Williams v. Chino Valley Indep. Fire Dist., S213100.

• Decision Date: 04 May 2015
• Docket Number: No. S213100.,S213100.
• Citation: 347 P.3d 976,61 Cal.4th 97,31 A.D. Cases 935,186 Cal.Rptr.3d 826
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: Loring Winn WILLIAMS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CHINO VALLEY INDEPENDENT FIRE DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent.

61 Cal.4th 97

347 P.3d 976

186 Cal.Rptr.3d 826

31 A.D. Cases 935

Loring Winn WILLIAMS, Plaintiff and Appellant

v.CHINO VALLEY INDEPENDENT FIRE DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent.

No. S213100.

Supreme Court of California

May 4, 2015.

Loring Winn Williams, in pro. per.; Hamilton & McInnis, Donald E. McInnis, Ben–Thomas Hamilton, San Diego; The deRubertis Law Firm, David M. deRubertis, Studio City, Helen U. Kim ; Pine & Pine and Norman Pine, Sherman Oaks, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Liebert Cassidy Whitmore, Peter J. Brown, Los Angeles, and Judith S. Islas, San Diego, for Defendant and Respondent.

Kira L. Klatchko, Indian Wells, for League of California Cities, California Association of Counties, California Special Districts Association, California Association of Sanitation Agencies, Fire Districts Association of California and Association of California Water Agencies as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

Opinion

WERDEGAR, J.

Plaintiff Loring Winn Williams sued defendant Chino Valley Independent Fire District (the District) for employment discrimination in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act. (FEHA; Gov.Code, § 12900 et seq. ) The trial court granted summary judgment for the District and, in a separate order, awarded the District its court costs. Williams appealed from the latter order, contending that in the absence of a finding his action was frivolous, unreasonable or groundless, defendant should not have been awarded its costs.

The issues presented are these: Is a defendant prevailing in a FEHA action entitled to its ordinary court costs as a matter of right pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, or only in the discretion of the trial court pursuant to Government Code section 12965, a provision of FEHA itself? And, if the trial court does have discretion, must that discretion be exercised according to the rule applicable to attorney fee awards in certain federal civil rights actions under Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC (1978) 434 U.S. 412, 98 S.Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (Christiansburg ), according to which a prevailing defendant receives its attorney fees only if the plaintiff's action was objectively groundless?

We conclude Government Code section 12965, subdivision (b), governs cost awards in FEHA actions, allowing trial courts discretion in awards of both attorney fees and costs to prevailing FEHA parties. We further conclude that in awarding attorney fees and costs, the trial court's discretion is bounded by the rule of Christiansburg; an unsuccessful FEHA plaintiff should not be ordered to pay the defendant's fees or costs unless the plaintiff brought or continued litigating the action without an objective basis for believing it had potential merit.

Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff, a firefighter, sued defendant, his employer, alleging disability discrimination in violation of FEHA. On summary judgment, the trial court ruled for defendant and awarded it costs in an amount to be determined. Defendant filed a memorandum of costs, and plaintiff moved to tax costs. The trial court granted the motion to tax in part, reducing the award from the requested amount, but rejected plaintiff's contention that the Christiansburg standard applied to an award of court costs. Without making any finding plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, the trial court awarded defendant costs totaling $5,368.88. (As far as the record on appeal shows, defendant did not request an award of attorney fees.)

On appeal from the costs order, the Court of Appeal affirmed. The appellate court held the governing statute was Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, subdivision (b), which allows a prevailing party its court costs as a matter of right, rather than Government Code section 12965, subdivision (b), which makes such an award discretionary. The court also distinguished between attorney fees (which it agreed were subject to the Christiansburg standard) and costs, observing that attorney fees “can be more expensive and unpredictable than ordinary costs and could discourage plaintiffs from filing meritorious actions.”

Discussion

As the issues here are ones of statutory interpretation, we begin with the central statutes involved.

Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, subdivision (b) (Code of Civil Procedure section 1032(b) ), guarantees prevailing parties in civil litigation awards of the costs expended in the litigation: “Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, a prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding.”

Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5 limits recoverable costs to those both “reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation” and “reasonable in amount.” (Id., subd. (c)(2), (3).) The section also details the types of expenses “allowable as costs under Section 1032.” (Id., subd. (a).) These include filing, motion, and jury fees, food and lodging costs for sequestered juries, the costs of taking necessary depositions, costs of service of process, fees of ordinary witnesses and of court ordered experts, the costs of transcripts ordered by the court, attachment expenses and surety bond premiums, fees of court reporters and interpreters, and the costs of exhibits helpful to the trier of fact. (Id., subd. (a)(1)-(9), (11)-(13).) Attorney fees and parties' expert witness fees are not ordinarily recoverable as costs under section 1032. (Id., subds. (a)(10), (b)(1).) Below, we sometimes use the phrase “ordinary costs” to refer to those costs allowed by section 1033.5, subdivision (a).

Government Code section 12965, subdivision (b) (Government Code section 12965(b) ), provides for private actions to enforce the provisions of FEHA. It states in part: “In civil actions brought under this section, the court, in its discretion, may award to the prevailing party, including the department, reasonable attorney's fees and costs, including expert witness fees.” (Ibid. )

Two principal issues are disputed here: Is Government Code section 12965(b) an express exception to Code of Civil Procedure section 1032(b), allowing discretion in cost awards rather than requiring them as a matter of right? And if so, is the court's discretion in awarding costs to a prevailing party under Government Code section 12965(b) bounded by an asymmetric rule requiring a finding the plaintiff's action was groundless before a cost award may be made to a prevailing defendant? While these are questions of California law, their resolution requires discussion, as well, of federal law on cost awards in civil rights litigation.

In an action under title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (Title VII), the trial court, “in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee ... as part of the costs.” (42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(k).) In Christiansburg, the high court interpreted this discretionary provision as creating a different standard for awards of fees to prevailing defendants than to prevailing plaintiffs: while prevailing Title VII plaintiffs, whom Congress had chosen as an instrument to vindicate its policy against job discrimination, should ordinarily be awarded their fees (Christiansburg, supra, 434 U.S. at pp. 416–417, 418, 98 S.Ct. 694 ), a Title VII plaintiff “should not be assessed his opponent's attorney's fees unless a court finds that his claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.” (Christiansburg, at p. 422, 98 S.Ct. 694.) The legislative history of Title VII indicated the purpose of the fee provision was to “ ‘make it easier for a plaintiff of limited means to bring a meritorious suit.’ ” (Christiansburg, at p. 420, 98 S.Ct. 694.) To award fees to a defendant simply because the plaintiff was ultimately unsuccessful “would substantially add to the risks inhering in most litigation and would undercut the efforts of Congress to promote the vigorous enforcement of the provisions of Title VII.” (Id. at p. 422, 98 S.Ct. 694.)

Christiansburg involved attorney fees, not court costs, and the high court has not decided whether the same asymmetrical standard applies to an award of costs to a prevailing Title VII defendant. Several lower courts have held it does not.

In Nat. Organization for Women v. Bank of California (9th Cir.1982) 680 F.2d 1291, 1294, the court relied on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 54(d) (28 U.S.C.) (rule 54(d) ), which states the prevailing party should be allowed costs unless otherwise provided by statute, rule, or court order, and observed that Title VII contains “no express statutory provision for applying Christiansburg to cost awards.” (Accord, Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Colbert (7th Cir.1982) 692 F.2d 489, 491, fn. 5 [“Title VII contains no provision respecting costs, unlike its special provision on attorney's fees.”]; Poe v. John Deere Co. (8th Cir.1982) 695 F.2d 1103, 1108 (Poe ) [positing as a rationale for Title VII's provision for discretionary award of fees and absence of similar provision for costs that “[w]hereas the magnitude and unpredictability of attorney's fees would deter parties with meritorious claims from litigation, the costs of suit in the traditional sense are predictable and, compared to the costs of attorneys' fees, small”]; Cosgrove v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (2nd Cir.1999) 191 F.3d 98, 101–102 [following Poe in distinguishing between costs and fees by their size and predictability]; Byers v. Dallas Morning News, Inc. (5th Cir.2000) 209 F.3d 419, 430 [relying on rule 54(d)'s allowance of costs to the prevailing party and noting that “Title VII does not expressly provide otherwise....”].)

While these lower federal court decisions have not applied Christiansburg to costs in Title VII actions, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has done so in actions under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), a provision of which gives trial courts discretion to award the prevailing party “a reasonable...