Lee v. Dunklee
| Decision Date | 25 June 1958 |
| Docket Number | No. 6357,6357 |
| Citation | 326 P.2d 1117,84 Ariz. 260 |
| Parties | Annie Williams LEE, formerly known as Annie Williams, Appellant, v. Carol DUNKLEE; Jessie Evelyn Bosse; Cecelia Ainsa; Elmer G. King; Norman A. Ross; and James E. Lindsay, James O. Lecky and David P. Kimball, formerly constituting the Board of Supervisors of Maricopa County, Arizona; Maricopa County, Arizona, a body politic. Appellees. |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Ira J. Bergman, Phoenix, for appellant.
Shimmel, Hill, Cavanagh & Kleindienst, and John E. Savoy, Phoenix, Charles C. Stidham, County Atty., and J. J. Caretto, Deputy County Atty., Phoenix, for appellees.
Appeal by plaintiff from a judgment of dismissal entered on an order sustaining a motion to dismiss of defendant, Maricopa County, and certain of its employees.
The complaint alleged that Laurence Williams, infant son of the plaintiff, age seven months, was admitted for treatment to the hospital maintained and operated by the County of Maricopa, who accepted and rendered hospital and medical services both to indigent and paying patients. The complaint did not allege that the deceased was a paying patient. On October 22, 1951, the infant was severaly scalded or burned in the pediatric ward while being treated by an attendant, due to the negligence of an attendant, and died a few days later.
The motion to dismiss was sustained on the ground the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The question is whether a county which operates a general hospital and imposes a charge for the care and treatment is immune from liability in tort for the negligence of its agents.
Plaintiff contends that because the statute of this state (§ 17-348, A.C.A.1939 1) specifically authorizes the hospital to admit pay patients, in so doing the hospital operates in a proprietary capacity and rule of governmental immunity is not applicable.
Plaintiff relies principally upon the cases of Henderson v. Twin Falls County, 56 Idaho 124, 50 P.2d 597, 101 A.L.R. 1151, and Suwannee County Hospital Corporation v. Golden, Fla., 56 So.2d 911; however, we agree with the disposition the Supreme Court of New Mexico made of those cases in Elliott v. Lea County, 58 N.M. 147, 267 P.2d 131, 132, wherein the court said:
See also 25 A.L.R.2d 229.
We hold with the majority rule that the operation of a county hospital is a governmental function, and that the county as an arm of the state is immune from suit and liability by indigent patients for the negligence of its officers or employees, 20 C.J.S. Counties § 220, and 14 Am.Jur., Counties, §§ 48 and 49; and that the imposition of a charge for service on those able to pay is not inconsistent with the exercise of a governmental function. Waterman v. Los Angeles County General Hospital, 123 Cal.App.2d 143, 266 P.2d 221; Talley v. Northern San Diego County Hospital Dist., 41 Cal.2d 33, 257 P.2d 22; and 25 A.L.R.2d 229, and cases cited.
Plaintiff also contends that the doctrine of immunity is not applicable if the county proceeded to build, maintain and operate a hospital when there was no mandatory duty imposed by law upon it compelling such action.
Section 17-401, A.C.A.1939, 2 provides:
'The boards of supervisors in each county of the state shall have the sole and exclusive jurisdiction to provide for the hospitalization and medical care of the indigent sick in such county, * * *.'
While we have held that it is a mandatory duty of the supervisors to provide medical attendance for the indigent sick, Industrial Commission v. Navajo County, 64 Ariz. 172, 167 P.2d 113, we do not believe under the provisions of the above quoted section there is a mandatory duty to erect a hospital to comply therewith.
The fact that the county was not required to establish and maintain a hospital but voluntarily exercised that power does not deprive it of governmental immunity. The maintenance of the county hospital was for a purpose essentially public and for the general and common good of the inhabitants of the county, and therefore a governmental function. 25 A.L.R.2d 223.
In the case of Gartman v. City of McAllen, 130 Tex. 237, 107 S.W.2d 879, 880,...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Holytz v. City of Milwaukee
...(1962), 91 Ariz. 35, 369 P.2d 271-272, the Supreme Court of Arizona studied precisely the same problem and concluded: 'In Lee v. Dunklee [84 Ariz. 260, 326 P.2d 1117] this Court refused to recede from the doctrine of governmental immunity, stating that the problem was legislative. We now ex......
-
Clouse ex rel. Clouse v. State
...of sovereign immunity, holding that the authority to do so rested solely with the legislature. See, e.g., Lee v. Dunklee, 84 Ariz. 260, 263-64, 326 P.2d 1117, 1119 (1958) ("[W]hether the doctrine of governmental immunity should be modified in this state is a legislative question and such po......
-
Clark v. Ruidoso-Hondo Valley Hospital
...Ch. 122, Sec. 821, 2 Ill.Rev.Stat.1959.4 Garrett v. Escambia County Hospital Board, 1957, 266 Ala. 201, 94 So.2d 762; Lee v. Dunklee, 1958, 84 Ariz. 260, 326 P.2d 1117; City and County of Denver v. Madison, 1960, 142 Colo. 1, 351 P.2d 826; Hall v. Hospital Authority of Floyd County, 1956, 9......
-
Clouse v. State, Dept. of Public Safety
...of sovereign immunity, holding that the authority to do so rested solely with the legislature. See, e.g., Lee v. Dunklee, 84 Ariz. 260, 263-64, 326 P.2d 1117, 1119 (1958) ("[W]hether the doctrine of governmental immunity should be modified in this state is a legislative question and such po......