Lincoln v. Florida Parole Com'n, 94-467
| Decision Date | 11 October 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 94-467,94-467 |
| Citation | 643 So.2d 668 |
| Parties | 19 Fla. L. Weekly D2176 Booker T. LINCOLN, Appellant, v. FLORIDA PAROLE COMMISSION, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Booker T. Lincoln, pro se.
Kurt E. Ahrendt, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Florida Parole Com'n, Tallahassee, for appellee.
Booker T. Lincoln asks us to reverse the order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The petition alleges that his release from prison should have been unconditional because his sentence had expired, by virtue of incentive gain-time; but that he was instead placed on conditional release, which has now been revoked, for failure to report as required. To decide the appeal, we consider the relationship among three statutory provisions enacted or amended in 1988, codified as sections 775.084(4)(e), 944.291, and 947.1405, Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.), 1 and their application to prisoners sentenced as habitual offenders. We conclude that appellant's reincarceration was lawful and affirm the trial court's denial of the writ.
In 1988, the Legislature adopted the Conditional Release Program Act (Act), since codified as section 947.1405, Florida Statutes. Ch. 88-122, § 19, at 542-43, Laws of Fla. The Act provides that inmates sentenced, as appellant was, as habitual offenders 2 shall
if released prior to serving their full sentences, be supervised for the remainder of the terms of their sentences. Appellee Florida Parole Commission is responsible for administering the conditional release program. The Commission determines when an inmate will be conditionally released and sets the terms and conditions of release, after which the Department of Corrections supervises conditional releasees.
Westlund v. Florida Parole Comm'n, 637 So.2d 52, 53 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). "The commission shall also determine whether the terms and conditions of such release have been violated and whether such violation warrants revocation of conditional release." § 947.1405(2), Fla.Stat. (1988 Supp.). The Act was designed to prevent certain repeat offenders' early, unsupervised release from incarceration, by making them subject to supervision, in the event of early release, and to possible reincarceration.
At one time, any "prisoner who [wa]s released early because of gain-time [wa]s considered to have completed his sentence in full." State v. Green, 547 So.2d 925, 926 (Fla.1989). See Waldrup v. Dugger, 562 So.2d 687 (Fla.1990). But the same law that created the conditional release program amended the gain-time statute, as follows:
Ch. 88-122, § 10, at 538, Laws of Fla. (Deletions struck through; additions underlined.) Both sections 10 and 19 of chapter 88-122 evince a legislative intent that a prisoner sentenced as a habitual offender, if released by reason of gain-time allowances, be released conditionally under supervision, in accordance with the Act. 3 This legislative intent is manifest from section 947.1405(2)'s specific denomination of habitual offenders and from the provisions of section 944.291(2), restricting habitual offenders' release by reason of gain-time allowances to conditional release under supervision.
Only days following adoption of chapter 88-122, the Legislature amended section 775.084, which governs habitual offender sentencing, by adding subsection (4)(e), which provides:
A sentence imposed under this section shall not be subject to the provisions of s. 921.001. The provisions of chapter 947 shall not be applied to such person. A defendant sentenced under this section shall not be eligible for gain-time granted by the Department of Corrections, except that the department may grant up to 20 days of incentive gain-time each month as provided for in s. 944.275(4)(b).
Ch. 88-131, § 6, at 706-09, Laws of Fla. Legislatively overruling Whitehead v. State, 498 So.2d 863 (Fla.1986), the first sentence of subsection (4)(e) renders the guidelines inapplicable to habitual offender sentencing. The second sentence of subsection (4)(e), on which appellant relies, is an anachronism which, properly understood, has nothing to do with conditional release or gain-time. The third sentence plainly contemplates the release of habitual offenders who earn incentive gain-time before their full terms have run.
Appellant Lincoln contends that the second sentence of section 775.084(4)(e), Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.) precludes his eligibility for the conditional release program created by the Act; and that appellee lacked authority to revoke his conditional release and recommit him to custody to serve the remainder of his sentence. But Mr. Lincoln's argument contains the seeds of its own destruction: If he was ineligible for conditional release, he was ineligible for release.
