Lindsey v. Butler

• Decision Date: 29 August 2014
• Docket Number: No. 11 CV. 9102ER.,11 CV. 9102ER.
• Citation: 43 F.Supp.3d 317
• Parties: Anthony LINDSEY, Plaintiff, v. Detective Sean BUTLER, Detective Richard Werner, Raymond Kelly, Commissioner of the N.Y.P.D., and City of New York, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

43 F.Supp.3d 317

Anthony LINDSEY, Plaintiff

v.Detective Sean BUTLER, Detective Richard Werner, Raymond Kelly, Commissioner of the N.Y.P.D., and City of New York, Defendants.

No. 11 CV. 9102ER.

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Signed Aug. 29, 2014.

Anthony Lindsey, Comstock, NY, pro se.

Melanie Mary Speight, New York City Law Department, Max Oliver McCann, NYC Law Department, Office of the Corporation Counsel, New York, NY, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

RAMOS, District Judge.

Pro se plaintiff Anthony Lindsey (“Plaintiff” or “Lindsey”) brings this suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Lindsey alleges that on December 16, 2008, Detective Sean Butler, Detective Richard Werner,¹ Commissioner Raymond Kelly, and the City of New York (collectively, “Defendants”) violated his constitutional rights during post-arrest questioning at the New York Police Department's (“NYPD”) Manhattan Robbery Squad Building.² Plaintiff claims that his rights under the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments were violated because NYPD officers forcibly shaved his facial hair, which he is required to maintain in keeping with his Muslim faith. Pending before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint (“Am. Compl.”). Doc. 41. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. Background³

a. Factual Background

Plaintiff, a practicing Black Sunni Muslim, was arrested on December 16, 2008, by Detective Sean Butler (“Detective Butler”) and Detective Richard Werner (“Detective Werner”) of the NYPD. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8, 10. Plaintiff was transported to the NYPD's Sixth Precinct before being transferred to the Manhattan Robbery Squad Building. Id. ¶ 11.

At a certain point during several hours of questioning, Detectives Butler and Werner arranged for a police lineup. Id. ¶ 29. When the “fillers” arrived for the lineup, the detectives realized that they were all “clean shaven and none were similar to Plaintiff.” Id. Because the detectives “could not place [Plaintiff] in the line-up where Plaintiff was [the] only one with facial hair,” they asked Lindsey “if he would forfeit his religious rights and allow them to shave his face.” Id. Plaintiff objected, “NO!” Id. Lindsey also requested counsel. Id.

Later in the questioning, Lindsey asked Detective Butler if he could use the bathroom. Id. Three or four unidentified officers allegedly rear-cuffed Lindsey upon his exiting the bathroom and forcefully knocked him to the floor while Detective Werner “forcibly shaved Plaintiff['s] facial hair.” Id. Despite Plaintiff's objections and request to contact counsel, Detective Butler commanded that Lindsey be shaved. Id. ¶ 12. Specifically, according to Plaintiff, “Detective Sean Butler gave the Order to Detective Richard Werner to shave plaintiff['s] facial hair which was then done.” Pl. Opp. Mem. L. 1.

In addition to being forcibly shaven, Plaintiff suffered “various injuries” as a result of Defendants' conduct, including a mild concussion

from being slammed on the floor and lower back pain. Am. Compl. ¶ 21. Detective Butler denied Plaintiff's requests for medical attention, “stating that there is no medical here and you're not getting medical assistance or [a]ttention.” Id.

Plaintiff alleges that former NYPD Commissioner Ray Kelly (“Commissioner Kelly”) “excersized [sic ] deliberate indifference in his position as Commissioner, where he knew that his subordinates had been following his unwritten policies and practices to use excessive force upon Plaintiff a Muslim to forcefully shave a Muslim Beard without seeking a court order for permission to do this ... as required by law.” Id. ¶ 32.

