Leyba v. Renger
| Decision Date | 06 October 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 20444,20444 |
| Citation | 114 N.M. 686,1992 NMSC 61,845 P.2d 780 |
| Parties | Lawrence LEYBA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Hartmut RENGER, Anesthesia Specialists of Albuquerque, a New Mexico partnership, and St. Joseph Health Care Corp., a New Mexico corporation, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
Plaintiff, Dr. Lawrence Leyba, filed suit against Dr. Hartmut Renger, Anesthesia Specialist of Albuquerque (ASA) and St. Joseph Health Care Corporation (St. Joseph) in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico. This action arises out of defendants' failure to renew plaintiff's credentials in connection with an exclusive agreement between ASA and St. Joseph for anesthesia services and for defamatory statements Dr. Renger allegedly made about Dr. Leyba in the course of investigating Dr. Leyba's application for privileges at three St. Joseph hospitals in Albuquerque. The following question was certified to this Court pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 34-2-8 (Repl.Pamp.1990) and SCRA 1986, 12-607: Did the enactment of the New Mexico Review Organization Immunity Act (NMROIA), NMSA 1978, Secs. 41-9-1 to -7 (Repl.Pamp.1989), abrogate the absolute immunity created by Franklin v. Blank, 86 N.M. 585, 525 P.2d 945 (Ct.App.1974)?
We accepted certification on March 23, 1992.
We hold that the NMROIA abolished any common-law absolute immunity available to review organization participants prior to its enactment, establishing instead a qualified immunity. We further hold that the NMROIA controls and supersedes the common law immunity set out in Franklin. In Franklin, the Court of Appeals found Dr. Franklin absolutely immune from liability in connection with a letter allegedly containing defamatory statements about a Dr. Blank. This letter was written by Dr. Franklin and sent to the appropriate person for initiating peer review proceedings. The Court of Appeals found absolute immunity because the peer review proceedings were quasi-judicial in character, and the communication initiating the proceedings was an indispensable part thereof. Id.
Dr. Renger has argued to the United States District Court that the common-law absolute immunity set out in Franklin applies here because his activities were related to the St. Joseph credentialing process, which he claims to be a "quasi-judicial" proceeding.1 We disagree. Any common law immunity involving hospital peer review proceedings that existed under Franklin has been superseded by the 1979 enactment of the NMROIA, which established a comprehensive scheme of regulation of hospital peer review proceedings, including the scope of immunity available to members of a review organization. The immunity, however, is not absolute, but qualified.
Section 41-9-3 governing the immunity available to persons providing information to review organizations provides:
No person providing information to a review organization shall be subject to any action for damages or other relief by reason of having furnished such information, unless such information is false and the person providing such information knew or had reason to believe such information was false.
The immunity available to members of review organizations is also limited:
No person who is a member or employee of, who acts in an advisory capacity to or who furnishes counsel or services to a review organization shall be liable for damages or other relief in any action brought by a person or persons whose activities have been or are being scrutinized or reviewed by a review organization by reason of the performance by the person of any duty, function or activity of such review organization, unless the performance of such duty, function or activity was done with malice toward the person affected thereby. No person shall be liable for damages or other relief in any action by reason for the performance of the person of any duty, function or activity as a member of a review organization or by reason of any recommendation or action of the review organization when the person acts in the reasonable belief that the person's action or recommendation is warranted by facts known to the person or the review organization after reasonable efforts to ascertain the facts upon which the review organization's action or recommendation is made.
The qualified immunity set out in the NMROIA conflicts with the common-law absolute immunity of Franklin. It would be contrary to the intent of the legislature to accord absolute immunity in quasi-judicial proceedings when the hospital review committee members are specifically accorded limited qualified immunity by statute. The statute applies specifically to hospital credentialing proceedings. Section 41-9-2(E) defines "review organization" to include an organization whose
membership is limited to health care providers and staff ... and which is established by a health care provider which is a hospital ... to gather and review information relating to the care and treatment of patients for the purposes of:
....
(8) determining whether a health care provider shall be granted authority to provide health care services using the health care provider's facilities or whether a health care provider's privileges should be limited, suspended or revoked.
The NMROIA is a specific legislative declaration that its provisions will control the hospital peer review process. It covers the entire question of health care review organization immunity and privilege. Because this legislation has created a mechanism for regulating the hospital peer review process, the legislation preempted the common law in areas that overlap. Rutherford v. Darwin, 95 N.M. 340, 343, 622 P.2d 245, 248 (Ct.App.1980) ().
Dr. Renger argues that NMROIA is silent with respect to Franklin immunity and, therefore, the legislature intended to leave it intact. Legislative silence, by itself, expresses no intention one way or the other. Torrance County Mental Health Program, Inc. v....
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... ... the immunity afforded persons who furnish information to medical peer review committees was recognized by the New Mexico Supreme Court in Leyba v. Renger, 114 N.M. 686, 845 P.2d 780 (1992) ... In Leyba, the court addressed a claim that is substantially similar to the claim raised by the ... ...
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White v. Farris
... ... {41} The Legislature's silence on the question "expresses no intention one way or the other." Leyba v. Renger , 1992-NMSC-061, 9, 114 N.M. 686, 845 P.2d 780. Because the statutory language is unclear, we must consider the overall structure of ... ...
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New Mexico
...not absolute, noting that anticompetitive concerns were raised by the very nature of the medical peer review process. See Leyba v. Renger, 845 P.2d 780 (N.M. 1992). 61. Leyba , 874 F. Supp. at 1232. 62. Id. 63. Id. at 1231 n.1 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-1-15). 64. Id. at 1238-41. 65. Id. ......
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New Mexico. Practice Text
...not absolute, noting that anticompetitive concerns were raised by the very nature of the medical peer review process. See Leyba v. Renger, 845 P.2d 780 (N.M. 1992). 70. Leyba , 874 F. Supp. at 1232. New Mexico 34-9 received privileges at all three hospitals, he claimed that the initial deni......