Lawson v. Toney
| Decision Date | 12 October 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:01CV00533.,1:01CV00533. |
| Citation | 169 F.Supp.2d 456 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina |
| Parties | Christopher Bradley LAWSON, Plaintiff, v. Matthew TONEY; Deborah Bryant, R.N.; Stephanie Madden, R.N.; Worth Hill, Sheriff of Durham County; Hartford Fire Insurance Company, Surety on Sheriff's Bond; Durham County; and Unknown Officers, Defendants. |
Marvin Sparrow, Kathryn L. Vanderberg, Sparrow & Vanderberg, Durham, NC, for Plaintiff.
Curtis O. Massey, II, Durham County Atty's Office, Durham, NC, Edwin C. Bryson, Jr., Patterson, Dilthey, Clay & Bryson, L.L.P., Raleigh, NC, for Defendants.
S.C. Kitchen, Office of Durham County Atty., Durham, NC, for Durham County.
Plaintiff Christopher Bradley Lawson filed this action on May 25, 2001, alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") and the common law of North Carolina against multiple defendants. In general, Plaintiff alleges that he was assaulted while confined in the Durham County Detention Facility ("Detention Facility"), as a result of Defendants' negligence and deliberate indifference.
This matter is before the court on a joint motion to dismiss by Defendants Hill and Hartford Fire Insurance Company ("Hartford Insurance"), a motion for sanctions by Defendant Hill, a motion to dismiss by Defendant Durham County, and a motion for costs and to stay further proceedings by Defendant Toney. For the following reasons, the court will grant the joint motion to dismiss by Defendants Hill and Hartford Insurance, deny Defendant Hill's motion for sanctions, grant Defendant Durham County's motion to dismiss, and deny Defendant Toney's motion for costs and stay of proceedings.
Pursuant to a court order, Plaintiff was serving his time on weekends and was incarcerated at the Detention Facility on the evening of May 26, 2000. At approximately 1:00 a.m. on May 27, 2000, two other inmates, Turrentine and Saunders, threatened Plaintiff in the presence of Defendant Toney, a Detention Facility guard. Plaintiff asked Defendant Toney to move him to another cell because of the threats. Defendant Toney refused. At 5:30 a.m. on May 27, 2000, Turrentine again threatened Plaintiff within hearing range of Defendant Toney. Approximately one-half hour later, Turrentine struck Plaintiff within a few feet of the officer's desk, breaking Plaintiff's jaw.
Detention Facility guards escorted Plaintiff to the medical station. Defendant Bryant, a Detention Facility nurse, ordered an x-ray. An x-ray was taken at 9:30 a.m., and Plaintiff was told that the results would be in by 1:00 p.m. Later, Defendant Madden, a Detention Facility nurse, gave Plaintiff Motrin for the pain. Plaintiff received no further medical attention until he was taken to Duke Hospital at 6:45 p.m. New x-rays were taken at Duke Hospital which indicated that Plaintiff's jaw was broken. On May 31, 2000, after his release from the Detention Facility, Plaintiff went back to Duke Hospital for a follow-up appointment and his jaw was wired shut.
The Detention Facility has a written classification policy that governs where and with whom inmates are housed. Under the classification policy, each inmate is to be classified upon admission to the Detention Facility. Any dangerous or violent inmates or inmates with outstanding detainers from other jurisdictions should be considered maximum security. Weekend inmates should be considered minimum security. Any inmate with mental health problems or disabling medical conditions should be housed in special needs/medical housing. Within seventy-two hours of the initial classification, the policy requires a more formal classification.
Plaintiff alleges that failure of the Detention Facility to properly classify Turrentine and him was the proximate cause of his injury. Plaintiff was housed with the general population in Cell Block 3B. Plaintiff, however, suffers from a seizure disorder and claims that he is bipolar. Plaintiff alleges that Detention Facility officials did not complete classification forms for him and that he should have been housed in special housing as a result of his medical conditions. Turrentine was also housed in Cell Block 3B. Turrentine was awaiting trial on eight counts of armed robbery and eight counts of kidnapping, was awaiting extradition to California, had a bond of $250,000.00, and was known to be a "troublemaker." (Fed.Compl. ¶¶ 28-30). Plaintiff alleges that, according to the classification policy, Turrentine should have been assigned to maximum security.
