Leon v. Boardman Township, 100 Ohio St.3d 335 (Ohio 12/24/2003)

• Decision Date: 24 December 2003
• Docket Number: No. 2002-1955.,2002-1955.
• Parties: Leon, Appellant, <I>v.</I> Boardman Township, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 1

100 Ohio St.3d 335

2003 Ohio 6466

Leon, Appellant,v.

Boardman Township, Appellee.

No. 2002-1955.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted October 21, 2003.

Decided December 24, 2003.

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Mahoning County, No. 01CA235, 2002-Ohio-5371.

R. Brian Moriarty and Patrick A. D'Angelo, for appellant.

James L. Messenger and Scott C. Essad, for appellee.

ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J.

{¶1} On May 5, 2000, plaintiff-appellant, Andre Leon, a patrolman for defendant-appellee, Boardman Township, was discharged for violating the township's residency requirements for its civil-service employees. Leon's discharge was arbitrated on his behalf by his union, Ohio Patrolmen's Benevolent Association ("OPBA"), under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement between the township and OPBA. The arbitrator reduced Leon's discharge to a suspension and reinstated Leon to his position as a police officer (conditioned upon relocation to the township within 60 days) but declined to award any back pay. After OPBA denied Leon's request for further representation with regard to the issue of back pay, Leon instituted the present proceedings to vacate the arbitration award pursuant to R.C. 2711.10, which provides that "the court of common pleas shall make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration if" any of four delineated circumstances are found.

{¶2} The trial court dismissed Leon's application on the basis that he was not a party to the arbitration regarding his discharge and, therefore, "lacks standing to bring a motion to vacate the arbitration decision."

{¶3} In affirming the judgment of the trial court, the court of appeals agreed that "only parties to the arbitration have standing to move for vacation of an arbitration award [under] R.C. 2711.10." After reviewing several decisions from other Ohio appellate districts, the court of appeals concluded that "the language of the collective bargaining agreement is the top consideration" in determining an employee's status as a party. In particular, the court held, "Absent language in the collective bargaining agreement allowing the employee to have control over the arbitration proceedings, an employee has no standing [to challenge the arbitration award] and * * * is not a `party' to the arbitration proceedings as contemplated by R.C. 2711.10."

{¶4} Having so held, the court of appeals then reviewed and contrasted two parts of the collective bargaining agreement between the township and OPBA—Article 24, Section 8 (Employee Discipline), and Article 21 (Grievance and Arbitration Procedure). The court found that the arbitration in this case was initiated under Article 24, Section 8, and that this provision, unlike Article 21, does not give the employee control over the arbitration process. The court of appeals reasoned that "if the collective bargaining agreement was intended to grant the employee control over the arbitration process in the Employee Discipline section, the agreement could have either included the provisions under Article 21 or referenced Article 21 as a guide for the arbitration process under Article 24."

{¶5} The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a discretionary appeal.

{¶6} The sole issue presented for our review is whether Leon was a "party" to the arbitration regarding his discharge for purposes of R.C. 2711.10. In order to resolve this issue, we must decide whether and under what circumstances an employee has standing to challenge an arbitration award rendered pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement between the employee's union and employer.

{¶7} Leon proposes that "[a]n employee-union member who is the `real party in interest' and who will be directly benefited or injured by the outcome of an arbitration proceedin[g] has standing to pursue review of the proceeding in the common pleas court pursuant to R.C. 2711.10." In support of this proposition, Leon relies on Barksdale v. Ohio Dept. of Adm. Serv. (1992), 78 Ohio App.3d 325, 604 N.E.2d 798, in which the Tenth District Court of Appeals reasoned:

{¶8} "Whether or not an employee is technically made a party to a labor arbitration proceeding, the employee is often the real party in interest with respect to such a proceeding. As we observed in Lepp [v. Ohio Hazardous Waste Facility Bd. (Sept. 26, 1991), 10th Dist. No. 91AP-464, 1991 WL 224181], employees are bound by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement even though they are not actual signatories to the agreement. They are, in fact, the intended beneficiaries of the agreement. Where the rights adjudicated at an arbitration proceeding belong to an employee, not to the union as a whole, it is the employee who will be directly benefitted or injured by the outcome of the litigation. Although the employee is represented by the union, the employee is the real party in interest where rights personal to the employee are the subject of the litigation. As used in R.C. 2711.10, the term `party' encompasses both the nominal and real parties to the suit. Where the employee is the real party in interest with respect to the subject matter of a labor arbitration proceeding, the employee is a `party' under R.C. 2711.10 with standing to challenge an award rendered in such a proceeding." Id., 78 Ohio App.3d at 329, 604 N.E.2d 798.

