Lima v. State
| Decision Date | 10 June 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 2008-0128.,No. 2008-0418.,2008-0128.,2008-0418. |
| Citation | 2009 Ohio 2597,909 N.E.2d 616,122 Ohio St.3d 155 |
| Parties | The CITY OF LIMA, Appellee, v. The STATE of Ohio, Appellant. The City of Akron, Appellee, v. The State of Ohio et al., Appellants. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Paul L. Cox and Gwen Callender, Columbus, urging reversal in case No. 2008-0128 for amicus curiae Fraternal Order of Police of Ohio, Inc.
Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn Co., L.P.A., Stephen L. Byron, Cleveland, and Stephen J. Smith; and John Gotherman, Columbus, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Municipal League.
Adam Loukx, Acting Director of Law, and John Madigan, General Counsel, urging affirmance for amicus curiae city of Toledo.
Matthew J. Rossman, urging affirmance in case No. 2008-0128 for amicus curiae Urban Development Lab, Case Western University School of Law.
Dolores F. Torriero, Columbus, urging affirmance in case No. 2008-0128 for amicus curiae Ohio Public Employer Labor Relations Association.
Robert J. Triozzi, Director of Law, Thomas J. Kaiser, Chief Trial Counsel, and Gary S. Singletary, Assistant Director of Law, urging affirmance in case No. 2008-0128 for amicus curiae city of Cleveland.
The Law Offices of Warner Mendenhall, Inc., Warner Mendenhall, and Jacquenette S. Corgan, Akron, urging reversal in case No. 2008-0418 for amicus curiae Jon K. Burdeshaw.
{¶ 1} R.C. 9.481(B)(1) states that "no political subdivision shall require any of its employees, as a condition of employment, to reside in any specific area of the state." The issue in this case is whether R.C. 9.481 was enacted pursuant to the authority granted to the General Assembly by Section 34, Article II of the Ohio Constitution. If it was so enacted, its provisions override any conflicting law of a political subdivision, including residency requirements imposed by municipalities pursuant to the Home Rule Amendment, Section 3, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution. We hold that R.C. 9.481 was enacted pursuant to the authority granted by Section 34 and that the local laws before us in this case therefore cannot stand.
{¶ 2} Lima City Charter Section 72 allows the Lima City Council to establish a residency requirement for city employees. Pursuant to this authority, the Lima City Council passed Ordinance 201-00, requiring all employees appointed by the mayor to reside within the city limits. When R.C. 9.481 was enacted, the city of Lima brought a civil action against the state seeking a declaration that the statute is unconstitutional, contending that it falls outside Section 34, Article II, because R.C. 9.481 does not involve all employees. Lima further asserted that R.C. 9.481 violates the city's powers of self-government under Sections 3 and 7, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution.
{¶ 3} The trial court granted summary judgment for the state, ruling that R.C. 9.481 is constitutional because it was enacted pursuant to the broad authority granted to the legislature under Section 34, Article II. Therefore, R.C. 9.481 prevails over the city of Lima's residency requirements. The court of appeals reversed, holding that R.C. 9.481 is not "economic legislation" and does not concern employees' working environment, and therefore it could not have been enacted pursuant to Section 34, Article II. Lima v. State, 177 Ohio App.3d 744, 2007-Ohio-6419, 896 N.E.2d 149, ¶ 61. Thus, the statute cannot prevail over the home-rule provisions of the Constitution. Because R.C. 9.481 interferes with local self-government and because it is not a "general law," it violates Section 3, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution, which authorizes political subdivisions to "exercise all powers of local self-government."
{¶ 4} Sections 105a and 106(5b) of the Charter of the City of Akron require that classified and unclassified civil servants of Akron reside within Akron for the duration of their employment. On May 1, 2006, the city of Akron filed a complaint seeking a declaration that R.C. 9.481's prohibition against residency requirements is unconstitutional facially and as applied. The complaint contends that R.C. 9.481 could not have been enacted under Section 34, Article II of the Ohio Constitution, because it does not provide for the comfort, health, safety, and welfare of employees. The complaint further alleged that R.C. 9.481 unconstitutionally interferes with the powers of local self-government granted by Section 3, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution.
{¶ 5} On May 2, 2006, the Akron firefighter and police unions filed a complaint against the city of Akron and Mayor Donald L. Plusquellic seeking a declaration that R.C. 9.481 prevails over the city's residency requirements. The trial court consolidated the cases and granted summary judgment for the state and the unions.
{¶ 6} The trial court determined that R.C. 9.481 was enacted for the "general welfare" of employees and therefore comes within the purview of Section 34, Article II of the Ohio Constitution. Because Section 34 provides that "no other provision of the constitution shall impair or limit" the General Assembly's power to enact legislation pursuant to the authority granted by that section, the Home Rule Amendment has no application, and the charter provision must fall.
{¶ 7} The city of Akron appealed, and the court of appeals reversed, holding that the legislature's broad authority under Section 34 to pass laws for the "general welfare" of employees does not include the authority to enact R.C. 9.481. The court reasoned that R.C. 9.481, unlike other legislation upheld under Section 34, "does not address any significant social issues impacting the public at large; it is not part of a comprehensive legislative scheme, but deals with a single issue; and it applies to a relatively small segment of the population (those who are employed by political subdivisions, are subject to residency requirements, and would choose to live elsewhere if allowed to do so)." State v. Akron, Summit App. No. 23660, 2008-Ohio-38, 2008 WL 81506, at ¶ 24. The court further ruled that R.C. 9.481 is not a "general law." Id. at ¶ 32-33. Thus, the Akron provisions are not prohibited by the Home Rule Amendment's ban on local laws that conflict with "general laws." See Section 3, Article XVIII, Ohio Constitution ().
{¶ 8} The causes are before this court pursuant to the allowance of discretionary appeals.
{¶ 9} It is abundantly clear that Sections 105a and 106(5b) of the Charter of the City of Akron and Lima City Ordinance 201-00 conflict with R.C. 9.481. Given this conflict, the issues before us are straightforward: was R.C. 9.481 enacted pursuant to Section 34, Article II of the Ohio Constitution, and if so, does it prevail over ordinances enacted pursuant to Section 3, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution? We conclude that R.C. 9.481 was enacted pursuant to Section 34 and that it prevails over conflicting local laws, because no other provision of the Constitution can "limit or impair" laws enacted pursuant to Section 34.
{¶ 10} Section 34, Article II of the Ohio Constitution states that the General Assembly may enact laws "providing for the comfort, health, safety and general welfare of all employes; and no other provision of the constitution shall impair or limit this power."
{¶ 11} "This court has repeatedly interpreted Section 34, Article II as a broad grant of authority to the General Assembly, not as a limitation on its power to enact legislation." (Emphasis sic.) Am. Assn. of Univ. Professors, Cent. State Univ. Chapter v. Cent. State Univ. (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 55, 61, 717 N.E.2d 286. See also Rocky River v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1989), 43 Ohio St.3d 1, 13, 539 N.E.2d 103 (); Cent. Ohio Transit Auth. v. Transport Workers Union of Am., Local 208 (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 56, 62, 524 N.E.2d 151.
{¶ 12} On at least three separate occasions, this court has upheld the constitutionality of statutes enacted pursuant to Section 34, Article II. In Rocky River, we relied on Section 34 in upholding the constitutionality of a statute that mandated binding arbitration between a city and its safety forces in the event of a collective-bargaining impasse, rejecting the city's argument that the statute interfered with its home-rule powers. Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. In State ex rel. Bd. of Trustees of Police &...
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