Williams v. State

• Decision Date: 29 August 1990
• Docket Number: No. 04-89-00178-CR,04-89-00178-CR
• Citation: 796 S.W.2d 793
• Parties: Billy Ray WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 793

796 S.W.2d 793

Billy Ray WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 04-89-00178-CR.

Court of Appeals of Texas,

San Antonio.

Aug. 29, 1990.

Jacquelyn L. Snyder, San Antonio, for appellant.

Fred G. Rodriguez, Ray Hardy, Edward F. Shaughnessy, III, Criminal Dist. Attys., San Antonio, for appellee.

Before PEEPLES, CARR and ONION, ¹ JJ.

OPINION

ONION, Presiding Justice (Retired).

This appeal is taken from a conviction for burglary of a building. TEX.PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02(a)(1) (Vernon 1989). Following the jury's verdict of guilty, the penalty stage of the trial was conducted before the trial court. Finding the enhancement allegations of two prior felony convictions to be true, the trial court assessed appellant's punishment at twenty-five (25) years' confinement in the Texas Department of Corrections. ²

Appellant advances five points of error. He initially contends the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction. He also urges that the trial court erred in denying his pre-trial motion to quash the indictment, and erred in refusing requested jury instructions on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass and on the defense of mistake of fact. Lastly, appellant contends that the formal sentence incorrectly reflects that life imprisonment was assessed as punishment.

Carolyn Cardenas testified that on May 13, 1988, she was the associate manager of Lerner's, a woman's apparel store located in the River Center Mall in San Antonio. Cardenas described Lerner's as being divided into two areas, a sales floor open to the public, and a back or rear area available only to employees of the store. The two areas were divided by a heavy door which was always kept closed. She admitted that on the date in question the door had an "Exit" sign over it. She related the rear portion of the store consisted of a hallway, an office, a restroom, a locker or lounge room, and a storeroom. Cardenas testified that on May 13, 1988, when she decided to take her lunch break, she went to retrieve her purse from the locker room. She left the sales area and went through the closed door into the rear area of the store. She walked down the hallway and opened the closed door to the locker room. As she started to open her locker to get her purse, she looked through the open door into the storeroom, and saw a man, whom she identified as the appellant, going through boxes on the shelves in the storeroom. Cardenas asked the appellant what he was doing, and he replied: "I want to take this." Appellant then grabbed a box of sunglasses which Cardenas said had a market value of $200.00. Cardenas told the appellant to follow her and she returned to the sales area and told the store's manager, Lilly Wolfe, what she had observed. Appellant then appeared and placed the box of sunglasses on the sales desk, saying the box was his wife's layaway and he wanted to take it. He did not produce a receipt or offer payment. Appellant then began to leave through the front door although he was told to wait. The mall security officers had been called. Cardenas testified that she had never seen the appellant before, and had not given him permission to enter the rear area or the storeroom.

Wolfe testified she followed the appellant out of the store and pointed him out to the security officers when they arrived. She did not give the appellant permission to enter the rear area or the storeroom. She explained that the names of appellant or his wife were not on the layaway list. It was shown that the layaway items were kept in a different part of the storeroom from where appellant picked up the box of sunglasses.

San Antonio Police Officer Michael J. Schott testified he went to the River Center Mall and arrested appellant on May 13, 1988. Officer George D. Karagas did a follow-up investigation and confirmed the layout of the store as described by Cardenas and Wolfe, including the fact the storeroom was an enclosed area.

Appellant did not testify but called his sister who testified he was retarded and could read only simple words. Dr. Julie Ewing, a psychologist, testified the appellant had a low I.Q., was mentally retarded, and read at a first grade level. She related that he had gone to junior high level in school, had told her he was working on his G.E.D., and had served in the Army. She stated appellant came across as more intelligent when he was talking than her testing revealed.

The standard for review of the sufficiency of evidence is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of the facts could have found the essential elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Butler v. State, 769 S.W.2d 234, 239 (Tex.Crim.App.1989); Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). The standard is applicable to both direct and circumstantial evidence cases. Chambers v. State, 711 S.W.2d 240, 244-45 (Tex.Crim.App.1986); Christian v. State, 686 S.W.2d 930, 934 (Tex.Crim.App.1985).

