Ledger-Enquirer Co. v. Brown, LEDGER-ENQUIRER
| Citation | 213 Ga. 538,100 S.E.2d 166 |
| Decision Date | 11 October 1957 |
| Docket Number | No. 19824,LEDGER-ENQUIRER,19824 |
| Parties | TheCOMPANY v. Carlton BROWN. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Georgia |
Syllabus by the Court
The judgment of the court below, overruling the demurrers raising the question of the jurisdiction of the court, was error.
Carlton Brown brought suit in Stewart County Superior Court against The Ledger-Enquirer Company, a newspaper publishing corporation which has its principal office in Columbus, Muscogee County, Georgia, alleging that said corporation in its newspaper, the Columbus Enquirer, had phblished false and libelous matter of and concerning the plaintiff, for which he sought damages.
The petition as amended alleged as follows:
The defendant corporation filed its general demurrer to the original petition and renewed its demurrers to the petition as amended, in which, among other things, it attacked the jurisdiction of the Superior Court of Stewart County. The trial judge ruled only on the demurrers attacking the jurisdiction of the court. These demurrers were overruled and the motion to dismiss the petition was denied. The exception here is to that judgment.
Foley, Chappell, Kelly & Champion, Columbus, for plaintiff in error.
Carlton S. Brown, Lumpkin, James H. Fort, Al Williams, Columbus, for defendant in error.
Sell & Comer, Mallory C. Atkinson, Macon, Victor Davidson, Irwinton, Carlisle & Edwards, J. Douglas Carlisle, Macon, Randall Evans, Jr., Thomson, for parties at interest.
he sole question involved in the instant case is the constitutionality of an act of the General Assembly passed in 1956 (Ga.L.1956, pp. 4-6), which reads in part as follows:
* * *'
Plaintiff in error attacks as unconstitutional each of the above-quoted sections and the act as a whole as unconstitutional for numerous reasons, as violating stated provisions of the Constitution of Georgia and of the Constitution of the United States. Among the attacks made upon the act in question, are that sections one, two and three and the act as a whole are unconstitutional and void because violative of Art. I, Sec. IV, Par. 1 (Code § 2-401) of the Constitution of Georgia, in that it is a special law on a subject where a prior general law exists; that the act violates Art. I, § I, Par. II of the Constitution of Georgia in that it denies to the plaintiff the impartial and complete protection of the law; and that said act violates Art. I, § I, Par. III of the Constitution of Georgia, in that it denies to the plaintiff due process of law.
The question involved in this case under each of the above provisions is one of classification. It is clear that the legislature may, for purposes of legislation, classify, and may legislate with respect to, each classification. The power of the legislature to classify for the purposes of legislation, however, is not without limitation. The classification must be natural and not arbitrary. It must have a reasonable relation to the subject matter of the legislation, and must furnish some legitimate ground of differentiation. Geele v. State, 202 Ga. 381, 43 S.E.2d 254, 172 A.L.R. 196. The legislation must be coextensive with and operate uniformly upon the entire class to which it is applicable.
The question in the instant case, therefore, is whether or not the classification the legislature has made in the act here involved is within the limitations placed upon the power of the legislature to classify for purposes of legislation as stated above. While it has been held that it is a legislative power to declare the residence of corporations (Davis v. Central Railroad & Banking Co., 17 Ga. 323; Gilbert v. Georgia Railroad and Banking Co., 104 Ga. 412, 30 S.E. 673), when the legislature chooses to classify corporations for the purpose of declaring their residences, its classifications must fall within the limitations above set out.
Turning now to the act before us, it is apparent that the purpose of the act is to establish the venue in actions for damages against certain corporations and to fix the residences of such corporations for the purposes of such suits. The classification which the legislature has chosen to make is: corporations publishing newspapers, magazines, and periodicals having a circulation in more than one county in this State. This classification...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Orkin v. State
...the crime of conspiracy to commit murder. Baugh v. City of LaGrange, 161 Ga. 80(2a), 130 S.E. 69 (1925); Ledger-Enquirer Co. v. Brown, 213 Ga. 538, 540, 100 S.E.2d 166 (1957); Clinkscales v. State, 102 Ga.App. 670, 674, 117 S.E.2d 229 We find Enumeration 9 to be without merit. 5. Enumeratio......
-
Stewart v. Davidson
...they are likewise barred from assailing that provision under the uniformity clause of the Constitution. In Ledger-Enquirer Co. v. Brown, 213 Ga. 538, 540, 100 S.E.2d 166, 168, an act of the General Assembly was attacked under the uniformity clause, due process clause, and equal protection c......
-
McAllister v. American Nat. Red Cross
...general effect are reasonable and not arbitrary. City of Atlanta v. Gower, 216 Ga. 368, 116 S.E.2d 738 (1960); Ledger-Enquirer Co. v. Brown, 213 Ga. 538, 100 S.E.2d 166 (1957); Stewart v. Anderson, 140 Ga. 31, 78 S.E. 457 (1913); McGinnis v. Ragsdale, 116 Ga. 245, 42 S.E. 492 The rationale ......
-
Atlanta Newspapers, Inc. v. Grimes
...cases: McGill v. State of Georgia, 209 Ga. 500, 74 S.E.2d 78; Waters v. Fleetwood, 212 Ga. 161, 91 S.E.2d 344; Ledger-Enquirer Co. v. Brown, 213 Ga. 538, 100 S.E.2d 166; Townsend v. State, 54 Ga.App. 627, 188 S.E. 560; Ledger-Enquirer Co. v. Brown, 214 Ga. 422, 105 S.E.2d 229. We heartily s......