Lawrence v. Great Northern Ry. Co.
| Decision Date | 06 July 1951 |
| Docket Number | No. 3608.,3608. |
| Citation | 98 F. Supp. 746 |
| Parties | LAWRENCE, Plaintiff v. GREAT NORTHERN RY. CO. (Walter D. Giertsen Co. et al. third-party defendants). |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
Bergmann Richards and Snyder, Gale, Hoke, Richards and Janes, of Minneapolis, Minn., appeared in behalf of third-party defendant Walter D. Giertsen Co.
Wright W. Brooks and Faegre and Benson, of Minneapolis, Minn., appeared in behalf of third-party defendant Waylander-Peterson Co.
Edwin C. Matthias, Anthony Kane, and J. H. Mulally, of St. Paul, Minn., appeared in behalf of Great Northern Ry. Co.
The motions to dismiss are bottomed upon two grounds; first, that the Court has no jurisdiction of the third-party defendants because no diversity of citizenship or other grounds of federal jurisdiction exist, and second, that the third-party proceeding would involve different issues and rules of law than are involved in the original proceeding, which would render the proceedings more complicated to the prejudice of the rights of the third-party defendants.
The plaintiff, James Lawrence, Sr., a switch foreman in the employ of the defendant, Great Northern Railway Company, brings this action against the defendant under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq. He alleges that, while in the performance of his duties as a switch foreman, he was walking under a bridge which was being rebuilt over the defendant's tracks and that, while in the course of his employment, a large timber fell from the bridge and struck him, causing serious injuries. The negligence of the Railway Company is based primarily upon its alleged failure to exercise reasonable care in affording plaintiff a safe place to work. The third-party defendants, which are the contractor and sub-contractor respectively, were engaged in the rebuilding of the bridge pursuant to a contract with the State Highway Department acting through the City of Minneapolis. The third-party complaint sets forth that the third-party defendants, or one of them, negligently left a timber near the edge of the bridge in such a position that it would fall off and that it was this timber which subsequently fell and struck the plaintiff. The Railway Company in its third-party complaint demands judgment against the third-party defendants for all sums that may be adjudged against it in favor of plaintiff.
Before the question of jurisdiction is discussed, the second ground of the third-party defendants' motions may be considered. At the outset, it should be noted that the Railway Company had nothing to do with the construction of the building of the bridge. There was no concert of action between the defendant and third-party defendants. If there is any liability on the part of the third-party defendants and the Railway Company to the plaintiff, their negligence was not joint, but concurrent. They are not in pari delicto. Under the pleadings, if the Railway Company is liable, the liability arises because it failed to exercise reasonable care in furnishing plaintiff a safe place to work and any liability under the Federal Employers' Liability Act on these grounds would be imputed to it by reason of the alleged acts of the third-party defendants. The defendant has not requested contribution, but rather indemnity on the grounds that the third-party defendants are solely responsible for the timber falling off the bridge. Apparently it is recognized that the rights to obtain indemnity must be determined under the Minnesota law. This State recognizes the right of contribution and indemnity under certain circumstances as between parties whose negligence is concurrent. However, as stated in Duluth, Missabe & N. Ry. Co. v. McCarthy, 183 Minn. 414, 236 N.W. 766, there must be a common liability in order to sustain the right of indemnity. Hence, the facts and the applicable law must establish liability to the plaintiff on the part of one or both of these third-party defendants before there would be any liability over to the Railway Company. The differences in the applicable law of tort liability on the part of the Railway Company to the plaintiff and on the part of the third-party defendants to the plaintiff present the complications which the movants allege as grounds for invoking the Court's discretion in granting their motions to dismiss. It is pointed out that, as to the third-party defendants, contributory negligence would be a complete defense, and as to the Railway Company only a partial defense, and moreover, that assumption of risk is a defense under the common law liability which must form the basis of any liability of the third-party defendants to the plaintiff, while that defense is abolished as to the Railway Company under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. These differences in the applicable law present such complications, according to the movants, that the jury would become confused and unable to apply these principles of law clearly and intelligently, to the prejudice of the rights of the third-party defendants. That there may be substance to the fears of the movants in this regard may be conceded, but I do not believe that they loom so formidably that the motions should be granted. And there is nothing anomalous or exceptional in our procedure in submitting these issues to one jury. This plaintiff, under the Minnesota law, would have a right to sue this Railway Company and these third-party defendants in one action in State Court and one jury would have to determine the respective liability of each of these defendants, with contributory negligence and assumption of risk being a complete defense as to the contractors and with contributory negligence only a partial defense as to the Railway Company. Our State Supreme Court in Doyle v. St. Paul Union Depot Co., 134 Minn. 461, 159 N.W. 1081, recognized the right of a plaintiff to...
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