Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Garffie, 70363

Decision Date14 January 1997
Docket NumberNo. 70363,70363
Citation939 S.W.2d 484
PartiesLIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and Ace Homart, Respondents/Plaintiffs, v. William J. GARFFIE, Jr., Appellant/Defendant.
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

Stephen H. Ringkamp, Mark J. Becker, St. Louis, for respondents/plaintiffs.

Jeffry S. Thomsen, Debbie S. Champion, Evans & Dixon, St. Louis, for appellant/defendant.

RHODES RUSSELL, Presiding Judge.

William J. Garffie, Jr., appeals from the entry of a declaratory judgment which held that a 1993 amendment to § 287.150.3 RSMo 1986 should not be applied retroactively. Section 287.150.3 RSMo 1986 allowed an employer to be subrogated to the rights of its employee against a third party, when the third party was liable for an injury in which the employer provided worker's compensation benefits. The 1993 amendment to that statute reduced the amount of subrogation an employer would receive in some circumstances. We agree that the amendment cannot be applied retroactively as it affected the substantive rights of the parties. We affirm the declaratory judgment in favor of Liberty Mutual Insurance Company ("Liberty Mutual") and Ace Homart.

On July 9, 1988, Garffie was injured in a work-related accident while employed by Ace Homart. Liberty Mutual was Ace Homart's worker's compensation insurer at the time of the accident. Liberty Mutual paid $86,482.40 in worker's compensation benefits to Garffie as a result of his accident.

Garffie also filed a products liability action against Caterpillar Industrial, Inc. for injuries sustained as a result of his work-related accident. That suit was settled prior to trial by Caterpillar agreeing to pay Garffie $150,000. The settlement did not mention any comparative fault on the part of Garffie.

Liberty Mutual and Ace Homart filed a petition for declaratory judgment to determine the amount of subrogation it was entitled to pursuant to § 287.150.3 RSMo.1986.

The case was submitted on stipulated facts. The only dispute between the parties was whether the 1993 amended version of § 287.150.3 should be applied or whether the earlier version applied. At the time of Garffie's work-related accident in 1988, and at the conclusion of his worker's compensation case in 1991, § 287.150.3 had not been amended. The statute in effect at that time provided, in pertinent part, as follows:

3. Whenever recovery against a third person is effected by the employee or his dependents, the employer shall pay from his share of the recovery a proportionate share of the expenses of the recovery, including a reasonable attorney fee. After the expenses and attorney fee has been paid the balance of the recovery shall be apportioned between the employer and the employee or his dependents in the same ratio that the amount due the employer bears to the total amount recovered, or the balance of the recovery may be divided between the employer and the employee or his dependents as they may agree....

This pre-1993 statute provided that when an employee sued a third party tortfeasor and received a monetary recovery, the employer was entitled to a pro rata reimbursement out of that recovery for its payments made for worker's compensation, after sharing fees and expenses with the employee. Ruediger v. Kallmeyer Bros. Service, 501 S.W.2d 56 (Mo.banc 1973).

Garffie contends, however, that the 1993 amended statute applies. The amended version of § 287.150.3 provides as follows:

3. Whenever recovery against the third person is effected by the employee or his dependents, the employer shall pay from his share of the recovery a proportionate share of the expenses of the recovery, including a reasonable attorney fee. After the expenses and attorney fee have been paid, the balance of the recovery shall be apportioned between the employer and the employee or his dependents in the same ratio that the amount due the employer bears to the total amount recovered if there is no finding of comparative fault on the part of the employee, or the total damages determined by the trier of fact if there is a finding of comparative fault on the part of the employee. Notwithstanding the foregoing provision, the balance of the recovery may be divided between the employer and the employee or his dependents as they may otherwise agree....

(emphasis ours).

Under the amended statute, if a "trier of fact" determines that an employee is comparatively at fault, the employer's recovery would be diminished by that same percentage. Garffie argues that his settlement with Caterpillar was significantly smaller than it otherwise would have been due to his own substantial comparative fault. Liberty Mutual and Ace Homart responds that the 1993 statute cannot be applied retroactively, since the amendment effected their substantive rights.

The trial court entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, order, and judgment stating that Liberty Mutual and Ace Homart's subrogation rights were governed by § 287.150.3 as in effect March 1, 1991. Furthermore, it found that if the 1993 amended version of the statute was applicable, the subrogation rights would not be altered because the amended statute would only reduce the subrogation rights of the employer if the "trier of fact" had determined that the employee was comparatively at fault.

Garffie's settlement with Caterpillar Industrial, Inc. included no finding of comparative fault. The trial court rejected Garffie's argument that it had authority to enter a finding as to Garffie's comparative fault. In order to avoid a remand, in the event we find the trial court did have such authority, it stated that Garffie had been 50% at fault and that his damages did exceed $300,000. Garffie appeals.

In Garffie's only point, he argues the trial court erred by not applying § 287.150.3, as amended in 1993. He further argues that the trial court erred by declaring that if the current...

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    ...of the insurer for the insured (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Garffie, 939 S.W.2d 484, 487 (Mo.Ct.App.1997) (holding, with respect to a statute providing for reimbursement to an employer when employee recovered from a thi......
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