Lincoln Park Detention Officers v. City of Lincoln Park

• Decision Date: 20 June 1977
• Docket Number: Docket No. 28691
• Citation: 256 N.W.2d 593,96 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2619,76 Mich.App. 358
• Parties: LINCOLN PARK DETENTION OFFICERS, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF LINCOLN PARK, a Michigan Municipal Corporation, and Ida Temple, personnel director, Defendants-Appellees. 76 Mich.App. 358, 256 N.W.2d 593, 96 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2619
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 593

256 N.W.2d 593

LINCOLN PARK DETENTION OFFICERS, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF LINCOLN PARK, a Michigan Municipal Corporation, and Ida Temple, personnel director Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 28691.

76 Mich.App. 358, 256 N.W.2d 593, 96 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2619

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

June 20, 1977.

Rehearing Denied July 28, 1977.

Released for Publication Aug. 18, 1977.

[76 MICHAPP 359] Richard C. McKnight, Harper Woods, for plaintiff-appellant.

John A. Aloisi, Lincoln Park, for defendants-appellees.

Before BEASLEY, P. J., and GILLIS and KAUFMAN, JJ.

GILLIS, Judge.

Plaintiff is a voluntary association [76 MICHAPP 360] of two detention officers employed in the Lincoln Park Police Department.

The controversy herein arose prior to July 1, 1975 when attempts were initiated to bargain a labor contract on behalf of the detention officers with the City of Lincoln Park.

Preliminary administrative steps, including mediation at the direction of the Michigan Employment Relations Commission (MERC), produced no contract agreement. On November 17, 1975 and December 22, 1975 plaintiff made demands on defendants to submit to compulsory arbitration pursuant to the compulsory arbitration act (hereinafter referred to as act 312), M.C.L.A. § 423.231 et seq.; M.S.A. § 17.455(31) et seq. Defendants refused, claiming that detention officers do not come within the purview of act 312. On January 16, 1976, plaintiff filed suit in Wayne County Circuit Court to compel defendants to enter into compulsory arbitration. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment under GCR 1963, 117.2(1). The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment and entered an order accordingly. Plaintiff appeals from that order as of right.

We must first determine who is covered under act 312 and then decide whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment.

The pertinent sections of act 312 at the time that this suit was filed read:

"Sec. 1. It is the public policy of this state that in public police and fire departments, where the right of employees to strike is by law prohibited, it is requisite to the high morale of such employees and the efficient operation of such departments to afford an alternate, expeditious, effective and binding procedure for the resolution of disputes, and to that end the provisions of [76 MICHAPP 361] this act, providing for compulsory arbitration, shall be liberally construed." M.C.L.A. § 423.231; M.S.A. § 17.455(31).

"Sec. 2. Public police and fire departments means any department of a city county, village or township having employees engaged as policemen or in fire fighting or subject to the hazards thereof." ¹ M.C.L.A. § 423.232; M.S.A. § 17.455(32).

"Sec. 3. Whenever in the course of mediation of a public police or fire department employee's dispute, the dispute has not been resolved to the agreement of both parties within 30 days of the submission of the dispute to mediation and fact-finding, or within such further additional periods to which the parties may agree, the employees or employer may initiate binding arbitration proceedings by prompt request therefor, in writing, to the other, with copy to the labor mediation board." M.C.L.A. § 423.233; M.S.A. § 17.455(33).

Plaintiff contends that section 2 merely defines police and fire departments, that the act applies unqualifiedly to all employees of such departments, that the detention officers in Lincoln Park are police department employees, and that plaintiff, having [76 MICHAPP 362] complied with the administrative procedures of section 3, is entitled to compulsory arbitration. Defendants argue that section 2 defines the employees who are entitled to compulsory arbitration to be police officers and fire fighters and those subject to the hazards thereof, and that detention officers do not come within that definition and therefore do not qualify for act 312 compulsory arbitration.

