Naugatuck Bd. of Educ. v. Mrs. D., 3:95cv1782 (AHN)DW.

Decision Date01 July 1998
Docket NumberNo. 3:95cv1782 (AHN)DW.,3:95cv1782 (AHN)DW.
Citation10 F.Supp.2d 170
PartiesNAUGATUCK BOARD OF EDUCATION v. MRS. D., et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Connecticut

Mark Sommaruga, Svlliran, Schoen, Campare & Connon, Hartford, CT, for Naugatuck Board of Education.

Tom Fiorentino, Attorney General's Office, Hartford, CT, for DCF.

Mary Jean Schierberl, Connecticut Legal Services, New Britain, CT, for Mrs. D.

RULING ON MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

NEVAS, District Judge.

The plaintiff, Naugatuck Board of Education ("Naugatuck"), brings this action against the defendants, Mrs. D, parent of M. L., State of Connecticut Board of Education ("SBE"), and State of Connecticut Department of Children and Families ("DCF"), to, inter alia, appeal a SBE due process hearing officer's decision regarding M.L.'s residential placement and Naugatuck's provision of a free appropriate education to M.L.1

Now pending before the court are Naugatuck's, Mrs. D's, and DCF's partial motions for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, Naugatuck's motion [doc. # 63] is DENIED, and DCF's and Mrs. D.'s motions [docs. # 61, 66] are GRANTED.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion for summary judgment may not be granted unless the court determines that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be tried and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Rule 56(c), Fed.R.Civ.P.; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The substantive law governing the case identifies those facts that are material on a motion for summary judgment. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A court must grant summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." Rule 56(c); see Miner v. Glens Falls, 999 F.2d 655, 661 (2d Cir.1993) (citation omitted). A dispute regarding a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The burden of showing that no genuine dispute about an issue of material fact exists rests on the party seeking summary judgment. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970).

After discovery, if the party against whom summary judgment is sought "has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of [its] case with respect to which [it] has the burden of proof," then summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In assessing the record to determine whether a genuine dispute as to a material fact exists, the court is required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Thus, "[o]nly when reasonable minds could not differ as to the import of the evidence is summary judgment proper." Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir.1991) (citation omitted).

FACTS

Mrs. D., a Naugatuck resident, is the parent of M.L., a twelve-year old who is disabled within the meaning of Connecticut and federal law. See Naugatuck Bd. of Educ. v. Mrs. D., Case No. 3:95cv1782 (AHN), 1997 WL 205791, * 2 (D. Conn. April 17, 1997). SBE is Connecticut's agent in all matters related to education, including special education. Id. DCF, another Connecticut agency, is responsible for serving the needs of the state's families and children. Id. Among other things, DCF provides for mental health services through psychiatric clinics and community mental health facilities. Id. DCF also develops and maintains a program of day treatment centers and extended day treatment programs for emotionally disturbed, mentally ill, behaviorally disordered and multiple handicapped children and youth. Id.

Prior to August, 1992, when Mrs. D. moved to Naugatuck, M.L. received special education and related services from his previous school districts. (See Pl.'s Stat. Mat. Facts Not in Dispute ¶ 5.) He also underwent psychological and psychiatric evaluations in which he was diagnosed with Attention Deficit Disorder with Hyperactivity and Oppositional Defiant Disorder.2 (See R. Exs. B-5; P-2 at 1.) As early as November, 1991, M.L. exhibited "inappropriate behaviors [which] presented significant management demand on the classroom teacher, disrupting both peers and classroom routine." (R. Ex. B-7 at 2.) In fact, in July, 1992, after being admitted to Elmcrest Psychiatric Hospital ("Elmcrest"), for the first time due to out of control and aggressive behavior at home, Dr. Kenneth Gilstein ("Gilstein") evaluated him and concluded that "due to concentration difficulties, emotional problems and Attention Deficit Disorder with Hyperactivity, [M.L.] will most probably have a great deal of difficulties in mainstream academic endeavors, especially if [his] personal and family problems continue." (R. B-12 at 3.) Gilstein warned that his "[p]otential behavior would include acting out, attention seeking, [and] oppositional behavior towards peers and authority figures." (Id.)

