Leftridge v. Western Union Telegraph Co.
| Decision Date | 01 March 1919 |
| Citation | 210 S.W. 18,277 Mo. 90 |
| Parties | J. M. LEFTRIDGE v. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY, Appellant |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Macon Circuit Court. -- Hon. Nat Shelton, Judge.
Reversed and remanded (with directions).
Franklin Ferriss, George F. Haid, and Albert T. Benedict, of counsel for appellant.
(1) Interstate communication by telegraph is interstate commerce. Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pendleton, 122 U.S. 347. (2) Under the original act, and prior to the amendment of June 18, 1910, Congress not having legislated on the subject, State statutes affecting interstate telegrams for acts done within the State were enforcible. Western Union Tel. Co. v. James, 162 U.S. 650; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Crovo, 220 U.S. 364. (3) Under the terms of the Interstate Commerce Act as amended June 18, 1910 Congress has taken exclusive possession of the field of interstate communication by telegraph. Hence the Missouri penalty statute cannot be applied to an interstate message by wire. Chap. 309, 36 Stat. at Large, 544; 8 U. S. Compiled Stats. 1916, p. 9053; Gardner v. Western Union Tel Co., 231 F. 405; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Bilisoly, 116 Va. 562; Poor Grain Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 196 Mo.App. 557; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Lee, 174 Ky. 210; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Compton, 114 Ark. 193; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 115 Ark. 564; Durre v. Western Union Tel. Co., 165 Wis. 190; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Hawkins, 73 So. 973; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Spencer, 156 P. 1175; Hall v. Western Union Tel. Co., 94 S.E. (S. C.) 870; Norris v. Tel. Co., 174 N.C. 92; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Schade, 137 Tenn. 214; Bailey v. Western Union Tel. Co., 97 Kan. 619; Strauss Gas & Iron Co. v. Western Tel. Co., 59 Pa. 122. (4) The questions in the case properly raised by demurrer. La Cost v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 203 S.W. 586; Davis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 202 S.W. 292; Taylor v. Western Union Tel. Co., 204 S.W. 818; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 115 Ark. 534; Durre v. Western Union Tel. Co., 165 Wis. 190.
This is a suit against the Western Union Telegraph Company, a corporation, to recover the penalty of three hundred dollars imposed by the terms of Section 3330 of the Revised Statutes of this State (1909), for failure to transmit and use due diligence to deliver into the hands of the addressee at McComb, Illinois, without material alteration, a telegram delivered to it by plaintiff on May 21, 1915, at its office in Clarence, Missouri, for that purpose, all charges being paid. The telegram was materially altered before delivery by the substitution of the word "dead" for the word "bad."
No fault is found with the form of the petition except as indicated in a general demurrer filed thereto with the following specification: "And for the further reason that said petition on its face shows that the message upon which this suit is based was filed at the town of Clarence in the State of Missouri and destined to the town of McComb in the State of Illinois and is therefore interstate commerce, so that the statute of Missouri, Section 3330, under which this suit is brought if construed as authorizing the recovery of the penalty therein provided in respect to such message would be unconstitutional, null and void and in violation of Article 1, Section 8 of Subdivision 3 of the Constitution of the United States conferring on Congress the power to regulate commerce among the several states, and would also be in violation of and in opposition to the acts of Congress passed and approved in pursuance of said Article I, Section 8 of said Subdivision 3, and especially the act of Congress passed and approved June 18, 1910, being the Thirty-sixth Statute at Large of the United States, at page 539."
The demurrer was overruled, and the defendant declining to plead over, judgment was entered for plaintiff, from which the defendant prosecutes this appeal.
The only question presented is whether the provision of the state statute imposing the penalty sued for was, at the time this message was delivered to the defendant for transmission, valid and operative under the provisions of the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States and the acts of Congress upon the same subject.
That the transmission of messages from State to State by means of telegraph is commerce among the several states, and therefore subject to regulation by Congress under the power granted in Section 8 of the First article of the Federal Constitution, is unquestioned. [Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 96 U.S. 1, 24 L.Ed. 708; Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U.S. 460, 26 L.Ed. 1067; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pendleton, 122 U.S. 347, 30 L.Ed. 1187, 7 S.Ct. 1126; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. James, 162 U.S. 650, 40 L.Ed. 1105, 16 S.Ct. 934.] It is equally well settled that the character of these carriers as instruments of interstate commerce does not relieve them from operation of laws enacted by the states in the exercise of their power over men and things situated within their jurisdiction. This control covers the entire field of human activity, both civil and criminal, within their borders. Contracts made within the State are construed and enforceable according to its laws, and acts are adjudged crimes by the same standard. Congress, by failing to legislate upon the subject of interstate commerce, did not leave the states without jurisdiction to enforce civil rights and redress civil wrongs incident to its prosecution within their borders.
The enactment by Congress of the interstate commerce law in the exercise of the constitutional power changes this condition materially with respect to interstate carriers by rail and placed them under the control of the commission it created, in many respects. This control was extended by laws enacted from time to time in the interest of safety and uniformity, until the instrumentalities of interstate transportation were controlled in their operation by Federal laws applying to every detail in the relation of these carriers to the public as well as to their own employees, leaving no room for the intervention of the State, which still retained, in most respects, the power to regulate telegraphic agencies in their relation to the public. [Western Union Telegraph Co. v. James, supra; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Milling Co., 218 U.S. 406, 54 L.Ed. 1088, 31 S.Ct. 59; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Crovo, 220 U.S. 364, 55 L.Ed. 498, 31 S.Ct. 399.]
The only question in this case is whether Congress has now, by the Act of June 18, 1910, 36 Statutes at Large, 544, occupied the field covered by this suit so as to exclude the power of the State to impose upon the Telegraph Company a penalty for its failure to deliver a message received by it in this State to the addressee in another State without material alteration. It would be difficult to imagine a cleaner illustration not only of the interstate character of the transaction, but also the interstate character of the control assumed by this State, in which the only act necessarily performed is the harmless one of receiving the message and payment for its transmission. The act or failure to act which incurs the penalty is to be performed in another State. It is not contemplated that the law should hold its ear to the instrument receiving it in the foreign State to ascertain whether it gives forth the proper sound. The operator who writes it down is the one who puts it in words which it did not contain, for delivery.
If the duty of the Telegraph Company in receiving and handling this message is completely covered by the Interstate Commerce Act as amended in 1910, it is plain that the State law prescribing the performance of the duty and imposing the penalty for its non-performance is thereby abrogated, for when it had performed its entire duty under the paramount law there was no room for further control. This principle has been so often applied in cases involving the acts of Congress relating to employers' liability and safety appliances that it would be futile to cite the many cases in the Federal and State courts which have placed it outside the region of legitimate debate. In the late case of Holloway v Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railway Company, 276 Mo. 490, 208 S.W. 27, this court said: "When Congress, in the exercise of its plenary constitutional power, enacts a law relating to a particular subject, the statute so enacted is not only paramount to all State legislation upon...
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