On October 5, 2000, Plaintiff initiated a cause of action in North Carolina state court against several defendants, including Defendant Hill (Durham County Sheriff), Defendant Hartford Insurance (surety on Defendant Hill's bond), and Defendant Toney (Detention Facility guard). Plaintiff filed an amended complaint in state court on December 15, 2000. Among other claims, Plaintiff asserted the following claims in his amended state complaint:
(24) Defendant Toney was negligent in failing to take any action in response to [Plaintiff's] request to be moved, or in response to the threats that he [had] heard directed at [Plaintiff] from inmate Turrentine ....
(28) Defendants Hill and Hartford Insurance are liable to Plaintiff under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the negligence of Defendants Toney, Bryant, Madden, and John Doe.
(29) Defendants Hill and Hartford Insurance are liable to Plaintiff for negligently failing to establish and maintain (1) an adequate system for providing prompt medical attention to inmates injured at the jail; and (2) an adequate system for classification of weekend inmates.
(30) Defendant Toney was deliberately indifferent to the threat of violence to Plaintiff, and is liable to Plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for a violation of Plaintiff's rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
(State Am. Compl. ¶¶ 24, 28-30).
On December 22, 2000, Defendant Hill filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's state claims against him. Defendant Hill moved to have the negligence and respondeat superior claims against him dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Defendant Hill also asserted the defense of public official immunity to the claims made against him in his individual capacity and sovereign immunity for claims asserted against him in his official capacity in excess of $25,000.00.1 The state trial court granted all of Defendant Hill's motions and involuntarily dismissed each of Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Hill.
On January 26, 2001, Defendant Toney filed a motion to dismiss in state court. Two days before the hearing, however, Plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice to all remaining defendants.
Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint in federal court on May 25, 2001. The federal complaint generally alleges the same facts as the amended state complaint. Among others, Plaintiff made the following claims:
(34) Defendant Toney ... demonstrated deliberate indifference to the risk of assault upon Plaintiff, resulting in Plaintiff's serious injuries, in violation of his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
(35) Defendants Hill and Durham County, through their failed classification policy and/or practice and custom, ... demonstrated deliberate indifference to the risk of assault upon Plaintiff, resulting in Plaintiff's serious injuries, in violation of his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
....
(37) Defendants Toney and Hill ... were negligent under North Carolina law, resulting in Plaintiff's injuries from the assault. By law, the acts and omissions of Defendant Toney are imputed to Defendant Hill.... Defendant Hartford Insurance, as surety on the sheriff's bond, is liable to Plaintiff for the negligent acts of Defendants Toney and Hill.
Federal courts asked to give preclusive effect to a state court judgment are bound by the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, to apply the law of the rendering state to determine whether and to what extent the state court judgment should have preclusive effect in the federal court action. Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81, 104 S.Ct. 892, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984). Thus, the question presented is whether, if the present action was pending in a North Carolina state court, North Carolina courts would give preclusive effect to the earlier state court judgment granting Defendant Hill's motion to dismiss.
Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, or res judicata, a final judgment on the merits in a prior action in a court of competent jurisdiction precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action. Thomas M. McInnis & Assocs., Inc. v. Hall, 318 N.C. 421, 428, 349 S.E.2d 552, 556 (1986). Thus, the essential elements of claim preclusion are: (1) a final judgment on the merits in an earlier lawsuit; (2) an identity of the cause of action in both actions; and (3) an identity of parties or their privies in both actions. Hogan v. Cone Mills Corp., 315 N.C. 127, 135, 337 S.E.2d 477, 482 (1985).
In the present case, the state court reached a final judgment on the merits. Although a Rule 12(b)(6), N.C.R. Civ. P., dismissal does not reach the merits of the complaint, it acts as an adjudication on the merits and precludes a plaintiff from refiling a claim unless the dismissal was without prejudice. Dawson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 106 N.C.App. 691, 693, 417 S.E.2d 841, 842 (1992); Fayetteville Investors v. Commercial Bldrs., Inc., 936 F.2d 1462, 1471 (4th Cir.1991) (...
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