Lillbask ex rel. Mauclaire v. Sergi

• Decision Date: 29 September 2000
• Docket Number: No. Civ. 3:97cv1202(PCD).,Civ. 3:97cv1202(PCD).
• Parties: Inga Britt LILLBASK as Legal Guardian on Behalf of Lindsey MAUCLAIRE, Plaintiff, v. Theodore S. SERGI, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut

117 F.Supp.2d 182

Inga Britt LILLBASK as Legal Guardian on Behalf of Lindsey MAUCLAIRE, Plaintiff, v. Theodore S. SERGI, et al., Defendants.

No. Civ. 3:97cv1202(PCD).

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

September 29, 2000.

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Winona Wellman Zimberlin, Hartford, CT, Arthur Allan Smith, Education Law Project, Inc., Mansfield Center, CT, for Plaintiff.

Seth R. Klein, Attorney General's Office, Hartford, CT, Richard J. Buturla, Marsha Belman Moses, Berchem, Moses & Devlin, P.C., Milford, CT, Nyle Kimrick Davey, Attorney General's Office, Health & Human Services, Hartford, Ct, for Defendants.

RULING ON PENDING MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

DORSEY, Senior District Judge.

State Defendants move for summary judgment. State Defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part.

Plaintiff moves for summary judgment against State Defendants. Plaintiff's motion is granted in part and denied in part.

Redding Defendants move for partial summary judgment. Redding Defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part.

Plaintiff moves for summary judgment against Redding Defendants. Plaintiff's motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. JURISDICTION

This court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear this case pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(A) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Lindsey Mauclaire, a handicapped child, receives special education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1415. He is cared for by Ms. Lillbask, his guardian, who has made many sacrifices to care for Lindsey. (Dkt. No. 166, Ex. J at 14 ¶ 12.) During the 1996-97 school year, he attended a pre-kindergarten program at Redding Elementary School. On August 5, 1997, a Planning and Placement Team ("PPT") meeting convened to plan for the 1997-98 school year. The Redding Board of Education decided to place Lindsey at the St. Vincent's Special Needs Center ("St.Vincent's") in Trumbull, Connecticut. (Dkt. No. 162 ¶ 42; Dkt. No. 177 ¶ 42.) Pursuant to the IDEA, Plaintiff, Lindsey's guardian, appealed this placement and other aspects of his Individualized Education Plan ("IEP") in Connecticut Department of Education due process hearings. This case concerns four hearing decisions, dated May 5, 1997 (Second Hearing, Case 97-046), August 5, 1997 (First Hearing, Case 97-028), September 5, 1997 (Third Hearing, Case 97-131), and August 7, 1998 (Fourth Hearing, Case 97-231). At the August 7, 1998 hearing, the state hearing officer upheld the Redding Board of Education's decision to place Lindsey in St. Vincent's. Under the stay-put rule, Lindsey remains at Redding Elementary School under his original IEP.

B. Procedural History

Pursuant to the IDEA, Plaintiff sued the State of Connecticut Department of Education and Theodore S. Sergi as Commissioner of the State of Connecticut Department of Education (collectively, the "State Defendants") and Kenneth Freeston as Superintendent of Schools and the Redding Board of Education (collectively, the "Redding Defendants") in order to appeal these hearing decisions, (Dkt. No. 39.) Plaintiff also asserts claims for injunctive relief and damages under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. § 794), related state statutes (CONN.GEN.STAT. § 10-76a et seq.), and the due process and equal protection clauses of the federal and Connecticut constitutions.¹ Essentially, Plaintiff contends that Redding Defendants placed Lindsey in St. Vincent's in retaliation for exercising her statutory hearing rights.

Despite the best efforts of Magistrate Judge Joan G. Margolis, multiple written rulings, and the assistance of a Special Master, the parties have not advanced the case since the preliminary injunction hearing, becoming mired in numerous disputes over discovery, scheduling, and the meaning of court orders. This court ruled on December 30, 1999 in part that the "parties shall file cross motions for partial summary judgment on the issue of the hearing appeals under the IDEA.... Until the hearing appeals are resolved, there will be no consideration of [the P]laintiff's retaliation claims." (Dkt. No. 155 at 11.) The arguments were to be limited to the twofold IDEA inquiry, relying primarily on the administrative record. (Id. at 6.)

