McMinn v. Town of Oyster Bay

Decision Date26 December 1985
Citation488 N.E.2d 1240,66 N.Y.2d 544,498 N.Y.S.2d 128
Parties, 488 N.E.2d 1240 Robert McMINN et al., Respondents, v. TOWN OF OYSTER BAY et al., Appellants.
CourtNew York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
OPINION OF THE COURT

SIMONS, Judge.

Plaintiffs are the owners and tenants of a four-bedroom house in Massapequa in the Town of Oyster Bay, Long Island, which is in violation of the Town zoning ordinance. They commenced this action against defendants, the Town of Oyster Bay, the Town Council and its supervisor and building inspector, for a declaration that that portion of the ordinance restricting "single-family" housing to any number of persons related by blood, marriage or adoption or to two persons not so related but both of whom are 62 years of age or older violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the State Constitution (N.Y. Const., art. I, §§ 6, 11) and Human Rights Law § 296 (Executive Law § 296). Plaintiffs also sought an injunction against further enforcement of the ordinance. Following a trial, Supreme Court concluded that the age requirement for defining two unrelated individuals as a family violated the State constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws and that the ordinance also violated Executive Law § 296(5) to the extent it prohibited occupancy of a single-family house by two individuals on the ground of marital status but that the ordinance was in all other respects valid (111 Misc.2d 1046, 445 N.Y.S.2d 859). The combined effect of these rulings was to find the ordinance constitutional insofar as it restricted occupancy of a single-family home to any number of persons related by blood, marriage or adoption or two unrelated persons. On cross appeals, the Appellate Division modified the judgment and declared that the challenged portion of the ordinance was facially unconstitutional under the due process clause of our State Constitution insofar as it prohibits occupancy of one-family homes by persons unrelated by blood, marriage or adoption and that it was constitutional insofar as it limits occupancy of one-family homes to a single housekeeping unit (105 A.D.2d 46, 482 N.Y.S.2d 773).

Although several issues are raised on defendants' appeal to this court, one is dispositive: whether defendants' zoning ordinance may so restrict occupancy in single-family houses. Because we conclude that the definition of family contained in this ordinance on its face infringes upon the due process protections embodied in our State Constitution, we affirm.

The Town of Oyster Bay zoning ordinance establishes a number of use districts, including a "D Residence" district, in which single-family houses are permitted as of right but rooming and boarding houses are allowed only if approved by the Town Board after a public hearing. The ordinance also contains the following definition of "family":

"(a) Any number of persons, related by blood, marriage, or legal adoption, living and cooking on the premises together as a single, nonprofit housekeeping unit; or

"(b) Any two (2) persons not related by blood, marriage, or legal adoption, living and cooking on the premises together as a single, nonprofit housekeeping unit, both of whom are sixty-two (62) years of age or over, and residing on the premises."

Plaintiffs Robert and Joan McMinn purchased their house in 1973. It is in a D Residence district. On June 1, 1976, they leased the house to four unrelated young men between the ages of 22 and 25 who had grown up in the area and wanted to remain near their families but not reside with them. Shortly after the tenants moved in, a criminal information was filed against the McMinns in District Court, Nassau County, charging them with violating the zoning ordinance because the house was occupied by more than one family. The McMinns and the tenants then commenced this action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and the criminal proceedings have been adjourned pending its disposition. * In their complaint, plaintiffs assert only State constitutional and statutory claims and expressly reserve the right to litigate all Federal claims in a Federal forum pursuant to England v. Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 84 S.Ct. 461, 11 L.Ed.2d 440. They contend that the restrictive definition of "family" contained in the ordinance is facially invalid under Executive Law § 296 and the due process and equal protection clauses of the State Constitution (N.Y. Const., art. I, §§ 6, 11) or, in the alternative, that it violated these statutory and constitutional provisions as applied to them.

Zoning ordinances, like other legislative enactments, are presumed constitutional and the burden is on the party challenging the ordinance to prove its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt (Northern Westchester Professional Park Assoc. v. Town of Bedford, 60 N.Y.2d 492, 500, 470 N.Y.S.2d 350, 458 N.E.2d 809; Robert E. Kurzius, Inc. v. Incorporated Vil. of Upper Brookville, 51 N.Y.2d 338, 344, 434 N.Y.S.2d 180, 414 N.E.2d 680; Marcus Assoc. v. Town of Huntington, 45 N.Y.2d 501, 505, 410 N.Y.S.2d 546, 382 N.E.2d 1323). Plaintiffs have satisfied that burden.

