LEGAL ENVIRON. ASSISTANCE FOUND. v. ADEM
Decision Date | 13 June 2003 |
Citation | 883 So.2d 198 |
Parties | LEGAL ENVIRONMENTAL ASSISTANCE FOUNDATION, INC. v. ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT et al. |
Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
David A. Ludder, Tallahassee, Florida, for appellant.
James L. Wright and Olivia Jenkins, Alabama Department of Environmental Management, for appellee.
Alabama Supreme Court 1021671.
On Application for Rehearing
The opinion of March 21, 2003, is withdrawn, and the following opinion is substituted therefor. These parties have been before this court before. Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation, Inc. ("LEAF"), sued the Alabama Department of Environmental Management ("ADEM"), alleging that ADEM had failed to follow the Alabama Administrative Procedure Act, § 41-22-1 et seq., Ala.Code 1975 ("the AAPA"), in promulgating its Implementation Procedures for Tier 2 of the Antidegradation Policy, Ala. Admin. Code (ADEM), Rule 335-6-10-.04(03), and seeking a determination that the Implementation Procedures were invalid. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of ADEM, and, on December 15, 2000, this court affirmed without an opinion. See Legal Envtl. Assistance Found. v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt. (No. 2990902, Dec. 15, 2000), 822 So.2d 490 (Ala.Civ.App. 2000) (table). Our supreme court reversed, holding that the Implementation Procedures were "rules" under the AAPA and, therefore, that ADEM was required to follow the rulemaking provisions of the AAPA in enacting the Implementation Procedures. Ex parte Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc., 832 So.2d 61 (Ala. 2002)
.
On May 16, 2002, the trial court, on remand, entered a judgment in which it declared the adoption of the Implementation Procedures invalid and enjoined ADEM from using those procedures until such time as they were adopted in compliance with the requirements of the AAPA. (Those Implementation Procedures are hereinafter referred to as "the invalid Implementation Procedures.") In its May 16, 2002, judgment, the trial court also enjoined ADEM from issuing permits for the discharge of pollutants into the State's waters until such time as some implementation procedures were adopted pursuant to the requirements of the AAPA. Also in that judgment, the trial court stated that LEAF could file a motion seeking an award of an attorney fee.
On June 24, 2001, LEAF filed in the trial court a motion seeking an award of an attorney fee; LEAF argued that it was entitled to an attorney fee because, it contended, the litigation it had initiated had conferred a benefit upon the general public. LEAF sought a total attorney-fee award of $111,450. ADEM filed an opposition to LEAF's request for an attorney fee, and LEAF responded to that opposition. On August 20, 2002, ADEM filed a "Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to [LEAF's] Motion for [an] Award of Attorney Fees," in which it argued that LEAF's claim for an attorney fee was barred by Art. I, § 14, Ala. Const. of 1901, and the doctrine of sovereign immunity. LEAF did not respond to that argument.
On August 29, 2002, the trial court entered a judgment in which it denied LEAF's request for an attorney fee; the trial court did not state the basis for its ruling. On October 9, 2002, LEAF appealed.
The facts detailing the parties' dispute are set forth as follows in our supreme court's opinion in Ex parte Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation, Inc., supra:
In April 2002, ADEM adopted an "emergency" rule allowing the implementation of its antidegradation policy, which allowed it to again issue permits for the discharge of pollutants. Pursuant to the AAPA, that emergency rule was effective for only 120 days, so that the effective period of the emergency rule ended on August 6, 2002. See § 41-22-5(b), Ala.Code 1975 ( ).
Apparently during the period in which it operated under the emergency rule, ADEM proposed the formal adoption of another set of Implementation Procedures that were substantially the same as the invalid Implementation Procedures. ADEM provided interested parties and the public the notice required under the AAPA, and it conducted a hearing to receive comments on the proposed adoption of the new proposed set of Implementation Procedures. ADEM adopted, pursuant to the provisions of the AAPA, that set of Implementation Procedures; those procedures were effective July 31, 2002. See Ala. Admin. Code (ADEM), Rule 335-6-10-.12. (Those procedures are hereinafter referred to as "the newly adopted Implementation Procedures.")
On appeal, LEAF first argues that the trial court erred in entering a judgment denying its claim for an attorney fee because, it contends, the claim for an attorney fee is not barred by Art. 1, § 14, and the doctrine of sovereign immunity. LEAF did not present any argument to the trial court in opposition to ADEM's assertion that LEAF's claim for an attorney fee was barred under those theories.1 This court may not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal.2 Andrews v. Merritt Oil Co., 612 So.2d 409 (Ala.1992); Smith v. Equifax Servs., Inc., 537 So.2d 463 (Ala.1988). It is not clear whether the trial court relied on this theory as the basis of its judgment. Given LEAF's failure to properly argue this issue before the trial court, we decline to address it on appeal.
LEAF next argues that the trial court erred in failing to award the attorney fee it requested. LEAF argues that it is entitled to an attorney fee under the "common-benefit" doctrine.
"Under the American rule, the parties to a lawsuit bear the responsibility of paying their own attorney fees. However, the law recognizes certain exceptions to this rule, and attorney fees are recoverable when authorized by statute, when provided by contract, or when justified by special equity. Blankenship v. City of Hoover, 590 So.2d 245 (Ala.1991); Reynolds v. First Alabama Bank of Montgomery, N.A., 471 So.2d 1238 (Ala. 1985). In the latter instance, attorney fees may be awarded where the plaintiff's efforts are successful in creating a fund out of which the fees may be paid, or when the efforts of the plaintiff's attorneys render a public service or result in a benefit to the general public in addition to serving the interests of the plaintiff. City of Ozark v. Trawick, 604 So.2d 360 (Ala.1992)
; Brown v. State, 565 So.2d 585 (Ala.1990); Bell v. Birmingham News Co., 576 So.2d 669 (Ala. Civ.App.1991). These have been termed the `common fund' and `common benefit'...
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