Town of Aurora v. Vill. of E. Aurora, Corp.

• Decision Date: 20 November 2018
• Docket Number: No. 116,116
• Citation: 116 N.E.3d 64,32 N.Y.3d 366,91 N.Y.S.3d 773
• Parties: TOWN OF AURORA, a Municipal Corporation, Respondent, v. VILLAGE OF EAST AURORA, a Municipal Corporation, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

32 N.Y.3d 366

116 N.E.3d 64

91 N.Y.S.3d 773

TOWN OF AURORA, a Municipal Corporation, Respondent,

v.VILLAGE OF EAST AURORA, a Municipal Corporation, Appellant.

No. 116

Court of Appeals of New York.

November 20, 2018

OPINION OF THE COURT

STEIN, J.

On this appeal, we are asked to determine which party, plaintiff Town of Aurora or defendant Village of East Aurora, is responsible for the maintenance and repair of the Brooklea Drive Bridge, located within both of the municipalities. Because the Village did not assume control of the bridge pursuant to Village Law § 6–606 —which sets forth the exclusive methods by which a village may assume control and supervision of a bridge unless said bridge was under village control prior to 1897 (see Village Law § 6–604 )—we hold that the Town is responsible for maintaining the Brooklea Drive Bridge.

In 1971, the Village Board of Trustees approved construction and financing of the Brooklea Drive Bridge in connection with the development of a residential subdivision. Construction was completed by October 1973. Over the next several decades, the bridge remained, without any apparent repair or modification. Beginning in 2006, the New York State Department of Transportation (DOT) issued yearly structural bridge reports to the Village, flagging the bridge as being in need of repair. The Village undertook no repairs and, in 2010, after receiving several such reports, ultimately informed DOT that the Town was responsible for repairing the bridge. Thereafter, DOT notified the Town that it was responsible for maintaining the bridge and sent it flagged bridge reports for the next three years.

The Town commenced this action, seeking a judgment declaring the Village solely responsible for the supervision, control, care, and maintenance of the Brooklea Drive Bridge. The Town asserted that the Village's control was evidenced by its unilateral construction of the bridge, its uninterrupted exclusive supervision and control thereof, and its failure to properly relinquish control to the Town pursuant to Village Law § 6–608. The Village answered and counterclaimed, arguing that it had never assumed control, care, and maintenance of the bridge in accordance with Village Law § 6–606, and requesting a declaration that the Town was responsible for the costs of the repairs ordered by DOT.

The Town moved for summary judgment and, in support thereof, submitted minutes of the Village Board of Trustees' meetings and other records demonstrating the Village's role in approving and constructing the bridge. The Village cross-moved for summary judgment, proffering an affidavit from the Village Clerk/Treasurer, wherein she averred that the Village had never adopted any resolutions, or taken any actions in connection with permissive referendums, in relation to assuming control over the bridge.

Supreme Court denied the Town's motion for summary judgment, dismissed the complaint, granted the Village's cross motion, directed entry of judgment on the Village's counterclaim, and declared both that the Village had never assumed control of the Brooklea Drive Bridge in accordance with Village Law § 6–606 and that the Town was responsible for the maintenance of any other bridge located in the Village with respect to which the Village had not assumed control under section 6–606. Following the Town's appeal, the Appellate Division reversed, reinstated the complaint, granted the Town's motion for summary judgment, and denied the Village's cross motion (149 A.D.3d 1506, 53 N.Y.S.3d 755 [4th Dept. 2017] ). That Court declared "that the Village ... [wa]s responsible for the supervision, control, care, and maintenance of the ... bridge" because the Village had "planned, financed, and constructed" the bridge and "was the only entity ever to exercise ... supervision and control" over it ( 149 A.D.3d at 1507, 53 N.Y.S.3d 755 ). The Court further held that the Village was not entitled to a declaration regarding any other bridges in its boundaries (see id. at 1508, 53 N.Y.S.3d 755 ). We granted the Village leave to appeal ( 29 N.Y.3d 919, 64 N.Y.S.3d 669, 86 N.E.3d 561 [2017] ).

In its current form, Village Law § 6–604 provides that,

"[i]f the board of trustees of a village has the supervision and control of a bridge therein, it shall continue to exercise such control under this chapter. In any other case, every public bridge within a village shall be under the control of the ... town in which the bridge is wholly or partly situated, ... and the expense of constructing and repairing such bridge and the approaches thereto is a town charge, unless the village assumes the whole or part of such expense."

The latter part of section 6–604 states the long-established general rule that "[a]ll bridges within a village ... are expressly made the responsibility of the town, unless the village has voluntarily assumed responsibility therefor" ( Matter of Village of Chestnut Ridge v. Howard, 92 N.Y.2d 718, 724, 685 N.Y.S.2d 915, 708 N.E.2d 988 [1999] ; see Village Law § 6–604 ; Highway Law § 140 ).

