Lezette v. Board of Ed., Hudson City School Dist.

Decision Date08 October 1974
Citation319 N.E.2d 189,35 N.Y.2d 272,360 N.Y.S.2d 869
Parties, 319 N.E.2d 189 In the Matter of Cherie LEZETTE, Respondent, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION, HUDSON CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant.
CourtNew York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

John M. Donoghue, Poughkeepsie, for appellant.

Bernard F. Ashe, Albany, and James R. Sandner, Albany, of counsel, for respondent.

Joseph D. Quinn, Jr., Poughkeepsie, for the Bd. of Ed. of the City School Dist. of the City of Poughkeepsie, amicus curiae.

WITMER, Judge.

The principal issue presented on this appeal is whether petitioner, a probationary elementary school teacher whose position was abolished by respondent board of education, is entitled to continued employment by the board and to back salary and incidental benefits.

The essential facts are not in dispute. In January, 1971 petitioner was employed by respondent board as a substitute kindergarten teacher to the end of that school year. In June, 1971 the board gave her a permanent probationary appointment as an elementary teacher, effective September 1, 1971, and she entered upon such employment, teaching in the first grade. Because of a reduction in enrollment and for reasons of economy, in the spring of 1972 respondent considered abolishing petitioner's position. This information came to petitioner's attention, and before the board acted in this regard she wrote to the assistant superintendent of schools for the district, who was in charge of personnel, and advised him that in the event her position was abolished she would like to remain in the school system as a teacher, and she requested assignment to another position which might be open in the district. Thereafter, on April 19, 1972 respondent board voted to abolish several teaching positions in its schools, including that of petitioner. On April 20 respondent's superintendent sent a notice to all the teachers in the school district which contained the statement that if a teacher had not been notified that he would not be reappointed nor told that his position was eliminated, he could assume that he was being recommended for reappointment. Petitioner alleges that she had not then been told that the board had voted to abolish her position; but respondent asserts that she had been told thereof. At any rate, respondent does not claim that petitioner had been given written notice as provided in the statute when a teacher's Employment is terminated. On June 13, 1972 respondent's superintendent of schools delivered to petitioner a letter dated that day advising her that her Position had been abolished by the board, effective June 30, 1972.

Respondent's assistant superintendent had previously caused to be posted on the bulletin boards of its schools a notice of the teaching position vacancies that existed for the ensuing year. On receiving the notice on June 13 petitioner asked the superintendent for transfer to one of such positions, and he indicated to her that he could see no problem about her obtaining one of them. Petitioner then conferred with the assistant superintendent regarding such employment and was told that the district was screening candidates and that she was being considered. Thereafter, a number of new applicants were employed by respondent as elementary school teachers in the district, effective September 1, 1972.

In April, 1972 the principal of one of respondent's schools had rated petitioner as 'good' in most respects, and rated her 'very good' in communication and 'satisfactory' in appearance; and in early May, 1972 a principal of another one of the schools had rated petitioner generally as 'satisfactory' but as borderline in appearance.

Petitioner was not offered a position. She appeared at respondent's administrative offices on the first day of school in September, 1972 and requested her assignment, but the assistant superintendent informed her that there was none for her. Respondent admits that had petitioner's position not been abolished, she would have continued in employment, since her teaching ability was not questioned.

Petitioner then instituted this article 78 proceeding, seeking adjudication that respondent's actions were contrary to law and requesting an order that respondent assign her to a teaching position in one of its elementary schools and pay her the salary and benefits which she would have received except for respondent's failure to so assign her.

Special Term dismissed the petition upon the grounds first, that the issue was one which should be resolved by the State Commissioner of Education and second, that petitioner had not obtained tenure and had demonstrated no violation of law or arbitrary action by respondent board in abolishing her position.

The Appellate Division reversed (43 A.D.2d 755, 350 N.Y.S.2d 26) the judgment of Special Term and ordered that the judgment grant the petition and direct respondent to appoint petitioner Nunc pro tunc as of September 5, 1972 to the position of elementary teacher in one of its schools. The court held that in litigation between private parties involving only questions of law, where the issue is whether school officials have acted in violation of statute, direct resort to the courts is proper, citing Cottrell v. Board of Educ. (181 Misc. 645, 650, 42 N.Y.S.2d 472, 476, affd. 267 App.Div. 817, 47 N.Y.S.2d 106, affd. 293 N.Y. 792, 59 N.E.2d 32), and that the merits of the controversy presented lie with petitioner. We agree.

