Leonard v. Benjamin, 41828

• Decision Date: 07 January 1985
• Docket Number: No. 41828,41828
• Citation: 253 Ga. 718,324 S.E.2d 185
• Parties: LEONARD v. BENJAMIN.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 185

324 S.E.2d 185

253 Ga. 718

LEONARD v. BENJAMIN.

No. 41828.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Jan. 7, 1985.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 23, 1985.

M. Dale English, Adel, for Patricia Leonard.

Elsie Higgs Griner, Nashville, for Robert Benjamin.

BELL, Justice.

Appellant Patricia Leonard is the mother of a minor child born out of wedlock. Appellee Robert Benjamin is the putative father. Appellant filed a complaint for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that appellee was illegally holding the child. OCGA Title 9, Chapter 14, Article 1. The superior court awarded partial custody to each party, and Leonard filed a direct appeal.

The threshold question for our consideration is whether the appeal is dismissable for failure to follow OCGA § 5-6-35. As originally enacted, the Code section required applications for appeals to be filed in all "[a]ppeals from judgments or orders granting or refusing a divorce or temporary or permanent alimony, awarding or refusing to change child custody, or holding or declining to hold persons in contempt of such alimony or child custody judgment or orders." 1979 Ga.L. 619, 621, Section 3. (Emphasis supplied.)

If this language were still in force, appellant would not have been required to file an application. Bryant v. Wigley, 246 Ga. 155(1), 269 S.E.2d 418 (1980); Wright v. Hanson, 248 Ga. 523(1), 283 S.E.2d 882 (1981). However, in 1984 the General Assembly revised OCGA § 5-6-35, so that it now includes "[a]ppeals from judgments or orders in divorce, alimony, child custody, and other domestic relations cases including, but not limited to, granting or refusing a divorce or temporary or permanent alimony, awarding or refusing to change child custody, or holding or declining to hold persons in contempt of such alimony or child custody judgment or orders," 1984 Ga.L. 599, 601, Section 2. (Emphasis supplied.)

The language of OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(2), as amended, does not expressly refer to child custody habeas actions. However, this absence does not control our interpretation of the amendment, since the term "child custody, and other domestic relations cases" is facially broad, and the language following that term, which states that it includes, but is not limited to, the enumerated classes of domestic relations judgments and orders, indicates that the General Assembly intended the term to be interpreted as broadly as it appears. Our construction of the amendment is also guided by the principle that "[i]t is presumed that all statutes are enacted by the General Assembly with full knowledge of the existing law, including decisions of the courts." Medical Center Hosp. Auth. v. Andrews, 250 Ga. 424, 426, 297 S.E.2d 28 (1982). Accord Mullins v. First General Insurance Co., 253 Ga. 486, 487, 322 S.E.2d 265 (1984); Price v. City of Snellville, 253 Ga 166, 167-68, 317 S.E.2d 834 (1984). Here, inasmuch as our previous...