Village Law § 6–606, entitled "[w]hen [a] village may construct or repair bridges," states, as relevant here, that

"[a] village may assume the control, care and maintenance of a bridge or bridges wholly within its boundaries, upon the adoption of a resolution of the board of trustees therefor; such action, however, shall be subject to a permissive referendum as provided in this chapter or the board of trustees may enter into an agreement with the town, in which any part of such village is situated, to construct or repair a bridge in any part of the village included in such town, at the joint expense of the village and town, which agreement shall fix the portion to be paid by each. Such action of the board of trustees shall be subject to a permissive referendum as provided in this chapter."

This provision, by its plain terms, sets forth an exception to the general rule that a town is responsible for all bridges within its boundaries by permitting a village to assume control over a bridge through the adoption of a resolution by its board of trustees or an express agreement with the town, both of which are subject to permissive referendums.

Here, the Village argues that the Town is responsible for the repair and maintenance of the Brooklea Drive Bridge because the Village never assumed supervision and control over the bridge through either mechanism outlined in Village Law § 6–606. In response, the Town asserts that the procedures set forth in section 6–606 are not the exclusive methods by which a village may obtain control of a bridge. The Town further contends that, in any event, the Village has supervision and control of the bridge pursuant to the first sentence of Village Law § 6–604.

"[W]hen presented with a question of statutory interpretation, our primary consideration is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature" ( Samiento v. World Yacht Inc., 10 N.Y.3d 70, 77–78, 854 N.Y.S.2d 83, 883 N.E.2d 990 [2008], quoting Matter of DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Spitzer, 7 N.Y.3d 653, 660, 827 N.Y.S.2d 88, 860 N.E.2d 705 [2006] ). As we have often explained, because "the clearest indicator of legislative intent is the statutory text, the starting point in any case of interpretation must always be the language itself, giving effect to the plain meaning thereof" ( Majewski v. Broadalbin–Perth Cent. School Dist., 91 N.Y.2d 577, 583, 673 N.Y.S.2d 966, 696 N.E.2d 978 [1998] ; see Matter of Avella v. City of New York, 29 N.Y.3d 425, 434, 58 N.Y.S.3d 236, 80 N.E.3d 982 [2017] ). "We are also guided in our analysis by the familiar principle ‘that a statute ... must be construed as a whole and that its various sections must be considered together and with reference to each other’ " ( Matter of New York County Lawyers' Assn. v. Bloomberg, 19 N.Y.3d 712, 721, 955 N.Y.S.2d 835, 979 N.E.2d 1162 [2012], quoting People v. Mobil Oil Corp., 48 N.Y.2d 192, 199, 422 N.Y.S.2d 33, 397 N.E.2d 724 [1979] ). "Additionally, we should inquire ‘into the spirit and purpose of the legislation, which requires examination of the statutory context of the provision as well as its legislative history’ " ( Matter of Albany Law School v. New York State Off. of Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities, 19 N.Y.3d 106, 120, 945 N.Y.S.2d 613, 968 N.E.2d 967 [2012], quoting Nostrom v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 15 N.Y.3d 502, 507, 914 N.Y.S.2d 725, 940 N.E.2d 551 [2010] ).

The Town argues, and the Appellate Division held, that a village has discretion to assume control of bridges in ways other than those enumerated in Village Law § 6–606. We disagree. " ‘[W]here a law expressly describes a particular act, thing or person to which it shall apply, an irrefutable inference must be drawn that what is omitted or not included was intended to be omitted or excluded’ " ( Matter of Town of Riverhead v. New York State Bd. of Real Prop. Servs., 5 N.Y.3d 36, 43, 799 N.Y.S.2d 753, 832 N.E.2d 1169 [2005], quoting McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 240, Comment, at 411–412; see Pajak v. Pajak, 56 N.Y.2d 394, 397, 452 N.Y.S.2d 381, 437 N.E.2d 1138 [1982] ). Here, the legislature has limited the methods by which a village may assume control of a bridge by establishing specific procedures to be followed.¹ Had the legislature intended for a village to have the ability to unilaterally construct, and thereby control, a bridge—without regard to the passage of resolutions, agreements with the town, or permissive referendums—the legislature could easily have so stated, and its failure to do so compels the conclusion that such other methods of assuming control are ineffective (see Pajak, 56 N.Y.2d at 397, 452 N.Y.S.2d 381, 437 N.E.2d 1138 ; McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 74).

Moreover, contrary to the Town's assertion, the legislature's use of the word "may" in Village Law § 6–606 reflects only that a village has discretion in choosing whether to assume control of a bridge—since the default rule...