Lenk v. Monolithic Power Sys.
| Decision Date | 18 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | 20-cv-08094-BLF |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
| Parties | KENNETH LAWRENCE LENK, Plaintiff, v. MONOLITHIC POWER SYSTEMS, INC., Defendant. |
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PREVAILING PARTY ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS [Re: ECF 36]
Following dismissal of this action - the fourth that pro se Plaintiff Kenneth Lenk (“Lenk”) has filed against his former employer, Defendant Monolithic Power Systems, Inc. (“MPS”) - MPS filed the present Motion for Prevailing Party Attorneys' Fees and Costs (“Fees Motion”). See Fees Motion, ECF 34. Plaintiff Kenneth Lawrence Lenk (“Lenk”) has filed an opposition and MPS has filed a reply. See Opp., ECF 39; Reply, ECF 40. The Court has vacated the hearing that was noticed for March 24, 2022 and submitted the motion for decision without oral argument. See Order Submitting Fees Mot., ECF 46.
MPS's Fees Motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. MPS seeks attorneys' fees in the amount of $49, 740 and costs in the amount of $215.30. The Court awards attorneys' fees in the amount of 25, 000 and costs in the amount of $215.30.
Lenk has filed four unsuccessful lawsuits against MPS, claiming that he was subjected to discrimination and other wrongful conduct that resulted in his constructive discharge from MPS in 2013. Those lawsuits are summarized briefly as follows:
Lenk I: In March 2015, Lenk sued MPS for wrongful constructive discharge from employment and related claims under federal and state law. See Lenk v. Monolithic Power Systems, Inc., Case No. 15-cv-01148-NC. The action was dismissed for failure to state a claim, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (“Ninth Circuit”) dismissed Lenk's appeal as frivolous.
Lenk II: In May 2016, Lenk filed a second suit against MPS, again alleging that he was wrongfully discharged and asserting claims for violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. See Lenk v Monolithic Power Systems, Inc., Case No 16-cv-02625-BLF. Lenk also named his former supervisor at MPS, Sciammas. See id. The action was dismissed as barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. See Lenk v. Monolithic Power Sys., Inc., 754 Fed.Appx. 554, 556 (9th Cir. 2018). This Court awarded MPS attorneys' fees in the amount of $17, 582.50 and costs in the amount of $83.24. See Lenk v. Monolithic Power Sys., Inc., No. 16-CV-02625-BLF.
Lenk III: In March 2018, Lenk filed a third suit against MPS, reasserting his claims for wrongful discharge and violations of Title VII and § 1981, and also asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and California state law. See Lenk v. Monolithic Power Sys. Inc., No. 19-CV-03791-BLF. Lenk named MPS, his former supervisor Sciammas, and MPS's former law firm as defendants. Lenk III was dismissed under the doctrine of collateral estoppel and for failure to state a claim. Lenk did not appeal that dismissal. This Court denied MPS's motion for prevailing party attorneys' fees and costs.
Lenk IV (present suit): In November 2020, Lenk filed the present suit against MPS, again asserting claims for violations of Title VII and § 1981, as well as claims under California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), claims of blacklisting under various states' laws, and claims of unfair competition, intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, and unjust enrichment under California law. See Compl., ECF 1. This Court dismissed the operative first amended complaint (“FAC”) by order dated November 10, 2021 (“Dismissal Order”), finding that most claims were barred by res judicata, collateral estoppel, and statutes of limitations, and that others failed to state a claim. See Dismissal Order, ECF 32.
“It is the general rule in the United States that in the absence of legislation providing otherwise, litigants must pay their own attorney's fees.” Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 415 (1978). “Congress has provided only limited exceptions to this rule under selected statutes granting or protecting various federal rights.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 falls into this last category, providing as it does that a district court may in its discretion allow an attorney's fee to the prevailing party.” Id. at 416. Although the statute itself does not distinguish between prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants, the Supreme Court has held that they are to be treated differently. See Id. at 416-17. “[A] prevailing plaintiff ordinarily is to be awarded attorney's fees in all but special circumstances.” Id. at 417. However, a prevailing defendant may be awarded fees under Title VII only “upon a finding that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.” Id. at 421.