Under section 944.291, Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.), a prisoner sentenced as a habitual offender can only be released by reason of gain-time allowances "under conditional release supervision as described in chapter 947." § 944.291(2), Fla.Stat. (1988 Supp.). If appellant were correct in his assertion that the Act, which is codified in chapter 947, did not apply to him, then he had no entitlement to release on any basis at any time prior to the expiration of the full term of his sentence, and has, therefore, no right to discharge by writ of habeas corpus before then.
Appellant's invocation of the rule that criminal statutes, specifically provisions of chapter 775, should be strictly "construed most favorably to the accused," section 775.021(1), Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.), rings hollow. Ineligibility for release is no favor to the accused. In any event, this rule of construction does not mean that the intention of the Legislature should not be given effect. Valdes v. State, 443 So.2d 221 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), review denied, 450 So.2d 489 (Fla.1984). Although strict construction of penal statutes is appropriate, no statute should be construed so as to defeat the intention of the Legislature. State ex rel. Washington v. Rivkind, 350 So.2d 575 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
We reject appellant's contention that the second sentence of subsection 775.084(4)(e) must be construed to preclude a habitual offender's placement on conditional release, when incentive gain-time makes his further incarceration unlawful. Such a construction would give no effect either to applicable provisions of section 947.1405(2) or to section 944.291(2), Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.). Statutes on the same subject and having the same general purpose should be construed in pari materia, and the courts have a duty to harmonize related statutes passed during the same legislative session, giving meaning and effect to each, if possible. Alterman Transport Lines, Inc. v. State, 405 So.2d 456 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
Despite the imprecise language in separately enacted subsection 775.084(4)(e), Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.), the Legislature intended the conditional release program for persons sentenced as habitual offenders. It said so: The Act specifically applies to habitual and violent habitual offenders. This specific language must govern over the second sentence of section 775.084(4)(e), Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.), which addresses the application of chapter 947 to habitual offenders only generally. When two statutes are apparently inconsistent or in conflict, the more specific statute controls over the more general statute addressing the same subject. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. American Healthcorp of Vero Beach, Inc., 471 So.2d 1312 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), opinion adopted, 488 So.2d 824 (Fla.1986).
We do not believe the Legislature intended to enact a comprehensive program for extended supervision of habitual and violent habitual offenders released by reason of gain-time allowances, only to declare the program unavailable for many of the very inmates for whom it was designed. When the bill that amended subsection (4)(e) was drafted, chapter 947 did not contain the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
King v. State, 93-1261
...and "basic gain-time" cannot foreshorten their prison terms. Sec. 775.084(4)(e), Fla.Stat. (1989); see Lincoln v. Florida Parole Commission, 643 So.2d 668 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Corley v. State, 586 So.2d 432 (Fla. 1st DCA A burglary with assault is a felony of the first degree punishable by ......
-
Brown v. McNeil
...505, 507 (Fla.1999) (explaining that Florida's Conditional Release program is a "probation-type program"); Lincoln v. Florida Parole Comm'n, 643 So.2d 668, 670 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (noting that pursuant to Florida statute section 947.1405, the Florida Parole Commission, charged with administ......
-
Suggs v. Fla. Parole Comm'n
...has broad authority to determine issues surrounding revocations of release. Rivera, supra. See also Lincoln v. Florida Parole Commission, 643 So.2d 668 (Fla. 2 DCA 1994). It is first noted that there is no constitutional right to conditional release before expiration of a valid sentence. Se......
-
Ellard v. Fla. Comm'n of Offender Review, 3:20cv5520/MCR/EMT
... JAMES ELLARD, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA COMMISSION ON OFFENDER REVIEW, Respondent. No ... advice as to the defendant's eligibility for parole under ... the sentence agreed to in the plea bargain ... 1998): ... Lincoln v, Fla. Parole Comm'n , 643 So.2d 668, ... 669 (Fla ... ...
-
Coming to terms with strict and liberal construction.
...construed, the `strict construction' rule is not applied so as to defeat the legislative intent."); Lincoln v. Fla. Parole Comm'n, 643 So. 2d 668, 671 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) ("Although strict construction of penal statutes is appropriate, no statute should be construed so as to defeat t......