Plaintiff, as against State Defendants and Redding Defendants, moves for summary judgment. Defendants in turn have so moved. All of the motions are supported by memoranda of law and statements of material fact.²

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

1. The legal standard of summary judgment

Rule 56(c) provides that summary judgment shall be rendered "if the pleadings depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party has the burden to show this. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A factual issue is material if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. An issue of material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. To defeat summary judgment, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The movant's burden does not shift when cross motions for summary judgment are before the court; rather, each motion must be judged on its own merits. See Association of Int'l Auto. Mfrs., Inc. v. Abrams, 84 F.3d 602, 611 (2d Cir.1996).

2. The standard of review of prior administrative hearings under the IDEA

The IDEA provides that "[a]ny party aggrieved by the findings and decision" made by a state hearing officer "shall have the right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint presented ... in a district court of the United States." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A). The district court "(i) shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings; (ii) shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party; and (iii) bas[e] its decision on the preponderance of the evidence." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B); see 34 C.F.R. § 300.512.

The district court must give "due weight" to the findings and decision of the state hearing officer. See Board of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. School Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982). This deference seeks to ensure that district courts do not "substitute their own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities which they review." Id.; see also Mrs. B. v. Milford Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 1114, 1120 (2d Cir.1997). Federal courts "are expected to give due weight to [administrative decisions], mindful that the judiciary generally lacks the specialized knowledge and experience necessary to resolve persistent and difficult questions of educational policy." Walczak v. Florida Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 129 (2d Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks and original alteration omitted); see also Naugatuck Bd. of Educ. v. Mrs. D., 10 F.Supp.2d 170, 177 (D.Conn.1998); Wall v. Mattituck-Cutchogue Sch. Dist., 945 F.Supp. 501, 507 (E.D.N.Y.1996); Wills v. Ferrandino, 830 F.Supp. 116, 121 n. 1 (D.Conn.1993).

As to procedural issues, the standard of review is de novo "because [they] concern[] an issue of law; namely, the proper interpretation of the federal statute and its requirements." Mrs. B., 103 F.3d at 1122. State hearing officers are not more experienced or expert than courts in interpreting federal statutes or the federal constitution as to which deference is not warranted.

Plaintiff's procedural issues regarding the IDEA, other federal and state statutes, and due process issues present questions of law and are reviewed de novo. Plaintiff's questions of fact that deal with how and to what extent the IDEA has been applied to the particular factual circumstances, deference and due weight is given to the findings and decisions of the hearing officer.

B. The Scope of Review Per This Court's Prior Ruling

"The Act's procedural guarantees are not mere procedural hoops through which Congress wanted state and local educational agencies to jump. Rather, the formality of the Act's procedures is ... a safeguard against arbitrary or erroneous decision-making." Evans v. Board of Educ. of the Rhinebeck Cent. Sch. Dist., 930 F.Supp. 83, 93 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). Congress placed great importance on the procedural provisions incorporated into the IDEA. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205, 102 S.Ct. 3034 ("the importance Congress attached to these procedural safeguards cannot be gainsaid"). It is through these procedural safeguards that "Congress sought to protect individual children by providing for parental involvement in the development of state plans and policies and in the formulation of the child's [IEP]." Id. at 208, 102 S.Ct. 3034 (internal citation omitted).

The current situation is troubling due to the apparent breakdown in communication between Plaintiff and Redding Defendants. Lindsey's best interests have become obscured by the parties' contentiousness and inability to communicate constructively. Indeed, the legal issues before the court seem to be not so much what is best for Lindsey, but the form and format of discussions between the parties (e.g., Can Plaintiff microphone PPT meetings? Do rules of discovery apply? What are the applicable rules of evidence?). Who is at fault for the breakdown in communication between the parties will not distract the court. Such "he-said/she-said" inquiries are neither constructive nor necessary to advance the...