Layne v. Crist Elec. Contractor, Inc., Record No. 0756–13–3.

Decision Date17 December 2013
Docket NumberRecord No. 0756–13–3.
Citation62 Va.App. 632,751 S.E.2d 679
PartiesMelvin L. LAYNE v. CRIST ELECTRICAL CONTRACTOR, INC. and Assurance Services Corporation.
CourtVirginia Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Monica Taylor Monday (Matthew W. Broughton; Gregory D. Habeeb; Robert E. Evans; Gentry Locke Rakes & Moore, Roanoke, on briefs), for appellant.

Christopher M. Kite (Lucas & Kite, PLC, Roanoke, on brief), for appellees.

Present: HUMPHREYS and BEALES, JJ. and ANNUNZIATA, S.J.

ANNUNZIATA, Judge.

Melvin L. Layne (claimant) appeals a decision of the Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission affirming the deputy commissioner's denial of claimant's request for benefits on a finding that claimant willfully and knowingly violated a known safety rule. Claimant cites three errors in his challenge to the commission's denial of his objection, motion to vacate, and motion to reconsider the March 20, 2013 review opinion:

a. The Full Commission, as composed for review of this case, lacked authority to review the Deputy Commissioner's Opinion as only two of the three statutorily authorized Commissioners decided it.

b. No statute authorized a retired Commissioner to participate in review of this decision, whether by designation or recall.

c. A majority of the statutorily authorized Commissioners did not reach a decision in this case; the Commission lacked a necessary quorum for a majority decision.

The threshold issue in this appeal that we address first concerns the commission's authority to review cases before it in the absence of three commissioners who are authorized by statute to participate in review proceedings. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the decision of the full commission and remand for further proceedings.1

BACKGROUND

On January 19, 2009, claimant sustained injuries while employed with Crist Electrical Contractor, Inc. (employer) and he filed a claim with the commission.2 At a hearing on the claim, employer agreed that claimant suffered an injury during the course of his employment, but defended the claim under Code § 65.2–306 and argued claimant was barred from receiving benefits because claimant willfully violated a known safety rule.

On August 24, 2011, a deputy commissioner denied claimant's request for benefits, finding that employer's safety procedure was reasonable, that claimant had knowledge of the procedure, and that claimant willfully and knowingly failed to follow the established procedure. Claimant appealed to the full commission.

On December 7, 2011, after written statements were filed, Chief Deputy Commissioner James J. Szablewicz sent a letter to claimant informing him that Commissioner Diamond had retired effective December 1, 2011. The parties were directed to inform the commission whether they objected to proceeding with a deputy commissioner appointed to serve on the review panel following Commissioner Diamond's retirement. On December 9, 2011, claimant filed an objection and requested a review by three commissioners in accordance with Code §§ 65.2–704 and 65.2–705.

The review hearing proceeded with Commissioners Williams and Marshall and retired Commissioner Dudley comprising the panel. Although Commissioner Dudley had retired effective February 1, 2013, he was designated by the chairman of the commission to participate in the review. The panel issued its review opinion on March 20, 2013. Retired Commissioner Dudley and Commissioner Williams affirmed the deputy commissioner's opinion while Commissioner Marshall dissented, finding that the evidence did not support the willful misconduct defense because, at best, the evidence showed that claimant was negligent.

After the commission affirmed the deputy commissioner's decision, claimant filed a motion to vacate and objected to retired Commissioner Dudley's participation in the decision on the ground that he was not statutorily authorized to participate in the review. Claimant contended that, since three statutorily authorized commissioners had not participated in the review of his case, the review opinion reflected the absence of the necessary quorum for a majority decision. Claimant requested reconsideration of his claim by a properly constituted full commission. In denying claimant's motion to vacate and motion for reconsideration, the three active commissioners 3 found that participation in a review panel by a retired commissioner was proper, noting, however, the absence of express statutory authority for the recall of retired commissioners.4 The commissioners based their decision on Code §§ 17.1–327 and 65.2–201.

ANALYSIS

The commission is a creature of statute and derives its authority from the General Assembly. Kim v. Sportswear, 10 Va.App. 460, 471, 393 S.E.2d 418, 424 (1990). [A]s such it is a matter of legislative prerogative as to the organization and authority of the ... Commission.” Id. By statute, the review of a deputy commissioner's award shall be before the full commission. Code § 65.2–705(A). The statute further states the commission is comprised of three members who are elected by the General Assembly. Code § 65.2–200(B). “Without those three [statutorily authorized] members, the commission was subject to a challenge to its authority to decide the cases before it.” Hitt Constr. v. Pratt, 53 Va.App. 422, 433, 672 S.E.2d 904, 909 (2009).5

In addition to the provisions governing the organization and authority of the Workers' Compensation Commission, the Virginia Code contains provisions governing the method and circumstances under which a vacancy on the commission is to be filled.

