Lewis v. Heartland Inns of Am.

• Decision Date: 10 February 2011
• Docket Number: No. 4:07–cv–00287.,4:07–cv–00287.
• Parties: Brenna LEWIS, Plaintiff,v.HEARTLAND INNS OF AMERICA, L.L.C., d/b/a Heartland Inn, Ankeny and Barbara Cullinan, individually and in her corporate capacity, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa

764 F.Supp.2d 1037

Brenna LEWIS, Plaintiff,

v.HEARTLAND INNS OF AMERICA, L.L.C., d/b/a Heartland Inn, Ankeny and Barbara Cullinan, individually and in her corporate capacity, Defendants.

No. 4:07–cv–00287.

United States District Court, S.D. Iowa, Central Division.

Feb. 10, 2011.

David J. Dutton, Erin P. Lyons, Dutton Braun Staack Hellman Iversen, Waterloo, IA, for Defendants.Andrew L. LeGrant, Mark D. Sherinian, Sherinian & Walker PC, West Des Moines, IA, for Plaintiff.

ORDER

ROBERT W. PRATT, Chief Judge.

Currently before the Court is a motion for judgment as a matter of law, filed by Defendants Heartland Inns of America, L.L.C. and Barbara Cullinan (collectively “Defendants”) on December 9, 2010. Clerk's No. 112. Plaintiff Brenna Lewis (“Lewis”) filed a response in opposition to the motion on December 27, 2010. Clerk's No. 124. Defendants filed a reply on January 6, 2011. Clerk's No. 131. Also before the Court is an application for attorney's fees and costs filed by Lewis on November 24, 2010. Clerk's No. 109. Defendants filed a response in opposition to this application on December 9, 2010. Clerk's No. 111. Lewis filed a reply on December 20, 2010. Clerk's No. 122. The matters are fully submitted.¹

I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 29, 2007, Lewis filed a complaint against Defendants, alleging that Defendants violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Iowa Civil Rights Act (“ICRA”), by: (1) discriminating against Lewis on the basis of sex stereotypes; and (2) retaliating against her for opposing what she reasonably believed to be discrimination.² See Compl. at 3–6. The case was tried to a jury beginning on November 8, 2010. See Clerk's Nos. 91–104. On November 12, 2010, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Lewis on her retaliation claim and in favor of Defendants on Lewis' sex-stereotype discrimination claim. Clerk's No. 97. During the liability phase of trial, the jury awarded Lewis compensatory damages. Id. Following a separate punitive damages phase of trial, the jury awarded Lewis punitive damages as well. Clerk's No. 101.

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Defendants' Motion for Judgment as Matter of Law

In Defendants' motion, they seek judgment as a matter of law on Lewis' claims for: (1) retaliation; and (2) punitive damages. See Renewed Mot. for J. as a Matter of Law & Incorporated Br. (hereinafter “Defs.' Mot.”) at 1 (Clerk's No. 112). “Under Rule 50, if the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for a party on an issue, the court may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against the party.” Howard v. Mo. Bone and Joint Center, Inc., 615 F.3d 991, 995 (8th Cir.2010) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court must “view[ ] the evidence most favorably to the nonmoving party and drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor.” Hinz v. Neuroscience, Inc., 538 F.3d 979, 984 (8th Cir.2008) (citing Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Scott, 486 F.3d 418, 422 (8th Cir.2007)). “If the evidence viewed according to this standard would permit reasonable jurors to differ in the conclusions they draw, judgment as a matter of law cannot be granted.” Id. (quoting Liberty Mut., 486 F.3d at 422). “However, ‘when the record contains no proof beyond speculation to support the verdict, then judgment as a matter of law is appropriate.’ ” Hinz, 538 F.3d at 984 (quoting Liberty Mut., 486 F.3d at 422; and Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1)). The Court will address each of Defendants' arguments in turn.

1. Retaliation.

In order to prevail on her retaliation claim, Lewis “had to show that she engaged in protected conduct by opposing a practice that a reasonable person could believe violated [Title VII]; that a materially adverse action was taken against her; and, that there was a causal connection between the protected conduct and the adverse action.” See Helton v. Southland Racing Corp., 600 F.3d 954, 960 (8th Cir.2010). The Eighth Circuit “has held that a plaintiff employee need not establish that the conduct [s]he opposed was in fact prohibited under Title VII to satisfy the first element. Rather ... [she] must simply prove she had a good faith, reasonable belief that the underlying challenged conduct violated Title VII.” Brannum v. Mo. Dep't of Corr., 518 F.3d 542, 547 (8th Cir.2008) (quoting Bakhtiari v. Lutz, 507 F.3d 1132, 1137 (8th Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks, footnote, and citation omitted)).

