is ‘ due to a stoppage of work existing because of a labor dispute in the establishment.’ Plaintiff contends that the phrase of the amendment, ‘stoppage of work,’ means the work or employment of the individual employee. Under such contention plaintiff argues that by stopping their work and going on strike, the claimants disqualified themselves for benefits. Defendant contends, as held by the circuit court, that such phrase means the stoppage of the operations or work of the employer establishment.

The constitutionality of State social security acts, which include provisions for unemployment compensation, were upheld, in general, in Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 57 S.Ct. 868, 81 L.Ed. 1245, 109 A.L.R. 1327, and Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 672,57 S.Ct. 904, 81 L.Ed. 1307, 109 A.L.R. 1319.

In construing the 1941 amendment of section 29(c), we should ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature. In re Chamberlain's Estate, 298 Mich. 278, 299 N.W. 82;City of Grand Rapids v. Crocker, 219 Mich. 178, 189 N.W. 221. It may be presumed that by the 1941 amendment the legislature intended to change the meaning of the existing law. In 59 C.J. p. 1097, § 647, it is stated:

‘It will be presumed that the legislature, in adopting the amendment, intended to make some change in the existing law, and therefore the courts will endeavor to give some effect to the amendment. So a change of phraseology from that of the original act will raise the presumption that a change of meaning was also intended.’

In said 1941 amendment of section 29(c) the legislature adopted the identical provision used in the unemployment statutes of many other states to impose disqualification for unemployment benefits. See Social Security Yearbook 1940, p. 64 et seq. In the English National Insurance Act of 1911 (Statutes 1-2, Geo. V, chap. 55, § 87, as amended) the same provision is used to impose benefit disqualification. The construction placed upon similar statutory provisions by the courts of other states affords us guidance in interpreting such amendment. In re Cox's Estate, 284 Mich. 628, 279 N.W. 913, 117 A.L.R. 1224;Stellwagen v. Wayne Probate Judge, 130 Mich. 166, 89 N.W. 728.

A provision of the Nebraska unemployment insurance law, Nebraska Comp. Stats. Supp. 1939, § 48-705(d), was considered and construed in Magner v. Kinney, 141 Neb. 122, 2 N.W.2d 689. In holding that the phrase ‘stoppage of work’ meant the work or operations of the employer establishment and not the work of the individual claimant as an employee, the court said in part, page 128 of 141 Neb.,page 692 of 2 N.W.2d:

‘The next question for our consideration is the challenge to the interpretation given by the district court to the words of the statute, section 48-705: ‘An individual shall be disqualified for benefits * * * (d) For any week with respect to which the commissioner finds that his total unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute at the factory, establishment, or other premises at which he is or was last employed. * * *’ The district court construed this language to mean ‘that the term ‘stoppage of work,’ which appears in subsection (d) of section 48-705, Comp.St.Supp.1939, refers to an existing condition at the former place of employment on the date of the claims and not to the original cause of any claimant's unemployment.' In other words, the technical meaning of the term, ‘stoppage of work,’ as used in our disqualification clause, is a substantial curtailment of work in an establishment, not the cessation of work by the claimant or claimants.

‘The language of our unemployment compensation law quoted above was a substantial reenactment of the English National Insurance Act of 1911. See Statutes 1-2 Geo. V. ch. 55, sec. 87, which was amended in 1924 by section 4(1), ch. 30, Statutes 14-15, Geo. V. This language, it appears, had received a settled construction by the English authorities charged with the administration of this English act long prior to the adoption of it by ourselves.’

See, also, In re Steelman, 219 N.C. 306, 13 S.E.2d 544.

In the present case, in holding that the claimants were not disqualified from receiving benefits, the circuit court said in part:

‘Under the present form of the statute, the disqualification to receive benefits is not imposed on the employee unless a stoppage of work results from the labor dispute. On behalf of plaintiff it is contended that the language used in the amended act should be construed as having reference to the status of the employee. However, such interpretation would make the phrase ‘stoppage of work’ practically synonymous with ‘unemployment’ as used in the same sentence. Furthermore such interpretation would, as a practical proposition, leave the amendment without significance. The decisions dealing with this matter, both in England and in this country, uniformly support the construction accepted by the appeal board. It must be assumed that the legislature made the amendment of 1941, using the language quoted, in the light of prior judicial and administrative interpretation.'

We cannot agree with plaintiff's argument that the circuit court's construction of section 29(c), as amended, is in conflict with the declaration of public policy stated in section 2 of the 1936 act. Said section provides in part:

‘Declaration of policy. The legislature acting in the exercise of the police power of the state declares that the public policy of the state is as follows: * * * The systematic accumulation of funds during periods of employment to provide benefits for periods of unemployment by the setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own, thus maintaining purchasing power and limiting the serious social consequences of relief assistance, is for the...