{¶9} It appears, however, that the decision in Barksdale is a legal anomaly. Leon has not cited, nor has our research disclosed, a decision from any other court in which it was held that an employee has standing to challenge an adverse arbitration award under a collective bargaining agreement merely because his or her personal rights were affected by or the subject of the arbitration.

{¶10} In any event, the Barksdale test fails to account for the contractual nature of the "personal" rights to which it refers. "Since the employee's claim is based upon breach of the collective bargaining agreement, he is bound by the terms of that agreement which govern the manner in which contractual rights may be enforced." Vaca v. Sipes (1967), 386 U.S. 171, 184, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842. Thus, when an employee seeks to vindicate his or her rights under a collective bargaining agreement that provides for binding arbitration, as in this case, the question becomes whether the collective bargaining agreement gives the aggrieved employee, rather than his or her union, the procedural right to invoke arbitration. By focusing on whether the right sought to be vindicated is personal to the aggrieved employee or collective in nature, the Barksdale test resolves this contractual question without regard to the terms of the contract.

{¶11} On the other hand, appellee proposes that "[a]n individual employee has no standing to move or petition a court to vacate the results of an arbitration between a union and an employer." This proposition is similarly flawed because it too establishes a blanket rule that operates irrespective of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Besides, the cases upon which appellee relies do not support such a blanket proposition. In fact, these cases actually suggest, in one form or another, that an aggrieved worker would have standing to challenge an arbitration award under a collective bargaining agreement that clearly provides for an individual right of action. In some of these cases, this view is expressed in the form of an exception. For example, as explained in Taylor v. State Bd. of Mediation & Arbitration (1999), 54 Conn.App. 550, 557-558, 736 A.2d 175, the aggrieved employee is not ordinarily considered a party to the arbitration and thus has no standing to apply to confirm or vacate an award, "`[u]nless [the] collective bargaining agreement provides for a personal right to seek arbitration.' " Quoting Hous. Auth. v. Local 1161, Council 4, AFSCME (1984), 1 Conn.App. 154, 156, 468 A.2d 1251. Similarly, the court in Melander v. Hughes Aircraft Co. (1987), 194 Cal.App.3d 542, 544, 239 Cal.Rptr. 592, held that "when an employee grievance is arbitrated under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between an employer and a union, the individual employee does not have standing to petition to vacate the award unless (1) the CBA contains a provision expressly giving employees themselves the right to submit disputes to arbitration * * *."

{¶12} Other courts recognize essentially the same exception but express it in the form of prefatory language. See, e.g., Lee v. Municipality of Bethel Park (1993), 156 Pa.Commw. 158, 162, 626 A.2d 1260, fn. 3 ("absent a specific provision in the collective bargaining agreement, [individual employees] lack standing, independent of the bargaining representative, to challenge arbitration awards"); Milwaukee Bd. of School Directors v. Milwaukee Teachers' Edn. Assn. (1988), 143 Wis.2d 591, 597, 422 N.W.2d 149, fn. 3 ("in the absence of provisions [in the collective bargaining agreement] to the contrary, only [the employer] and [the union] are the proper parties to the proceeding, and they alone have standing to arbitrate").

{¶13} In other cases, the contractual exception to the general no-standing rule may not be explicitly stated, but it is certainly implied in the court's analysis. For example, in Wilson v. Toledo Bd. of Edn. (Oct. 17, 1986), 6th Dist. No. L-85-425, 1986 WL 11639, upon which appellee relies heavily, the Sixth District Court of Appeals adopted "[t]he general rule * * * that individual employees have no standing to challenge an arbitration proceeding to which the union and the employer were the sole parties." Finding that "the union (TFT) and the employer (Board) were the sole parties to the arbitration proceeding," which involved the recommended termination of Wilson's teaching contract, the court concluded that Wilson lacked standing to challenge the award under R.C. 2711.10. But the court's analysis did not end there. Instead, the court went on to...