Lockett v. State

• Decision Date: 18 April 2014
• Docket Number: Nos. D–2000–1330,D–2003–829.,s. D–2000–1330
• Citation: 329 P.3d 755
• Parties: Clayton LOCKETT and Charles Warner, Appellants, v. STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee.
• Court: United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

329 P.3d 755

Clayton LOCKETT and Charles Warner, Appellants,

v.STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee.

Nos. D–2000–1330, D–2003–829.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

April 18, 2014.

ORDER DENYING STAYS OF EXECUTION

¶ 1 The Oklahoma Supreme Court has again transferred to this Court a joint request for stay of execution filed in connection with a civil appeal involving Appellants currently pending before that Court. Lockett, et al. v. Evans, et al., Case No. 112,741 (April 11, 2014). The recent procedural history of this case is lengthy and requires repeating for clarity. This Court set execution dates in January 2014 for Lockett and Warner after both death row inmates had exhausted their state and federal appeals.¹ Both sought and were denied executive clemency from the Oklahoma Pardon and Parole Board. On February 26, 2014, Lockett and Warner filed a civil declaratory judgment action in the District Court of Oklahoma County against the Oklahoma Department of Corrections (ODOC). Lockett, et al. v. Evans, et al., Case No. CV–2014–330. That lawsuit challenged, among other things, the constitutionality of the confidentiality provision in 22 O.S.2011, § 1015(B).² The complaint was accompanied by a motion for injunctive relief seeking a stay of their respective executions. Because the complaint challenged § 1015(B) on both state and federal grounds, ODOC removed the case to federal court. Appellants amended their complaint, deleting all federal constitutional claims, and the federal district court declined jurisdiction and remanded the case back to state court. Appellants filed an amended complaint along with their motion for stay of execution. The Honorable Patricia G. Parrish of the District Court of Oklahoma County held a hearing on March 10, 2014, and denied Appellants' request for stay of execution, finding that “jurisdiction for such matters properly lies with the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals.” Judge Parrish did not otherwise rule on the declaratory judgment action.

¶ 2 On March 11, 2014, Appellants filed with the Oklahoma Supreme Court a petition in error and designation of record to initiate an appeal of Judge Parrish's ruling denying the requested stay of execution. See Lockett, et al. v. Evans, et al., Case No. 112,639. Appellants also filed with the Oklahoma Supreme Court an “Emergency Application for Stay of Execution Pending Outcome of Appeal.” The next day ODOC filed a response in opposition to Appellants' motion for stay of execution. On March 13, 2014, the Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled that Judge Parrish had jurisdiction to hear the merits of Appellants' declaratory judgment action. That Court declined, however, to grant a stay of execution, citing Maynard v. Layden, 1992 OK CR 31, 830 P.2d 581,³ and transferred to this Court Plaintiffs' Emergency Application for Stay of Execution Pending Outcome of Appeal. That same day, this Court directed briefs from the parties addressing the applicability of Malicoat v. State⁴ and 22 O.S.2011, § 1001.1 to the application for stay. In the supplemental briefing, the State announced its inability to procure the necessary execution drugs for the impending executions. Based on the State's revelation that it lacked execution drugs and could not obtain them, this Court on March 18, 2014 vacated Lockett's and Warner's execution dates and reset them.⁵ On March 26, 2014, Judge Parrish ruled from the bench that the portion of § 1015(B) making confidential the identity of execution participants and those who supply the execution drugs violated Appellants' state constitutional right to access to the courts.⁶ A written order memorializing Judge Parrish's ruling was entered on April 1, 2014. Appellants filed in this Court an application for stay of execution on April 7, 2014, but did not file an action challenging their convictions, death sentences or the constitutionality of the execution protocol. The State filed a response that same day, attesting that ODOC had the necessary drugs to lawfully carry out Appellants' scheduled executions and had advised Appellants of ODOC's newly adopted execution protocol. This Court denied Appellants' request for stay of execution on April 9, 2014, on the basis that we had no authority to enter a stay under 22 O.S.2011, § 1001.1(C) because there was no pending case in this Court. With their executions approaching and their request for stay of execution denied by this Court, Appellants filed on April 11, 2014, an application for stay of execution in the Oklahoma Supreme Court in connection with their appeal of Judge Parrish's adverse ruling of March 26, 2014.⁷ The State filed a response. The Oklahoma Supreme Court transferred the application for stay of execution to this Court on April 17, 2014 to decide whether a stay of execution should be issued pending the resolution of Appellants' civil appeal before the Supreme Court.⁸ The Supreme Court retained jurisdiction of Appellants' appeal of Judge Parrish's adverse ruling.

