Layton v. Hammond-Brown-Jennings Co.

• Decision Date: 12 June 1939
• Docket Number: 14895.
• Citation: 3 S.E.2d 492,190 S.C. 425
• Parties: LAYTON v. HAMMOND-BROWN-JENNINGS CO. et al.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

3 S.E.2d 492

190 S.C. 425

LAYTON v. HAMMOND-BROWN-JENNINGS CO. et al.

No. 14895.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

June 12, 1939

Osborne Butler & Moore, of Spartanburg, for appellants.

Johnston & Williams and Hannon & Lancaster, all of Spartanburg, for respondent.

BAKER Justice.

In this action, respondent, an employee of the appellant, Hammond-Brown-Jennings Company, seeks to recover compensation for hernia alleged to have been sustained while about the usual duties of his employment with said appellant.

The appellants having denied liability, a hearing was had and testimony taken before one member of the Industrial Commission, who rendered an opinion awarding compensation to respondent. On appeal to the full Commission, the award of the single Commissioner was confirmed; and on appeal to the Court of Common Pleas, the action of the Commission was sustained, and the appeal dismissed. From such order, an appeal has been taken to this Court.

The appellants' "Statement of Issues" follows:

"1. Does the evidence show that claimant-respondent's hernia was the result of an 'injury by accident', as provided in Section 2-F of the South Carolina Compensation Act, and does it show that such hernia 'immediately followed an accident', as required by Section 2-R of said Act?

"2. Does the evidence show the claimant's hernia appeared suddenly as required by Section 2-R of said Act?"

Subsections (f) and (r) of section 2 of the South Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act read, respectively:

"(f) 'Injury' and 'personal injury' shall mean only injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment, and shall not include a disease in any form except where it results naturally and unavoidably from the accident."

"(r) In all claims for compensation for hernia or rupture resulting from injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employee's employment, it must be definitely proven to the satisfaction of the Industrial Commission:

"First. That there was an injury resulting in hernia or rupture.

"Second. That the hernia or rupture appeared suddenly.

"Third. That it was accompanied by pain.

" Fourth. That the hernia or rupture immediately followed an accident.

"Fifth. That the hernia or rupture did not exist prior to the accident for which compensation is claimed." Act July 17, 1935, 39 St. at Large, pp. 1233, 1234.

In Rudd v. Fairforest Finishing Co. et al., 189 S.C 188, 200 S.E. 727, 728, there is such an excellent statement of the law and governing principles of the Workmen's Compensation Act applicable to the instant case, that we quote copiously therefrom:

"It is a familiar formula that findings of fact by a Board or Commission on a claim under a Workmen's Compensation Act are conclusive; and the appellate court will not review such findings except to determine whether there is any evidence to support the award. It may reverse an award if there is an absence of any evidence to support it, but it is not a trier of facts. If the facts proved are capable as a matter of law of sustaining the inferences of fact drawn from them by the Board, its findings are conclusive in the absence of fraud, and neither this Court nor the Court of Common Pleas is at liberty to interfere with them. This is but an application to Workmen's Compensation cases of the fundamental principle universal in Courts of law, that whether there is any competent evidence is for the Court to determine, but whether the evidence is sufficient is a question for the jury; the function of the Commission being in that respect that of a jury in actions of law. While the findings of fact by the Industrial Commission will be upheld if there is any evidence on which it can rest, it must be founded on evidence, and cannot rest on surmise, conjecture or speculation. Phillips v. Dixie Stores, Inc., et al., 186 S.C. 374, 195 S.E. 646; Murdaugh v. Robert Lee Const. Co., 185 S.C. 497, 194 S.E. 447; Spearman v. F. S. Royster Guano Co., 188 S.C. 393, 199 S.E. 530.

"These governing principles find general concurrence in other jurisdictions. See Note in Ann.Cas., 1918B, 647. Compensation laws should be given a liberal construction in furtherance of the beneficent purpose for which they were enacted, and if possible, so as to avoid incongruous or harsh results. Baltimore & Philadelphia Steamboat Company v. Norton, 284 U.S. 408, 414, 52 S.Ct. 187, 189, 76 L.Ed. 366.

"In our opinion, the legislative purpose evident in our Act is to restrict compensation for hernia to those cases where there is a relative and reasonably close coincidence between the accidental injury and the hernia, and where it is clear that no other agency intervened, as to time, place, or action, to cause the injury.

"The words 'suddenly' and 'immediately' are elastic terms, admitting of much variety of definition, as held by the Commission. And, as used in the Act, these words should not be construed as the equivalent of the word 'instantaneous.' Like similar absolute expressions, they are used here with less strictness than the literal meaning requires. For to give them their literal signification in all cases, regardless of the attendant situations and circumstances, would often defeat meritorious claims upon purely technical grounds, and thus frustrate the purpose of the Act."

Having in mind the foregoing principles of the Act, we will discuss the "Issues" in inverse order.

Respondent was engaged in moving some laundry heaters. These heaters weighed approximately sixty pounds, and were stacked four high. When respondent picked up one of these heaters, and as he "came around with it", "something caught me". "It felt like something pulled loose in my stomach, the right side". Respondent further testified that his injury was accompanied by pain. He undertook to move a couple more stoves, but the pain became so severe, he quit and reported the incident and his condition or injury to Mr. Lambert Hammond, the shipping clerk of the appellant-employer. Mr. Hammond sent respondent to a Dr. Temples, who examined him, but did not determine what was wrong. He continued to go to Dr. Temples, and on Wednesday night (the injury occurred on Monday before) respondent went to Dr. W. S. Zimmerman, and as a result of the examination by Dr. Zimmerman, was operated upon the following Saturday--an exploratory operation--in which his appendix was removed, and as the appendix "was more or less innocent looking", and apparently was not a sufficient cause for his symptoms, the surgeons "felt down lower and found a group of gut, intestines, which had entered in the hernial ring, but saw no external evidence of it at all." The attending surgeons agreed that respondent would probably not get relief unless they repaired the hernia, so they extended the incision, repaired the ring, closed it up, and respondent made an uneventful recovery. Respondent never had any trouble with his right side before the date of this injury; and this injury came on suddenly while he was lifting the stove. The further medical testimony was that the protusion, which is the hernia, was of recent date.

There was testimony from which the Industrial Commission could easily conclude that respondent's hernia appeared suddenly; and the Circuit Judge very properly refused to hold otherwise. The last two paragraphs from opinion in the Rudd case, quoted hereinabove, are especially applicable to the facts of this case.

Did the hernia or rupture result from injury by accident? Did the hernia or rupture immediately follow an accident?

When respondent's injury occurred he was lifting a heater off the pile or stack of heaters just like he had lifted the others-- in the usual manner. He did not strike himself in any way, He did not slip, his foot did not slip and he did not stumble nor fall. There was no untoward happening. He was not conscious of any strain. However, from the circumstances related, it is a reasonable inference that there was a strain.

Therefore, the question before the Court is: What is meant by the word "accident" as used in the...