Lindsey further alleges that all of the defendants are “Pro–White officials of the city, acting with racial [a]nimus while attacking Plaintiff who is [a] Black Sunni Muslim by forcefully shaving his facial hair with no right to do so.” Id. ¶ 27.

b. Procedural Background

Plaintiff requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis on December 12, 2011, and filed the original complaint that day. Doc. 2. The original complaint brought claims under the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.

Defendants moved to dismiss the original complaint on November 30, 2012 pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Doc. 24. Plaintiff did not file an opposition to the motion to dismiss, but did file a submission on January 18, 2013 entitled “Motion to Amend Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a),” which attached a proposed amended complaint. On January 23, 2013, Defendants opposed Plaintiff's motion to amend, arguing that the proposed amended complaint would be futile.

On June 24, 2013, the Court granted Plaintiff's motion to amend with respect to the First Amendment claim and the Fourteenth Amendment due process claim, but denied the motion with respect to the claims under the Equal Protection Clause and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments as well as the claims against the City of New York. See Lindsey v. Butler, No. 11 Civ. 9102(RWS), 2013 WL 3186488, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 2013).⁴

Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint on September 3, 2013, bringing claims under the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Doc. 37. Defendants moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint on November 15, 2013. Doc. 41.⁵ Plaintiff opposed Defendants' motion on December 20, 2013. Doc. 47.

II. Standard of Review

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the court must accept as true all of the factual allegations from the complaint, and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Nielsen v. Rabin, 746 F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir.2014). However, this requirement does not apply to legal conclusions, bare assertions, or conclusory statements. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). The complaint must adhere to Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a), which has been interpreted to require that it contain enough factual matter for the claim to be plausible on its face. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). Rule 8(a) “does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Id. at 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937. If the plaintiff has not “nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, [the] Complaint must be dismissed.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

In the case of a pro se plaintiff, a court is obligated to construe the complaint liberally, Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir.2011), and to interpret the claims as raising the strongest arguments that they suggest. Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir.2006). The obligation to be lenient while reading a pro se plaintiff's pleadings “applies with particular force when the plaintiff's civil rights are at issue.” Jackson v. N.Y.S. Dep't of Labor, 709 F.Supp.2d 218, 224 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (citing McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir.2004) ). “However, even pro se plaintiffs asserting civil rights claims cannot withstand a motion to dismiss unless their pleadings contain factual allegations sufficient to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ) (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, as the Second Circuit recently held, “[a] district court deciding a motion to dismiss may consider factual allegations made by a pro se party in his papers opposing the motion.” Walker, 717 F.3d at 122 n. 1 (emphasis added).

III. Discussion

a. Section 1983 Claims

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a defendant must have been acting under the “color of state law” when he deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional or federal statutory right. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988). Section 1983 does not create any rights, but merely provides “a procedure for redress for the deprivation of rights [already] established.” Sykes v. James, 13 F.3d 515, 519 (2d Cir.1993) (citation omitted). The Second Circuit has held that it is “well settled in this Circuit that personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under section 1983.” Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 484 (2d Cir.2006) (quoting Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir.1994) ) (internal quotation marks omitted).

b. First Amendment

Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated his First Amendment rights in two ways. First, he charges that Detectives Butler and Werner exercised deliberate indifference toward the free exercise of his religion by forcibly shaving his beard. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 18, 17. Lindsey further alleges that the NYPD acted on unwritten policies and practices to use excessive force to shave his beard. Id. ¶ 32.

The First Amendment provides in part that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ....” U.S. Const. amend. I. The Free Exercise Clause protects against “governmental compulsion either to do or refrain from doing an act forbidden or required by one's religion, or to affirm or disavow a belief forbidden or required by one's religion.” Mozert v. Hawkins Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1066 (6th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066, 108 S.Ct. 1029, 98 L.Ed.2d 993 (1988). The Clause therefore “recognizes the value of religious training, teaching and observance and, more particularly, the right of every person to freely choose his own course with reference thereto, free of any compulsion from the state.” Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 10 L.Ed.2d 844 (1963). To state...