Levin v. Yeshiva University
| Decision Date | 15 March 1999 |
| Citation | 691 N.Y.S.2d 280,180 Misc.2d 829 |
| Parties | , 136 Ed. Law Rep. 517, Sara LEVIN et al., Plaintiffs, v. YESHIVA UNIVERSITY et al., Defendants. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court |
Weil, Gotshal & Manges, New York City (Mark Jacoby of counsel), for defendants.
Vladeck, Waldman, Elias & Engelhard, New York City (James Esseks of counsel), for plaintiffs.
In this action, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants maintain a housing policy which violates the prohibition in both the New York State and New York City Human Rights Laws against discrimination on the basis of marital status. They also allege that the defendants' housing policy violates the New York State Roommate Law by restricting occupancy in university housing and the New York City Human Rights Law by having a disparate impact on homosexuals. The defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint in its entirety for failure to state a cause of action.
The plaintiffs are medical students enrolled at the defendant Albert Einstein College of Medicine. Einstein is a division of the defendant Yeshiva University. Plaintiffs Levin and Jones are lesbians who assert that they each have a long-term, committed relationship with a life partner.
Einstein offers housing accommodations at below market rates to its students in apartment buildings located near its campus. This housing is made available solely to students, along with the students' spouses and dependent children. The college requires proof of marriage in order for spouses to reside in the apartments.
Levin and Jones allege that although they themselves were offered accommodations, their request to have their respective partners live with them was denied because they were not married. As a result, according to Levin and Jones, they accepted the safe and affordable housing offered by the college and were forced to live apart from their partner. They allege that they each eventually moved out of their university apartments in order to live with their partners.
Both the New York State Human Rights Law and the New York City Human Rights Law make it unlawful to discriminate on the basis of marital status. See, e.g., Exec. L. §§ 296(2-a), 296(4) and 296(5)(a)(1); N.Y.C.Admin.Code § 8-107(5). The plaintiffs allege (First, Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action) that the defendants' housing policy violates these provisions by allowing married spouses of Einstein students to live in university housing while prohibiting non-married partners from doing the same.
The plaintiffs also allege (Sixth Cause of Action) that the defendants' policy violates the New York State Roommate Law (Real Property Law § 235-f). The Roommate Law provides that it shall be unlawful for a landlord to restrict occupancy of residential premises to a tenant and the tenant's immediate family. The statute further provides that any rental agreement must permit occupancy by the tenant, the immediate family of the tenant, one additional occupant and the dependent children of the occupant.
Finally, under the New York City Human Rights Law, a policy or practice which has a disparate impact to the detriment of a group which is protected therein is unlawful unless it is shown that the policy or practice bears a significant relationship to a significant business objective. See N.Y.C.Admin.Code § 8-107(17). Noting that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is prohibited by the City Human Rights Law, the plaintiffs allege (Seventh Cause of Action) that the defendants' policy has a disparate impact on homosexuals because, unlike heterosexuals, they are unable to marry their partners and are therefore absolutely barred from residing in university apartments with their partners.
The plaintiffs argue that the statutory prohibition against discrimination on the basis of marital status requires that nonmarital relationships between two committed and loving partners be accorded the same rights as are otherwise accorded marital relationships. The Court of Appeals has rejected this broad interpretation of the applicable city and state statutes. In Matter of Manhattan Pizza Hut, Inc. v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 51 N.Y.2d 506, 512, 434 N.Y.S.2d 961, 415 N.E.2d 950 (1980), the Court concluded that the proscription against discrimination on the basis of marital status does not cover discrimination based on an individual's "relationships " (emphasis in original text). Rather, the Court held that this prohibition only applies to discrimination against an individual because that person is single, married, separated, divorced or widowed. As the Court explained, it would, for example, be unlawful for an employer to hire or fire someone because that person falls within one of these classifications. Id. at 510, 434 N.Y.S.2d 961, 415 N.E.2d 950.
Here, none of the plaintiffs has alleged that she herself was denied university housing because of her marital status. On the contrary, each of the plaintiffs was offered and accepted housing accommodations at Einstein. Thus, the plaintiffs were not individually prevented from obtaining university housing.
The plaintiffs nevertheless argue that they were in fact discriminated against individually because, unlike married students, they were not allowed to reside in university housing with a person with whom they have established an intimate and committed relationship. In Hudson View Properties v. Weiss, 59 N.Y.2d 733, 463 N.Y.S.2d 428, 450 N.E.2d 234 (1983), the Court of Appeals rejected such an argument. There, the plaintiff was a named tenant whose lease limited the occupancy of her apartment to her and the members of her immediate family. When her landlord sought to evict her from the apartment because she had been residing there with a man to whom she was not married but with whom she had a loving relationship, she commenced an action claiming that she had been discriminated against on the basis of her marital status. In denying the tenant's claim, the Court reiterated the conclusion which it had earlier reached in Manhattan Pizza Hut that a person's right not to be discriminated against on the basis of marital status does not extend to that person's relationship with another person. Id. at 735, 463 N.Y.S.2d 428, 450 N.E.2d 234. Since the tenant in that case had not been evicted because she was single, the Court found that the statutory proscription did not apply. Thus, the Court clearly held that the prohibition against discrimination on the basis of marital status does not prevent a landlord from recognizing the institution of marriage and distinguishing between married and unmarried couples. See also McMinn v. Town of Oyster Bay, 105 A.D.2d 46, 50, 482 N.Y.S.2d 773 (2nd Dept.1984), aff'd, 66 N.Y.2d 544, 498 N.Y.S.2d 128, 488 N.E.2d 1240 (1985) ().
The plaintiffs, however, assert that the precedential value of Hudson View has been substantially circumscribed by the subsequent Court of Appeals decision in Braschi v. Stahl Associates Company, 74 N.Y.2d 201, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784, 543 N.E.2d 49 (1989). I disagree. In Braschi, the Court found that the provision in the rent control laws which protects families against sudden eviction should not be rigidly restricted to blood relatives or those people who have formalized their relationship by obtaining a marriage certificate. Rather, the Court held that in the context of eviction, a more realistic and equally valid view of a family includes "two adult lifetime partners whose relationship is long term and characterized by an emotional and financial commitment and interdependence." Id. at 211, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784, 543 N.E.2d 49.
In reaching this decision, the Court never suggested that there was any general prohibition against treating married and nonmarried couples differently. Instead, the Court only found that since the rent control regulations at issue in that case did not employ any word or phrase which refers to the institution of marriage, the term "family" as used therein could and should be construed to include nonmarital partnerships. Implicit in the decision is the recognition that the right to succeed to the tenancy of a rent controlled apartment could have been expressly limited under the regulations to marital partners and the other members of the tenant's immediate family. There is no indication that governmental regulations or lease provisions which expressly limit their coverage to married couples were subject to invalidation under the rationale of the court's decision. On the contrary, the Court expressly stated that its decision was consistent with Hudson View and reaffirmed the holding in that case that the city and state proscriptions against discrimination on the basis of marital status did not prohibit a landlord from excluding occupancy by an unmarried person with whom the named tenant has a loving relationship. See Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 210-11, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784, 543 N.E.2d 49.
In support of their position, the plaintiffs also rely on a decision of the Appellate Division, First Department affirming the lower court's denial of a motion to dismiss an action brought by homosexual New York City school teachers who sought the same health benefits for their domestic partners as were available to the spouses of their heterosexual colleagues. See ...
To continue reading
Request your trial