A conviction based upon circumstantial evidence, however, cannot be sustained if the circumstances do not exclude every other reasonable hypothesis except that of the defendant's guilt. Burns v. State, 676 S.W.2d 118, 120 (Tex.Crim.App.1984). Any alternative hypothesis, however, must be reasonable, consistent with the facts proved and the circumstances and not out of harmony with the evidence. Autry v. State, 626 S.W.2d 758, 761 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 882, 103 S.Ct. 180, 74 L.Ed.2d 147 (1982).

Appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to prove that (1) the entry was with intent to commit theft or (2) that the rear portion of the building was not open to the public.

Intent can be inferred from acts, words and conduct by the accused. Dues v. State, 634 S.W.2d 304, 305 (Tex.Crim.App.1982); Ercanbrack v. State, 646 S.W.2d 480, 481 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no pet.). Intent, of course, may be established by circumstantial evidence. Mauldin v. State, 628 S.W.2d 793, 795 (Tex.Crim.App.1982); Clark v. State, 543 S.W.2d 125, 127 (Tex.Crim.App.1976). It is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of facts from all the circumstances and facts in evidence. Hemphill v. State, 505 S.W.2d 560, 562 (Tex.Crim.App.1974). Thus, the intent with which an accused enters a building is a question of fact for the jury to resolve from the circumstances surrounding the conduct of the accused. Robles v. State, 664 S.W.2d 91, 94 (Tex.Crim.App.1984); Bailey v. State, 722 S.W.2d 202 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1986, no pet.).

The undisputed testimony showed that the appellant had to go through two closed doors and walk through an open door to get into the storeroom where he was discovered "going through the boxes that were on the shelves" and the merchandise not yet being offered for sale. When confronted he grabbed a box of sunglasses in front of him and stated "I want to take this." In the sales area he fabricated a story about the sunglasses being his wife's layaway and then left the store without the sunglasses while being asked to wait. While specific culpable intent to commit theft must exist at the time of the entry, McAfee v. State, 658 S.W.2d 200 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1983, no pet.), the evidence is sufficient in the instant case to show the requisite intent. See Lewis v. State, 715 S.W.2d 655 (Tex.Crim.App.1986); Williams v. State, 537 S.W.2d 936 (Tex.Crim.App.1976); Teniente v. State, 533 S.W.2d 805 (Tex.Crim.App.1976).

Appellant also argues that the evidence failed to show that the portion of the building was not open to the public. Appellant places stress upon the "Exit" sign over the door separating the sales area from the rear portion of the store. The arrangement of the structure has been previously described, and the employees testified that no one other than employees were permitted in the rear portion of the building. No one gave the appellant consent to enter the storeroom. Evans v. State, 677 S.W.2d 814, 818 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 1984, no pet.) involved a similar factual situation. There, the office area of a clothing store, where money, merchandise and store records were maintained, was separated from the sales area by a door which was normally locked. Evans held that the office was sufficiently separated to sustain a conviction for burglary of a building. It was also held that a person can make an unlawful entry by walking through an open door when the entry is without the owner's consent, citing Johnson v. State, 664 S.W.2d 420, 422 (Tex.App.--Amarillo 1983, pet. ref'd). Evans also noted the "closed to the public" type of signs found in Hughes v. State, 625 S.W.2d 827 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no pet.). While conceding that such signs better informed the public, the Evans court concluded that signs forbidding entry to the public are not determinative of whether a portion of the building is open to the public. "The important evidence is that the restricted area was separate from the public and the defendant did not have permission to enter that portion of the building not open to the public." Evans, supra, at 818.

In Johnson, supra, it was determined that the pharmacy area of a large supermarket was capable of being the subject of a burglary when the pharmacy was closed and the doors locked at a time when the supermarket was open for business. Although the pharmacy had a front counter, incapable of being closed, there could still be a burglary if entrance to the pharmacy could only be obtained by walking through one of the doors or by climbing over the counter. See also Lopez v. State, 660 S.W.2d 592 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1983, pet. ref'd).

In Hughes, supra, evidence that a portion of a building was open to the public but that the engine and locker room in which the defendant was found was closed to the public was held sufficient to show burglary of a building not...