This is a case of first impression. Thus far, the reported cases which have dealt with compulsory arbitration under act 312 have all involved either police officers or fire fighters. The only case which held act 312 to be inapplicable is Ypsilanti Police Officers Association v. Eastern Michigan University, 62 Mich.App. 87, 233 N.W.2d 497 (1975). The issue in the Ypsilanti case involved the employer rather than the employee. The Court held that police officers who were employed by Eastern Michigan University and not by a municipal police department are not protected by act 312.

In attempting to construe the statute in question we are guided by the following rules of statutory construction:

"Although we may not usurp the law-making function of the legislature, the proper construction of a statute is a judicial function, and we are required to discover the legislative intent.

"Where, however, the language is of doubtful meaning, a reasonable construction must be given, looking to the purpose subserved thereby. Its occasion and necessity are matters of judicial concern, and its purpose should be effected if possible. Its spirit and purpose should prevail over its strict letter. Injustice in its application should be prevented, and absurd consequences avoided.

" * * * Resort may be had to other statutes relating to the same subject. Statutes in pari materia should be construed together, and the purpose of the legislature [76 MICHAPP 363] ascertained." Webster v. Rotary Electric Steel Co., 321 Mich. 526, 531, 33 N.W.2d 69, 70 (1948). (Citations omitted.)

Act 312 was enacted in 1969 as an experiment in response to a recommendation of the Governor's Advisory Committee on Public Employee Relations (February, 1967). Dearborn Fire Fighters Union Local No. 412, IAFF v. City of Dearborn, 394 Mich. 229, 279, 231 N.W.2d 226 (1975). Its original expiration date of June 30, 1972 was extended to June 30, 1975. 1972 P.A. 27. In 1975, the expiration date was repealed and the act became permanent. 1975 P.A. 3. The report issued by the Governor's Committee specifically mentions police and fire fighters. ² The statute as enacted is less clear.

A literal reading of the statute as it existed at the time of this suit favors plaintiff's interpretation. However, it must be remembered that "departure from the literal construction of a statute is justified when such construction would produce an absurd and unjust result and would be clearly inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the act in question." Salas v. Clements, 399 Mich. 103, 109, 247 N.W.2d 889, 891 (1976). Additionally, the language of the act is not entirely free from ambiguity. [76 MICHAPP 364] "Few words have a 'content so intrinsic' that their meaning does not become doubtful in the context of a particular question." People v. McFarlin, 389 Mich. 557, 563, 208 N.W.2d 504, 508 (1973). Defendants' interpretation can easily be derived from the language as the statute was written.

Our primary function is therefore to determine the legislative intent behind act 312. In Michigan, the Public Employees Relations Act (hereinafter referred to as PERA), M.C.L.A. § 423.201 et seq.; M.S.A. § 17.455(1) et seq., prohibits strikes by public employees. M.C.L.A. § 423.202; M.S.A. § 17.455(2). Although prohibited in the public sector, illegal strikes may result from impasses in negotiations. Act 312 is to be read in conjunction with the PERA. M.C.L.A. § 423.244; M.S.A. § 17.455(44). It provides an alternative to strikes for a limited group of public employees.

If plaintiff's interpretation of act 312 is utilized, any employee of a police or fire department, from janitor to secretary to police officer and fire fighter, is protected by the act. We do not perceive that the Legislature intended to give special protection to clerical workers of police and fire departments to the exclusion of other public employees. Compulsory arbitration statutes are generally limited to critical public employees. See McAvoy, Binding Arbitration of Contract Terms : A New Approach to the Resolution of Disputes in the Public Sector, 72 Colum.L.Rev. 1192, 1194-1196 (1972), comment, Collective Bargaining for Public Employees and the Prevention of Strikes in the Public Sector, 68 Mich.L.Rev. 260, 280-281 (1969). Work stoppages by certain public employees, e.g., police officers and fire fighters, can threaten the safety of the entire community, Dearborn Fire Fighters Union Local No. 412, IAFF v. City of [76 MICHAPP 365] Dearborn, supra, 394 Mich. at 247, 279, 293, 231 N.W.2d 226, and these statutes aim at preventing such work stoppages....