The law is clear that a board of education, acting in good faith and with reasonable judgment, may abolish a teaching position, not only if held by a probationary teacher but even if held by a tenured teacher (Matter of Young v. Board of Educ., 35 N.Y.2d 31, 358 N.Y.S.2d 709, 315 N.E.2d 768). Likewise, acting in accordance with the express provisions of the applicable statutes (see Education Law, § 2509, subd. 1; § 2573, subd. 1; § 3012, subd. 1; § 3019--a, Consol. Laws, c. 16), a board of education may terminate the services of a probationary teacher without a hearing and without giving a reason therefor (Matter of Butler v. Allen, 29 A.D.2d 799, 287 N.Y.S.2d 197; Matter of Pinto v. Wynstra, 22 A.D.2d 914, 255 N.Y.S.2d 536; cf. Matter of Mannix v. Board of Educ., 21 N.Y.2d 455, 288 N.Y.S.2d 881, 235 N.E.2d 892), subject, however, to the provisions of the so-called Taylor Law (Civil Service Law, art. 14, Consol.Laws, c. 7; Matter of Board of Educ. v. Helsby,37 A.D.2d 493, 326 N.Y.S.2d 452, affd. 32 N.Y.2d 660, 343 N.Y.S.2d 131, 295 N.E.2d 797; Matter of Board of Educ. v. Division of Human Rights, 42 A.D.2d 473, 349 N.Y.S.2d 25), the provisions of the Human Rights Act (Executive Law, art. 15, Consol.Laws, c. 18; Matter of Board of Higher Educ. v. Carter, 14 N.Y.2d 138, 250 N.Y.S.2d 33, 199 N.E.2d 141; Matter of Board of Educ. v. Division of Human Rights, 42 A.D.2d 473, 349 N.Y.S.2d 25, Supra), and subject to arbitration agreements, if any (Matter of Legislative Conference v. Board of Higher Educ., 38 A.D.2d 478, 330 N.Y.S.2d 688, affd.31 N.Y.2d 926, 340 N.Y.S.2d 924, 293 N.E.2d 92; Matter of Board of Educ. v. Chautauqua Cent. School Teachers Assn., 41 A.D.2d 47, 51--53, 341 N.Y.S.2d 690, 695--698; cf. Matter of Central School Dist. v. Three Vil. Teachers Assn., 39 A.D.2d 466, 336 N.Y.S.2d 656).

The position which petitioner held in respondent school, therefore, was effectively abolished. Respondent board did not, however, take any action to terminate petitioner's employment. The board's contention that abolishing petitioner's position was intended also as termination of her employment and was tantamount thereto has little efficacy.

The applicable statute relating to petitioner's employment is subdivision 1 of section 2509 of the Education Law, which provides in part, '(t)he service of a person appointed to any of such positions may be discontinued at any time during such probationary period, on the recommendation of the superintendent of schools, by a majority vote of the board of education.' The commissioner of education has construed this statute as requiring strict compliance with its provisions in order for the board to terminate the employment of a probationary teacher (Matter of Tedesco, 4 Ed.Dept.Rep. 3; Matter of Gumpert, 9 Ed.Dept.Rep. 126, 10 Ed.Dept.Rep. 77), and such a ruling has been upheld as not arbitrary or contrary to law (Matter of Board of Educ. v. Allen, 30 A.D.2d 742, 291 N.Y.S.2d 243). There is no evidence in this record that the superintendent of schools ever recommended to respondent board that petitioner be dismissed nor any record that a majority of the board voted to terminate her services.

In a school district having several schools and many similar positions it cannot be inferred that the abolishment of one position presumes intent to terminate the services of the incumbent teacher. By abolishing her position respondent merely made petitioner an excess teacher available for another similar position in the district. Respondent waited nearly two months after abolishing petitioner's position before advising her thereof in writing, and in that notice (June 13, 1972) made no mention of terminating her employment, but advised her that she would 'receive full consideration when candidates are being screened for openings within the school district'. Such action and notice did not tend to alert petitioner that the board was dissatisfied with her services, that her seniority rights would not be recognized or that she was dismissed. It is clear that sections 2509 and 2510 of the Education Law are to be read together and that the board must take special action to discontinue the services of a teacher whose position has been abolished. Petitioner continued, therefore, as an employee of the district. * Respondent contends that in any event petitioner, as a probationary teacher, did not have seniority rights in the school system and hence was not required to be transferred to another elementary teaching position available therein. Respondent relies...

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