Ledbetter v. Astrue

• Decision Date: 07 April 2011
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 8:10-CV-00195-JDA
• Parties: Terry M. Ledbetter, Sr., Plaintiff, v. Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina

Terry M. Ledbetter, Sr., Plaintiff,

v. Michael J. Astrue,Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 8:10-CV-00195-JDA

DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

GREENVILLE DIVISION

Filed: April 7, 2011

ORDER

This matter is before the Court for a final Order pursuant to Local Civil Rules 73.02(B)(1) and 83.VII.02, D.S.C., 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), and the Honorable Margaret B. Seymour's June 11, 2010 Order referring this matter for disposition. Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("the Commissioner"), denying Plaintiff's claims for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI"). For the reasons set forth below, the decision of the Commissioner is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Commissioner for further administrative action consistent with this Order.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed a claim for DIB and SSI on January 12, 2005 (protective filing date, January 3, 2005), alleging a disability onset date of January 9, 2004. [R. 56, 71, 305.] The claim was initially denied on June 24, 2005, [R. 41-45] and was denied upon reconsideration by the Social Security Administration ("the Administration") on October 19, 2005 [R. 48-49]. Plaintiff requested and was granted a hearing before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Arthur L. Conover on July 12, 2007. [R. 52, 1146-65.] By decision dated August 31, 2007, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act ("the Act"). [R. 20.]

Following his review of the evidence, the ALJ found Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the impairments listed at 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. [R. 22, Finding 4.] The ALJ also found that (1) Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform an unlimited range of exertional activity; (2) Plaintiff needed to avoid concentrated exposure to environmental irritants; needed simple, routine, repetitive work; and needed to avoid waiting on the public as customers, either in person or on the telephone; (3) Plaintiff could not perform any supervisory responsibility and needed to avoid large crowds in the workplace; and (4) Plaintiff needed ready access to a bathroom. [R. 24, Finding 5.] With these restrictions, the ALJ found Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work [R. 26, Finding 6], but jobs existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform, including the jobs of manufacturing laborer, linen room attendant, and hand packer [R. 27, Finding 10]. On December 11, 2009, the ALJ's findings became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review of the hearing decision. [R. 5-10; 20 C.F.R. § 404.981.] Plaintiff filed this action for judicial review on January 26, 2010.

THE PARTIES' POSITIONS

Plaintiff contends that the Commissioner erred when the ALJ (1) failed to properly evaluate the "medical source opinions" of Karen Cleven, a nurse practitioner, and John Miracle, a licensed professional counselor; (2) failed to properly evaluate Plaintiff's credibility; and (3) relied on flawed vocational expert testimony. Plaintiff also argues the Appeals Council failed to properly consider new and material evidence submitted with Plaintiff's request for review of the ALJ's decision. [Doc. 13.]

The Commissioner contends that the ALJ properly evaluated the opinions of Cleven and Miracle, neither of whom were "acceptable medical sources." The Commissioner also states that, because the ALJ had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of Plaintiff and to determine the credibility of Plaintiff, the ALJ's observations concerning Plaintiff's credibility are to be given great weight. Further, the Commissioner claims that the hypothetical considered by the vocational expert was proper, although it excluded limitations found by Cleven and Miracle, because the ALJ found Cleven and Miracle's testimony to be unsupported by the record. Lastly, the Commissioner contends that the Appeals Council was justified in denying review because the material presented was not "new." [Doc. 14.]

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Commissioner's findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla—i.e., the evidence must do more than merely create a suspicion of the existence of a fact and must include such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support the conclusion. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966) (citing Woolridge v. Celebrezze, 214 F. Supp. 686, 687 (S.D.W. Va. 1963)) ("Substantial evidence, it has been held, is evidence which a reasoning mind would accept as sufficient to support a particular conclusion. It consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance. If there is evidence to justify a refusal to direct a verdict were the case before a jury, then there is 'substantial evidence.'").

Where conflicting evidence "'allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the [Commissioner] (or the [Commissioner's] designate, the ALJ),'" not on the reviewing court. Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting Walker v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 635, 640 (7th Cir. 1987)); see also Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991) (stating that where the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, the court will affirm, even if the reviewer would have reached a contrary result as finder of fact and even if the reviewer finds that the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner's decision). Thus, it is not within the province of a reviewing court to determine the weight of the evidence, nor is it the court's function to substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner so long as the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Laws, 368 F.2d at 642; Snyder v. Ribicoff, 307 F.2d 518, 520 (4th Cir. 1962).

The reviewing court will reverse a Commissioner's decision on plenary review, however, if the decision applies incorrect law or fails to provide the court with sufficient reasoning to determine that the Commissioner properly applied the law. Myers v. Califano, 611 F.2d 980, 982 (4th Cir. 1980); see also Keeton v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994). Where the Commissioner's decision "is in clear disregard of the overwhelming weight of the evidence, Congress has empowered the courts to modify or reverse the [Commissioner's] decision 'with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.'" Vitek v. Finch, 438 F.2d 1157, 1158 (4th Cir. 1971) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Remand is unnecessary where "the record does not contain substantial evidence to support a decision denying coverage under the correct legal standard and when reopening the record for more evidence would serve no purpose." Breeden v. Weinberger, 493 F.2d 1002, 1012 (4th Cir. 1974).

The court may remand a case to the Commissioner for a rehearing under sentence four or sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Sargent v. Sullivan, 941 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1991) (unpublished table decision). To remand under sentence four, the reviewing court must find either that the Commissioner's decision is not supported by substantial evidence or that the Commissioner incorrectly applied the law relevant to the disability claim. See, e.g., Jackson v. Chater, 99 F.3d 1086, 1090-91 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding remand was appropriate where the ALJ failed to develop a full and fair record of the plaintiff's residual functional capacity); Brehem v. Harris, 621 F.2d 688, 690 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding remand was appropriate where record was insufficient to affirm but was also insufficient for court to find the plaintiff disabled). Where the court cannot discern the basis for the Commissioner's decision, a remand under sentence four may be appropriate to allow the Commissioner to explain the basis for the decision. See Smith v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1176, 1181-82 (4th Cir. 1986) (remanding case where decision of ALJ contained "a gap in its reasoning" because ALJ did not say he was discounting testimony or why); Gordon v. Schweiker, 725 F.2d 231, 235 (4th Cir. 1984) (remanding case where neither the ALJ nor the Appeals Council indicated the weight given to relevant evidence). On remand under sentence four, the ALJ should review the case on a complete record, including any new material evidence. See Smith, 782 F.2d at 1182 ("The [Commissioner] and the claimant may produce further evidence on remand."). After a remand under sentence four, the court enters a final and immediately appealable judgment and then loses jurisdiction. Sargent, 941 F.2d 1207 (citing Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 102 (1991)).

In contrast, sentence six provides:

The court may . . . at any time order additional evidence to be taken before the Commissioner of Social Security, but only upon a showing that there is new evidence which is material and that there is good cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A reviewing court may remand a case to the Commissioner on the basis of new evidence only if four prerequisites are met: (1) the evidence is relevant to the determination of disability at the time the application was first filed; (2) the evidence is material to the extent that the Commissioner's decision might reasonably have been different had the new evidence been before him; (3) there is good cause for the claimant's failure to submit the...