Lawton v. INTERN. UNION OF POLICE, LOCAL
Decision Date | 05 October 1999 |
Docket Number | No. 91,397.,91,397. |
Parties | CITY OF LAWTON, a Municipal Corporation, Appellant, v. INTERNATIONAL UNION OF POLICE ASSOCIATIONS, LOCAL 24, bargaining agent, and William Mathis, Appellees. |
Court | United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma |
John H. Vincent City Attorney's Office Lawton, Oklahoma, For Appellant
Alan D. Rosenbaum, Lawton, Oklahoma, For Appellees
Released for Publication by Order of the Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, Division No. 4.
¶ 1 Appellant City of Lawton (City) suspended its employee William Mathis (Mathis) for 28 days without pay from August 5, 1996, to September 1, 1996. Mathis is employed by City as a police lieutenant with the Lawton Police Department. Mathis is a member of the International Union of Police Associations, Local 24 (Union). City and Union had a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) in effect which permitted Union members to have their suspensions reviewed by an arbitrator. Mathis chose arbitration.
¶ 2 The arbitrator conducted a hearing July 10, 1997, ruling on September 22, 1997, that Mathis' suspension was improper. The arbitrator found the suspension was in violation of the CBA, and ordered Mathis reimbursed for time and benefits lost during the suspension.
¶ 3 On October 20, 1997, City filed a petition with the Comanche County District Court seeking to vacate the arbitration award as exceeding the scope of the CBA. Union and Mathis each filed an answer denying the award was beyond the scope of the agreement. The trial court ruled in favor of the Union and, in an order filed May 12, 1998, denied City's motion to vacate. City appeals.
¶ 4 The facts in this case are undisputed. Where evidence is undisputed, only a question of law is involved, which is reviewable on appeal. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Wyer, 60 F.2d 856 (10th Cir. 1932). Contested issues of law are reviewable in all actions, suits, and proceedings by a de novo standard. Weeks v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 1994 OK CIV APP 171, 895 P.2d 731. Review of law is called "de novo," which means no deference, not necessarily a full rehearing or new factfinding. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984).
¶ 5 City contends the arbitrator used the wrong standard of review, and therefore exceeded its authority, rendering the arbitration award void on its face, and thus reviewable by this court. We first examine the limits of the arbitrator's authority. City of Yukon v. International Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 2055, 1990 OK 48, ¶ 11, 792 P.2d 1176, 1180.
¶ 6 Paragraph 5.6(E) of the fiscal year 1995/1996 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) states:
E. With respect to the interpretation, enforcement, or application of the provisions of the agreement, the decision, findings, and recommendations of the arbitrator shall be final and binding on the parties to this Agreement. The authority and responsibility of the City as provided by the Charter of the City of Lawton shall not be usurped in any manner, unless specifically amended or modified by this agreement. (Emphasis added.)
¶ 7 Paragraph 2.2 of the CBA states in relevant part:
¶ 8 Article 8, Section 8-1 of City's charter states:
A merit system is hereby established for personnel in the city service. Appointments and promotions in the service of the city shall be made solely on the basis of merit and fitness; and removals, demotions, suspensions, and layoffs shall be made solely for the good of the service.. . . (Emphasis added.)
By the clear terms of the CBA, City can agree to modify or amend portions of its charter, but can never agree to supersede the charter. The arbitrator's award specifically found City failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the suspension was for a proper cause, the standard used in paragraph 2.2(G) of the CBA, but did not address the standard set out in the charter, i.e., for the good of the service.
¶ 9 City thus contends the sole issue before this court is which standard the arbitrator was to apply — that found in the CBA, or that found in the city charter? City contends the arbitrator superseded City's charter by using the standard found in the CBA, rather than that found in the charter, thus violating both the charter and the...
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