In order for a zoning ordinance to be a valid exercise of the police power it must survive a two-part test: (1) it must have been enacted in furtherance of a legitimate governmental purpose, and (2) there must be a "reasonable relation between the end sought to be achieved by the regulation and the means used to achieve that end" (French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 596, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 350 N.E.2d 381; Salamar Bldrs. Corp. v. Tuttle, 29 N.Y.2d 221, 222-225, 325 N.Y.S.2d 933, 275 N.E.2d 933; see, Northern Westchester Professional Park Assoc. v. Town of Bedford, 60 N.Y.2d 492, 500, 470 N.Y.S.2d 350, 458 N.E.2d 809, supra; see also, Montgomery v. Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 54, 378 N.Y.S.2d 1, 340 N.E.2d 444). If the ordinance fails either part of this test, it is unreasonable and constitutes a deprivation of property without due process of law under our State Constitution (French Investing Co. v. City of New York, supra, 39 N.Y.2d at p. 595, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 350 N.E.2d 381).

Indisputably, this ordinance was enacted to further several legitimate governmental purposes, including preservation of the character of traditional single-family neighborhoods, reduction of parking and traffic problems, control of population density and prevention of noise and disturbance. The dispute centers on whether the means the local legislature has chosen, the challenged ordinance and more specifically the definition of "family" contained in it, are reasonably related to the achievement of these legitimate purposes.

Manifestly, restricting occupancy of single-family housing based generally on the biological or legal relationships between its inhabitants bears no reasonable relationship to the goals of reducing parking and traffic problems, controlling population density and preventing noise and disturbance (see, Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499-500, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1935-1936, 52 L.Ed.2d 531; id., at p. 520, n. 16, 97 S.Ct. at p. 1946, n. 16 City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal.3d 123, 164 Cal.Rptr. 539, 564, 610 P.2d 436, 441; State v. Baker, 81 N.J. 99, 405 A.2d 368, 373). Their achievement depends not upon the biological or legal relations between the occupants of a house but generally upon the size of the dwelling and the lot and the number of its occupants. Thus, the definition of family employed here is both fatally overinclusive in prohibiting, for example, a young unmarried couple from occupying a four-bedroom house who do not threaten the purposes of the ordinance and underinclusive in failing to prohibit occupancy of a two-bedroom home by 10 or 12 persons who are related in only the most distant manner and who might well be expected to present serious overcrowding and traffic problems.

Nor is the ordinance's restrictive definition of family saved by the desire to preserve the character of the traditional single-family neighborhood in Oyster Bay. That is a legitimate governmental objective (see, Group House v. Board of Zoning & Appeals, 45 N.Y.2d 266, 271, 408 N.Y.S.2d 377, 380 N.E.2d 207; City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 305, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449, 313 N.E.2d 756; see also, Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9, 94 S.Ct. 1536, 1541, 39 L.Ed.2d 797; and see generally, Validity of Ordinance Restricting Number of Unrelated Persons Who Can Live Together in Residential Zone, Ann., 12 A.L.R.4th 238), but a municipality may not seek to achieve it by enacting a zoning ordinance that "limitthe definition of family to exclude a household which in every but a biological sense is a single family" (City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, supra, 34 N.Y.2d at p. 306, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449, 313 N.E.2d 753). Zoning is "intended to control types of housing and living and not the genetic or intimate internal family relations of human beings" (City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, supra, at p. 305, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449, 313 N.E.2d 753) and if a household is "the functional and factual equivalent of a natural family" (Group House v. Board of Zoning & Appeals, supra, 45 N.Y.2d at p. 272, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449, 313 N.E.2d 756), the ordinance may not exclude it from a single-family neighborhood and still serve a valid purpose. This ordinance, by limiting occupancy of single-family homes to persons related by blood, marriage or adoption or to only two unrelated persons of a certain age, excludes many households who pose no threat to the goal of preserving the character of the traditional single-family neighborhood, such as the households involved in White Plains...

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