On August 20, 1992, upon entering the Naugatuck school district, a Planning and Placement Team ("PPT") meeting was held to discuss M.L.'s Individual Education Plan ("IEP"). (See First Am. Compl. Ex. 1 [hereinafter "Hearing Officer's Decision"] at 2.) At that meeting, based on prior reports suggesting that M.L. was having "difficulties with behavioral controls," he was placed in a "Learning and Adjustment Program" for students with social and emotional difficulties. (Id.) While this was a self-contained program, it allowed children to be mainstreamed for physical education and music classes. (See Pls.' Stat. ¶ 8.)

On November 19, 1992, another PPT meeting was held. The team decided to place M.L. in a mainstream classroom for story time and mathematics because it had determined that he was doing well in the classes in which he was already mainstreamed, and his behavior in the self-contained environment was improving. (See Pls.' Stat. ¶ 8(a); R. Ex. B-16 at 2.)

Soon after, however, M.L.'s behavior began to deteriorate. A PPT report of a December 10, 1992 meeting made the following observations:

In the past month, [M.L.] is having increased difficulties controlling his behavior. He has stated that if he misbehaves he will not have to come to school. [Mrs. D.] has stated that since November 10, 1992, [M.L.] is no longer taking his medication. For the past month, his attention to tasks is decreasing. The teacher needs to stay with [M.L.] while he is in time-out because he cannot control his behavior. Bus drivers have also stated that his behavior is ... becoming increasingly disruptive.3 Alternative transportation may be needed if he continues with unacceptable behavior. [M.L.'s] mother will be taking [M.L.] to the therapist tonight and will discuss the changes in [his] behavior.

(Hearing Officer's Decision at 5; R. Ex. B-22.) The PPT recommended that M.L.'s IEP be altered to reflect his change in behavior. (See Hearing Officer's Decision at 5.)

On January 20, 1993, M.L. once again entered the treatment program of the Saybrook Unit at Elmcrest. (See Pls.' Stat. ¶ 9; Hearing Officer's Decision at 5.) The initial psychiatric evaluation indicated that M.L. was impulsive and aggressive at home and in school.4 (See R. Ex. P-3 at 1.) It concluded that M.L. required in-patient care "[d]ue to [his] suicidal and self-endangering behavior[]." (Id. at 3.)

Upon admission, Elaine Dougherty ("Dougherty"), the School Liaison, sent a letter to Robert Cronin ("Cronin"), the Assistant Director of Special Services for Naugatuck Public Schools, informing him that M.L. would be attending school at Elmcrest and recommending that a PPT meeting be convened as soon as possible to discuss his IEP. (See R. Ex. B-23 at 1; Hearing Officer's Decision at 5.) In an agreement signed on this same date, Naugatuck stated that, because it was "unable to provide [M.L. with an] appropriate Special Education program through its public school arrangements," Elmcrest would provide him with such a program and ensure that it was specifically suited to his needs. (See R. Ex. B-28 at 1.) Naugatuck further agreed to pay Elmcrest for its provision of these educational services. (Id.)

On February 1, 1993, M.L. was again referred to Dr. Gilstein for a psychological evaluation. (See Hearing Officer's Decision at 7.) Gilstein made the following observations and recommendations:

Intellectually, [M.L.] is currently functioning within average range. Potentially, he has the abilities to function in the average range in the school setting, however, due to an Attention Deficit Disorder with Hyperactivity and to significant underlying psychopathology, he will have a great deal of difficulty being maintained in a mainstream classroom setting. A highly structured setting with a great deal of one-on-one help would be recommended. This is a troubled youngster.... It is strongly recommended that continued residential treatment be offered. The concern of this examiner is that if [M.L.] does not receive continued residential treatment, ... he will continue to decompensate and act out angrily towards others, or possibly himself.

(R. Ex. B-31 at 3.) At a February 2, 1993 PPT meeting, the Elmcrest staff recommended a "self-contained class with a therapeutic component." (R. Ex. B-32.) At this time, Mrs. D. indicated that she would contact DCF about a possible residential placement. (Id.)

Another PPT meeting was held on February 9, 1993 to discuss M.L.'s discharge from Elmcrest. (See Hearing Officer's Decision at 8.) While Naugatuck claimed that it could provide for M.L.'s educational needs, it decided that, because Elmcrest could better serve his emotional and...

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