Prevailing party attorneys' fees also are available under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, see 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), and FEHA, see Cal. Gov't Code § 12965(c)(6). The Christiansburg standard discussed above applies to fee awards under § 1981 and FEHA. See Miller v. Los Angeles Cty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 617, 619 (9th Cir. 1987) (); Williams v. Chino Valley Indep. Fire Dist., 61 Cal.4th 97, 99-100 (2015) ().
Even after finding a plaintiff's claims to be frivolous, “the district court still retains discretion to deny or reduce fee requests after considering all the nuances of a particular case.” Thomas v. City of Tacoma, 410 F.3d 644, 651 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A court must take particular care in cases brought by pro se plaintiffs. See Miller, 827 F.2d at 620. “[P]ro se plaintiffs cannot simply be assumed to have the same ability as a plaintiff represented by counsel to recognize the objective merit (or lack of merit) of a claim.” Id. Moreover, a district court “should consider the financial resources of the plaintiff in awarding fees to a prevailing defendant, ” particularly when a fee request against an individual plaintiff is a sizeable one. Id. at 621.
MPS seeks an award of attorneys' fees in the amount of $49, 740 and costs in the amount of $215.30, arguing that all of Lenk's claims were frivolous, unreasonable, and groundless. In opposition, Lenk argues that his claims were not frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless. Lenk also states that he has not been employed since March 2013 and thus has little ability to pay any award.
MPS is the prevailing party in this case, as all of Lenk's claims have been dismissed without leave to amend, the action has been dismissed with prejudice, and judgment has been entered for MPS and against Lenk. See Dismissal Order, ECF 32; Judgment, ECF 33. As a result, the Court clearly has discretion to award MPS attorneys' fees and costs incurred in litigating Lenk's claims brought under Title VII, § 1981, and FEHA if the Court finds that the Christiansburg standard is met. For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that it also has discretion to award MPS attorneys' fees and costs incurred in litigating Lenk's state law claims.
The Court first discusses whether Lenk's claims were frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless as required under Christiansburg. Next, the Court addresses MPS's showing that the requested fees and costs were reasonably incurred in defending this suit. Finally, the Court considers Lenk's pro se status and other factors relevant to the exercise of its discretion in awarding prevailing party fees and costs to a defendant.
Lenk filed the complaint in this action on November 16, 2020 and filed a FAC as of right on March 8, 2021. See Compl., ECF 1; FAC, ECF 25. The FAC, which was the operative pleading at the time the action was dismissed, contained eleven claims: (1) retaliation under Title VII; (2) civil rights violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981; (3) retaliation under FEHA; (4) harassment under FEHA; (5) hostile work environment under FEHA; (6) blacklisting under California state law; (7) blacklisting under Washington state law; (8) blacklisting under Arizona state law; (9) violation of California's Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”); (10) intentional interference with prospective economic relations; and (11) unjust enrichment. FAC, ECF 25.
Claims 1-5 of the FAC were brought under Title VII, § 1981, and FEHA. All of those statutes contain fee shifting provisions which, under Christiansburg, authorize an award of fees and costs to a prevailing defendant if the plaintiff's claims were frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless. See Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 422. “In applying these criteria, it is important that a district court resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or without foundation.” Id. at 421-22. The Court has no difficulty finding that Claims 1-5 were frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless when brought.
Claim 1 (Title VII): Claim 1 alleged retaliation under Title VII. The claim was dismissed as barred by collateral estoppel based on the Court's dismissal of a nearly identical Title VII claim with prejudice in Lenk III. See Dismissal Order at 8, ECF 32. The only aspect of the Title VII claim not barred by collateral estoppel was Lenk's new assertion that MPS blacklisted him, which...
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