¶ 3 The Court of Criminal Appeals has exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases and may exercise such other and further jurisdiction as may be conferred by statute. Okla. Const. art. 7, § 4; 20 O.S.2011, § 40. Our authority to grant a stay of execution is limited by 22 O.S.2011, § 1001.1(C).⁹ The language of § 1001.1(C) is clear. This Court may grant a stay of execution only when: (1) there is an action pending in this Court; (2) the action challenges the death row inmate's conviction or death sentence; and (3) the death row inmate makes the requisite showings of likely success and irreparable harm. The Supreme Court's opinion transferring Appellants' application for stay of execution finds that this Court “ignored” subsections (D),¹⁰ (E),¹¹ and (F) ¹² of § 1001.1 in denying Appellants' April 7th application for stay of execution filed in this Court. We respectfully disagree based on rules of statutory construction. The primary task in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Johnson v. State, 2013 OK CR 12, ¶ 10, 308 P.3d 1053,1055; Starkey v. Oklahoma Dept. of Corrections, 2013 OK 43, ¶ 34, 305 P.3d 1004, 1017. To discern that intent, we look first to the language of the statute itself, giving the statutory terms their commonly accepted and understood meaning. Johnson, 2013 OK CR 12, ¶ 10, 308 P.3d at 1055; W.R. Allison Enterprises, Inc. v. CompSource Oklahoma, 2013 OK 24, ¶ 15, 301 P.3d 407, 411–412 ( citing State ex rel. Oklahoma State Dept. of Health v. Robertson, 2006 OK 99, ¶ 6, 152 P.3d 875, 877–78). In construing statutory provisions, specific provisions govern over general ones. See State v. Hall, 2008 OK CR 15, ¶ 29, 185 P.3d 397, 404 ( citing Lozoya v. State, 1996 OK CR 55, ¶¶ 17–18, 932 P.2d 22, 28–29); Jones v. State ex rel. Office of Juvenile Affairs, 2011 OK 105, ¶ 14, 268 P.3d 72, 76.

¶ 4 It is evident from the plain language of § 1001.1 that the Legislature prescribed this Court's authority to grant stays of execution in Subsection (C). Although Subsections (D), (E), and (F) refer to stays of execution issued by “any state or federal court,” these subsections do not specify the conditions under which “any state or federal court” may grant a stay, nor do they specifically vest authority to do so. These subsections identify this Court by name and task us with setting execution dates upon the dissolution or vacation of stays issued by other state or federal courts. Subsection (C) vests authority in this Court to grant stays of execution and prescribes the conditions under which we may do so. It is controlling. While the Oklahoma Supreme Court has authority to deem an issue civil and so within its jurisdiction, it does not have the power to supersede a statute and manufacture jurisdiction in this Court for Appellants' stay request by merely transferring it here. Therefore, Appellants' application for stays of execution is DENIED.

¶ 5 IT IS SO ORDERED.

¶ 6 WITNESS OUR HANDS AND THE SEAL OF THIS COURT this 18th day of April, 2014.

DAVID LEWIS, Presiding Judge, CLANCY SMITH, Vice Presiding Judge, GARY L. LUMPKIN, Judge, CHARLES A. JOHNSON, Judge, and ARLENE JOHNSON, Judge: concur.

SMITH, Vice Presiding Judge, Dissenting.

¶ 1 The majority has set forth an erudite and accurate analysis of this Court's jurisdictional restraints. However, I find that whether or not a stay is an appropriate exercise of this Court's authority under 22 O.S.2011, § 1001.1., I would grant a stay to avoid irreparable harm as the appellants face imminent execution. I would do so in consideration of the appellants' rights, to avoid the possibility of a miscarriage of justice, and in comity with the Supreme Court's request for time to resolve the issues pending before it.

¶ 2 I am authorized to state that Judge Charles Johnson joins me in this dissent.

LUMPKIN, J., Specially Concurring.

¶ 1 I join in the order entered by the Court but write separately to point out Appellants' repeated failure to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court prevents the Court from reaching any other result.

¶ 2 On March 13, 2014, the Oklahoma Supreme Court determined only the Court of Criminal Appeals has jurisdiction to enter a stay of execution in a death penalty case and transferred to this Court part of the matter pending in Oklahoma Supreme Court Case No. 112,639. That portion transferred addressed the issue of whether a stay should be issued prior to the District Court of Oklahoma County considering the pleadings that have been filed in the above cited civil matter. This Court ordered the Appellants and the State to provide this Court with supplemental briefs and directed the parties to this Court's controlling precedent in Malicoat v. State, 2006 OK CR 25, 137 P.3d 1234 and 22 O.S.2011, § 1001.1. Appellants refused the opportunity to lawfully file an application for post-conviction relief and proceeded with their “civil” claim. Within its supplemental brief, the State acknowledged that...