LG 67 Doe v. Resurrection Lutheran Church
| Decision Date | 28 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | Index No. 811170/2021 |
| Citation | 75 Misc.3d 327,164 N.Y.S.3d 803 |
| Parties | LG 67 DOE, Plaintiff, v. RESURRECTION LUTHERAN CHURCH, Upstate New York Synod of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, Defendants. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court |
Amy Keller, Esq., Lipsitz Green Scime and Cambria, LLP, Counsel for Plaintiff
Michael Applebaum, Esq., Goldberg Segalla, LLP, Counsel for Evangelical Lutheran Church in America
Andrea Shillaci, Esq., Hurwitz & Fine, PC, Counsel for Upstate New York Synod of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America
Thomas Cunningham, Esq., Rupp Baase Pfalzgraf Cunningham, LLC, Counsel for Resurrection Lutheran Church
Deborah A. Chimes, J. Defendants, Resurrection Lutheran Church, Upstate New York Synod of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America and Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, (hereafter, defendants), moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) and CPLR 208(b), (NYSCEF motions 002, 004 and 005). Plaintiff opposed the motions.
This claim was filed pursuant to the Child Victims Act ( CPLR 214-g ). Plaintiff claims sexual abuse from 1960 to 1964 by two persons associated with his Boy Scout troop. The action was commenced on August 12, 2021. According to the complaint, plaintiff was born in 1951, making him at least sixty-nine years old when the action was commenced.
Defendants argue that the age limit referenced in CPLR 208 (b) applies to the revival window set forth in CPLR 214-g and that the complaint is therefore time-barred. Plaintiff argues the age requirement of CPLR 208(b) is not applicable to CPLR 214-g and relies in part on the provision of CLR 214-g that states "notwithstanding any provision of law ... to the contrary."
"In matters of statutory interpretation, ‘legislative intent is the great and controlling principle ... Because ‘the clearest indicator of legislative intent is the statutory text, the starting point in any case of interpretation must always be the language itself, giving effect to the plain meaning thereof’ " ( Matter of Peyton v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Standards & Appeals , 36 N.Y.3d 271, 279, 140 N.Y.S.3d 447, 164 N.E.3d 253 [2020], citing Matter of Rizzo v. New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal , 6 N.Y.3d 104, 114, 810 N.Y.S.2d 112, 843 N.E.2d 739 [2005] and Kuzmich v. 50 Murray St. Acquisition LLC , 34 N.Y.3d 84, 91, 108 N.Y.S.3d 431, 132 N.E.3d 624 [2019] ). A statute "must be construed as a whole," and "its various sections must be considered together and with reference to each other" ( Town of Aurora v. Village of E. Aurora , 32 N.Y.3d 366, 372, 91 N.Y.S.3d 773, 116 N.E.3d 64 [2018] ). Further, the court may "inquire into the ... purpose of the legislation, which requires examination of the statutory context of the provision as well as its legislative history" ( id. ).
CPLR 208 entitled, "Infancy, insanity", is a tolling provision based on the disabilities of infancy and insanity. CPLR 208(b) is part of the Child Victims Act and states, in pertinent part:
"Notwithstanding any provision of law which imposes a period of limitation to the contrary ... with respect to all civil claims or causes of action brought by any person for physical, psychological or other injury or condition suffered by such person as a result of conduct which would constitute a sexual offense against such person who was less than eighteen years of age ... such action may be commenced, against any party whose intentional or negligent acts or omissions are alleged to have resulted in the commission of said conduct, on or before the plaintiff or infant plaintiff reaches the age of fifty-five years."
CPLR 214-g, entitled "Certain child abuse sex cases," also part of the Child Victims Act, states:
"Notwithstanding any provision of law which imposes a period of limitation to the contrary every civil claim or cause of action brought against any party alleging intentional or negligent acts or omissions by a person for physical, psychological, or other injury or condition suffered as a result of conduct which would constitute a sexual offense which conduct was committed against a child less than eighteen years of age, which is barred as of the effective date of this section because the applicable period of limitation has expired ... is hereby revived.
(emphasis added). It is noted that CPLR 214-g does not contain an age limitation or refer to CPLR 208(b).
In addition, the Legislative Memorandum for the Bill, which...
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Kidder v. Hanes
...§ 2; S.H., supra, 205 A.D.3d at 184, 167 N.Y.S.3d at 175; see LG 67 Doe, supra, 75 Misc.3d at 329, 164 N.Y.S.3d at 804. Justice Chimes in LG 67 Doe held that CPLR 208(b) such claims (until the victim turned 55) while CPLR 214-g creates a one-year (later extended to two years due to COVID) r......