Lewis v. State
Decision Date | 18 June 1986 |
Docket Number | No. 797-85,797-85 |
Citation | 715 S.W.2d 655 |
Parties | Donald Wayne LEWIS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Richard D. Hughes, Nederland, for appellant.
James S. McGrath, Dist. Atty. and R.W. Fisher, Asst. Dist. Atty., Beaumont, Robert Huttash, State's Atty., Austin, for State.
Before the court en banc.
OPINION ON STATE'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
The appellant was convicted of burglary of a habitation. The jury, after finding that allegations of a prior burglary conviction were true, assessed punishment at 25 years' confinement in the Department of Corrections.
On appeal the appellant urged one ground of error contending the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction because it was insufficient to prove that entry was made with intent to commit theft as alleged, an essential element of the offense. The Beaumont Court of Appeals agreed and reversed the conviction. Lewis v. State, 694 S.W.2d 615 (Tex.App.--Beaumont 1985). We granted the State's petition for discretionary review to determine the correctness of the holding of the Court of Appeals.
Ray Wyatt, the alleged owner of the house, testified that his grandmother lived in the house until the time of her death; that furniture, clothing, a television set, silverware and other household items were still in the house on December 6, 1983, although the valuable jewelry had been removed. There were kitchen facilities and the utilities were still connected, and out-of-town relatives slept there on weekends when in Beaumont. When he went to the house on December 6th after being called about the entry, he found that a ladder had been moved from the living room, and placed so as to reach the closet above the hallway, and that some quilts and blankets that had been stored there had been removed from the closet. This was not the condition the day before when Wyatt was at the house. He stated that he had not given the appellant or anyone else permission to break and enter the house.
Pauline Carey operated the beauty shop immediately adjoining the house in question. About noontime on December 6, 1983, the activities of a black man in the yard of the house attracted her attention and that of her daughter, Miranda Woolridge. He was wearing a black jacket and blue gloves. As they watched from the beauty shop, a car passed the house and the man ducked behind some bushes, apparently trying to hide. The man then removed a screen from one of the windows of the house, raised the window and entered the house. The police were called.
Beaumont Police Officer Kenneth Brown responded to a "burglary in progress" call, arriving in a matter of a few minutes. He found the open window. While investigating, he climbed a fence. As he did so he saw a black male who had on a jacket and gloves inside a window in the house. Upon apparently seeing the officer, the individual dropped the curtain "back over the window" and disappeared from sight "inside that residence."
Other officers arrived and Officer Hall entered the house through the open window and unlocked the door for his fellow officers. Officer Brown observed that a ladder had been placed so as to reach a little closet or cupboard "up over the hall." The first search of the house revealed no one. Officer LeBlanc, however, returned to a valet or portable closet full of clothes he had earlier inspected. As he poked around with his night stick in the closet, he discovered the appellant hiding under the clothes. Appellant, a black male, was wearing a black jacket and blue gloves. Appellant had in his possession on his wrist or in his pockets a number of items of miscellaneous jewelry. After he was removed, he asked the officers to return and retrieve his cap that he left in the portable closet. When an officer returned, he found the cap and an open switchblade knife which appellant claimed.
The appellant offered testimony of two defense investigators, and recalled Wyatt and Officer LeBlanc. Wyatt testified his grandmother had a number of costume jewelry items but he could not personally make a positive identification of any items found in appellant's possession, including an ivory necklace. LeBlanc related he could not testify the necklace found on appellant as being property coming from the house in question.
V.T.C.A., Penal Code, § 30.02, provides in part:
The intent with which entrance is made is an essential element of the offense of burglary and therefore must be pled and proved. Ex parte Cannon, 546 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Tex.Cr.App.1976) ( ), and cases there cited.
The court charged the jury abstractly, inter alia, on the term "intentionally" defining it in the terms of V.T.C.A., Penal Code, § 6.03(a), and added "Intent can be inferred from the acts, words and conduct of the Defendant."
The court applied the law to the facts in its charge as follows:
The jury's verdict at the guilt stage of the trial reads:
"We, the Jury, find the defendant Guilty of the offense of Burglary of a Habitation, as alleged in the indictment." (Emphasis supplied.)
It is well settled that the intent to commit theft may be inferred from the circumstances. Williams v. State, 537 S.W.2d 936, 938 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Hawkins v. State, 467 S.W.2d 465, 466 (Tex.Cr.App.1971); Gibson v. State, 434 S.W.2d 851, 852 (Tex.Cr.App.1968). Thus the intent with which a defendant enters a habitation is a fact question for the jury to decide from surrounding circumstances in prosecution for burglary of a habitation with intent to commit theft. Robles v. State, 664 S.W.2d 91 (Tex.Cr.App.1984); Ortega v. State, 626 S.W.2d 746 (Tex.Cr.App.1981), and cases there cited; Daniels v....
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