Code § 65.2–200(C) provides:

Whenever a vacancy in the Commission occurs or exists when the General Assembly is in session, the General Assembly shall elect a successor for the unexpired term. If the General Assembly is not in session, the Governor shall forthwith appoint pro tempore a qualified person to fill the vacancy for a term ending thirty days after the commencement of the next session of the General Assembly, and the General Assembly shall elect a successor for the unexpired term.

In addition, Code § 65.2–705(D) states that [w]hen a vacancy on the Commission exists, or when a member of the Commission is absent or is prohibited from sitting with the full Commission to hear a review, the Chairman may appoint a deputy commissioner to participate in the review.” 6

The General Assembly's intent in passing these statutes is made known by the ‘plain and natural meaning of the words used.’ Gordon v. Ford Motor Co., 55 Va.App. 363, 370, 685 S.E.2d 880, 883–84 (2009) ( en banc ) (quoting Alcoy v. Valley Nursing Homes, Inc., 272 Va. 37, 41, 630 S.E.2d 301, 303 (2006)), aff'd,281 Va. 543, 708 S.E.2d 846 (2011). ‘When analyzing a statute, we must assume that “the legislature chose, with care, the words it used when it enacted the relevant statute, and we are bound by those words as we interpret the statute.” Rasmussen v. Commonwealth, 31 Va.App. 233, 238, 522 S.E.2d 401, 403 (1999) (quoting Frazier v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Soc. Servs., Div. of Child Support Enforcement ex rel. Sandridge, 27 Va.App. 131, 135, 497 S.E.2d 879, 881 (1998)).

Here, as acknowledged by the commission, the authority to designate or recall a retired commissioner to participate in a review hearing is not expressly provided by statute. Nonetheless, it denied claimant's motion to vacate and reconsider relying on the provisions of Code § 17.1–327 and Code § 65.2–201(A) to support its conclusion. Code § 17.1–327 provides for “the payment of services for retired judges, members of the State Corporation Commission and the Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission who are temporarily recalled for service.” Code § 65.2–201(A) addresses the general duties and powers of the commission and provides that [i]t shall be the duty of the Commission to administer this title and adjudicate issues and controversies relating thereto.... The Commission shall make rules and regulations for carrying out the provisions of this title.” We find the commission's reliance on these two statutory provisions to be misplaced.

We review the commission's construction of the statutes de novo on appeal. Thomas v. Commonwealth, 59 Va.App. 496, 500, 720 S.E.2d 157, 159 (2012). Accordingly, we will withhold the deference we normally accord the commission's statutory interpretation of the Workers' Compensation Act when the commission's interpretation conflicts with the plain language of the statute.” Peacock v. Browning Ferris, Inc., 38 Va.App. 241, 248, 563 S.E.2d 368, 372 (2002).

The words comprising Code §§ 17.1–327 and 65.2–201, when accorded their plain meaning, are silent on the commission's authority to recall or designate a retired commissioner to serve in a review proceeding. Virginia courts “construe the law as it is written,” Hampton Roads Sanitation Dist. Comm'n v. Chesapeake, 218 Va. 696, 702, 240 S.E.2d 819, 823 (1978), and assume that “the legislature chose, with care, the words it used when it enacted the relevant statute,” Barr v. Town & Country Props., Inc., 240 Va. 292, 295, 396 S.E.2d 672, 674 (1990). A court may not adopt a construction of the statute that would amount to holding that the legislature did not mean what it has actually expressed. Advanced Marine Enters. v. PRC, Inc., 256 Va. 106, 125, 501 S.E.2d 148, 159 (1998).

The commission's conclusion that the provision for the payment of services for retired judges, members of the State Corporation Commission, and the Virginia Workers Compensation Commission who are “temporarily recalled for service” under Code § 17.1–3277 authorizes the recall or designation of a retired commissioner to participate in review hearings ignores the premise for payment under Code § 17.1–327, to wit, that one has been properly “temporarily recalled for service,” the very question raised here. The materiality of that premise is reflected in other statutory provisions adopted by the legislature that expressly provide for the temporary recall...

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    ...“ ‘that the General Assembly clearly knew how to [create such authority] ... when it so desired.’ ” Layne v. Crist Elec. Contr., Inc., 62 Va.App. 632, 642, 751 S.E.2d 679, 684 (2013) (alterations in original) (quoting Schwartz v. Schwartz, 46 Va.App. 145, 157–58, 616 S.E.2d 59, 66 (2005)). ......
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