Lhotka v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 06 January 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. C2-97-1126,C2-97-1126 |
| Parties | Marcia LHOTKA, Appellant, v. ILLINOIS FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
A driver who strikes a pedestrian does not commit a hit-and-run when the driver stops; inquires about the pedestrian's condition; is not requested by the pedestrian to exchange names, addresses, and insurance information; and does not leave until assured by the pedestrian that the pedestrian has no apparent injuries.
Timothy W. Nelson, Nelson Personal Injury Attorneys, St. Cloud, for appellant.
Peter G. Mikhail, Askegaard & Robinson, P.A., Brainerd, for respondent.
Considered and decided by TOUSSAINT, C.J., and RANDALL, and FOLEY, * JJ.
Appellant challenges the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of respondent in an action for uninsured motorist benefits. We affirm.
On February 13, 1995, Appellant Marcia Lhotka was struck and knocked down by an automobile while walking across a gas station parking lot in Sartell, Minnesota. The driver of the automobile stopped, got out of her car, and asked Lhotka if she was "okay." Lhotka responded that she had some pain in her head and elbow, "but I think I'm okay." Lhotka did not request any information from the driver. The driver did not provide Lhotka with a name or address or any other information. After being satisfied that nothing needed to be done, the driver left. While driving herself home, Lhotka noticed swelling over her eye. She reported the incident to police the next morning, after she noticed increasing pain in her neck, back, and hips.
Lhotka brought suit against respondent Illinois Farmers Insurance Company (Farmers), her automobile insurance carrier, after Farmers denied her request for uninsured motorist benefits. Farmers moved for summary judgment on three grounds: (1) the accident was not a hit-and-run as a matter of law, and Lhotka failed to provide any evidence that the vehicle was uninsured; (2) Lhotka failed to give Farmers adequate notice of the claim as required by the insurance contract and Minnesota law; and (3) Lhotka primarily assumed the risk of loss. The district court granted Farmer's motion for summary judgment, ruling the accident was not a hit-and-run as a matter of law. The district court did not rule on the alternative grounds Farmers raised in support of its motion. This appeal by Lhotka followed.
1. Did the district court err as a matter of law in holding that the unidentified driver was not a hit-and-run driver?
2. Do genuine issues of material fact exist precluding a determination of this issue by summary judgment?
On appeal from summary judgment, a reviewing court must ask whether genuine issues of material fact exist and whether the lower court erroneously applied the law. State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Minn.1990). In such cases, the appellate court must consider "the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was granted." Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn.1993).
"[T]he interpretation of insurance contract language is a question of law as applied to the facts presented." Meister v. Western Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 479 N.W.2d 372 376 (Minn.1992). Further, whether ambiguity exists in an insurance policy is a question of law and is, therefore, reviewed de novo. American Commerce Ins. Brokers, Inc. v. Minnesota Mut. Fire & Cas. Co., 551 N.W.2d 224, 227 (Minn.1996).
The language of an insurance policy is ambiguous only if it can reasonably be given more than one meaning, and the court shall " 'fastidiously guard against the invitation to "create ambiguities" where none exist.' " Id. (quoting Columbia Heights Motors v. Allstate Ins. Co., 275 N.W.2d 32, 36 (Minn.1979)). Any ambiguous language is construed in favor of the policyholder, but the court must give policy language its "usual and accepted meaning" if no ambiguity is found. American Commerce, 551 N.W.2d at 227-28.
Lhotka argues on appeal that the district court erred in holding as a matter of law that the driver in this case was not "uninsured." She asserts that the definition of "uninsured motor vehicle," which includes a hit-and-run vehicle whose driver has not been identified, should be interpreted as referencing drivers not identified at the time the claim is made without regard for whether the driver could have been identified at the time of the accident. Because her policy does not indicate the time at which the lack of identification warrants policy coverage, she argues, the policy is ambiguous and must be interpreted in her favor.
Lhotka additionally argues that because she experienced only minor physical symptoms and had no apparent bodily injuries at the scene, it was reasonable for her to determine that no accident occurred which necessitated insurance involvement or exchanging information with the driver. She maintains that the court should look at the reasonableness of her actions at the time. She also insists the law places the obligation to provide information on the unknown driver. Minnesota law states:
The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in bodily injury to or death of any person * * * shall stop and give the driver's name, address, date of birth and the registration number of the vehicle being driven, and shall, upon request and if available, exhibit the driver's license or permit to drive to the person struck * * *.
Minn.Stat. § 169.09, subd. 3(a) (1996). Lhotka argues the unknown driver violated this statute, and Lhotka should not be penalized for the driver's violation.
Farmers asserts in response that, in addition to showing the driver fled the scene, appellant must show there was an accident causing damages. See Halseth v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 268 N.W.2d 730, 733 (Minn.1978) (). Farmers notes that according to Minnesota law, "The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in immediately demonstrable bodily injury to or death of any person shall immediately stop * * *." Minn.Stat. § 169.09, subd. 1 (1996) (emphasis added). Farmers asserts that, because Lhotka did not suffer "immediately demonstrable bodily injury" from the driver's perspective, no "accident causing damages" occurred.
Lhotka's insurance policy with Farmers covers accidents caused by an uninsured motor vehicle. Under the terms of the policy, an uninsured motor vehicle includes: "A hit-and-run vehicle whose operator or owner has not been identified and which causes bodily injury to you or any family member." "Uninsured motorist coverage" is defined by statute as "coverage * * * for bodily injury from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles and hit-and-run motor vehicles." Minn.Stat. § 65B.43, subd. 18 (1996).
Neither the policy, nor Minnesota statutes, defines "hit-and-run." Courts should, however, apply the ordinary meaning of terms not defined in an insurance policy, "as well as the interpretations adopted in prior cases." Boedigheimer v. Taylor, 287 Minn. 323, 327, 178 N.W.2d 610, 613 (1970). The supreme court has succinctly defined hit-and-run as "a vehicle involved in an accident causing damages where the driver flees from the scene." Halseth, 268 N.W.2d at 733 (emphasis added).
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