Defendants argue that “no reasonable jury could have found for Ms. Lewis on her retaliation claim because she had no good faith, objectively reasonable belief that the employment practice she challenged was unlawful.” Defs.' Mot. at 2. Specifically, Defendants argue that “[i]n order for Ms. Lewis's alleged oppositional conduct to be protected under Title VII's retaliation provision, Ms. Lewis had to demonstrate an objectively reasonable belief that reassigning her to the overnight shift would have constituted sex discrimination.” ³ Id. at 5. This statement, standing alone, is not necessarily incorrect. However, Defendants' arguments about what “constitute[s] sex discrimination” improperly conflate the general concept of “discrimination” with the elements of a cause of action for discrimination.

Defendants correctly note that, in order to prevail on a claim for sex discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must prove, among other things, that she suffered an “adverse employment action.” ⁴ See id. at 6 (citing Lewis v. Heartland Inns of Am., L.L.C., 591 F.3d 1033, 1038 (8th Cir.2010)). Expanding upon this basic proposition, Defendants assert that Lewis could not have reasonably believed that she had suffered “discrimination” until she had been subjected to—or had a reasonable belief that she was about to be subjected to—an adverse employment action.⁵ See id. at 5–6, 10–11. The Court does not agree.

Contrary to Defendants' suggestion, Title VII's retaliation provision does not limit its protection to those who oppose what they believe to be “actionable discrimination.” See id. at 8. Rather, it protects those who “oppose[ ] any practice made an unlawful employment practice ” under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a) (emphasis added). Title VII provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to limit, segregate, or classify his employees ... in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's ... sex....” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(2). Therefore, the test is not whether or not Lewis reasonably believed she had an actionable claim for sex discrimination, but whether Lewis reasonably believed that she was “limited” or “segregated” in a way that deprived—or would have tended to deprive—her of employment opportunities because of her nonconformance with sex stereotypes. See id.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Lewis, a reasonable jury could have concluded that requiring Lewis to interview for a job she was already performing, in the circumstances alleged, constituted a limitation or segregation that would tend to deprive Lewis of an employment opportunity due to her nonconformance with sex stereotypes. See Pl.'s Br. in Resistance to Defs.' Renewed Mot. for J. as a Matter of Law (hereinafter “Pl.'s Resp.”) at 8, 10–12 (Clerk's No. 124–1). Therefore, Defendants are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Lewis' claim for retaliation.

Additionally, the Court notes that “the standard for granting summary judgment ‘mirrors' the standard for judgment as a matter of law, such that “the inquiry under each is the same.” ” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250–51, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). The Court cannot ignore the fact that the Eighth Circuit has already ruled—based on the same evidentiary offer by Lewis—that Lewis' retaliation claim was submissible to a jury.⁶ See Lewis, 591 F.3d at 1042–43 (concluding that a reasonable jury could find for Lewis on her retaliation claim based on Lewis' opposition to the second interview requirement). To grant Defendants' motion in these circumstances would be tantamount to overruling the Eighth Circuit—and, of course, “[t]he court of appeals overrules decisions of the trial court, not the other way around.” Holst v. Bowen, 637 F.Supp. 145, 148 (E.D.Wash.1986). Therefore, for this independent reason, Defendants' motion must be denied.

2. Punitive damages.

Defendants also argue that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Lewis' claim for punitive damages. Defs.' Br. at 11. In response, Lewis argues that Defendants' motion on this issue is improper because Defendants did not move for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of punitive damages at trial. Pl.'s Resp. at 2. In their reply, Defendants do not seriously dispute this contention. See Reply to Resistance to Mot. for J. as a Matter of Law (hereinafter “Defs.' Reply”) at 4 (Clerk's No. 131). Instead, Defendants argue that “[a]llowing the punitive damages award to stand in this case would constitute plain error resulting in a manifest miscarriage of justice.” Id.

“Under Rule 50(b), a litigant who fails to move for judgment as a matter of law at the close of the evidence [pursuant to Rule 50(a) ] cannot later argue ... that the verdict was supported by insufficient evidence.” Pulla v. Amoco Oil Co., 72 F.3d 648, 655 (8th Cir.1995) (footnote omitted). The Eighth Circuit has “recognized an exception to this rule where a Rule 50 motion was made shortly before the close of the evidence and the district court indicated that another Rule 50 motion at the close of all evidence would be unnecessary.” Williams v. City of Kansas City, Mo., 223 F.3d 749, 752 (8th Cir.2000) (citing BE & K...